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v.
BOARD OF REGENTS OF FLORIDA

SUMMARY:

Federal/Civi

Timely
(Extension)

Petr argues that the CA improperly required her to

exhaust state administrative remedies in order to bring a §1983
action.
FACTS and DECISIONS BELOW:

Petr is employed as a secretary

at Florida International University, a state institution.
brought this §1983 action in SD Fla, alleging that the

She

~niversity

-

2 -

made it a practice to seek out members of minority groups to hire
and promote and that it segregated its personnel files according
to race and sex.

She alleged that she was denied several

promotions for which she was qualified, and concluded that the
University had violated the Equal Protection Clause by
discriminating against her on the basis of race and sex.

She

asked the DC to order that she be promoted to the next available
position for which she was qualified, or to award her $50,000 in
actual and punitive damages.
Resp, which is responsible for the operation of all state
universities in Florida, moved to dismiss on a number of grounds.

v

The DC (Gonzalez) granted the motion on the ground that petr had
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.
A panel of the CA (Godbold, Reavley and Anderson) reversed,
stating that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a
prerequisite in §1983 actions.

?

Dyson, 421

u.s.

The panel relied upon Ellis v.
\

426, 432-33 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415

'

452 (1974); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411

u.s.

564 (1973).

u.s.

The panel

-

a "person" within the meaning of §1983 and that the 11th
Amendment barred the suit, since they were not presented to the
DC.
The CA granted rehearing en bane, and concluded that
exhaustion should be required in certain instances.

Judge Roney

.
vGodbol d ,
wrote
for himself and Judges Coleman, y',Brown,~A1nsworth,

~Charles

Clark, Gee, Tjoflat, Hill, Fay, Garza, Henderson,
'

II"'

Reavley, Politz, Anderson, Randall, and Tate.

He began by noting
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that exhaustion of administrative remedies normally is required
before a federal court will decide a case on the merits.
v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).

Myers

The

advantages of exhaustion are particularly great when a federal
court is asked to review state action, since considerations of
federalism counsel restraint in such circumstances.

The majority

acknowledged that language in many of this Court's cases states
that exhaustion of admninistrative remedies is not required in
§1983 suits.

~CA

In tracing the origins of this rule, however, the

concluded that the Court had left room for the development of

an exhaustion requirement.
The majority recognized that Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961), held that state judicial remedies need not be exhausted
by a §1983 plaintiff.

Monroe was followed by McNeese v. Board of

Education, 373 U.S. 668 (1963), which held that plaintiffs
attempting to challenge racially discriminatory practices in a
school district were not required to exhaust state administrative
remedies.

The Court cited Monroe for the proposition that

"relief under the Civil Rights Act may not be defeated because
relief was not first sought under state law which provided a
remedy."

~he

373 U.S. at 671.

It went on to state, however, that

administrative remedy was inadequate.

Id. at 674-54.

The CA

stated that the traditional exhaustion requirement is
inapplicable when the administrative remedy is inadequate.
Therefore, McNeese does not necessarily support the proposition
that the traditional rule never should be applied in §1983 cases.
The CA found further support for its view in Barry v. Barchi, 443

- 4 -

u.s.

55 (1979), in which the Court stated that a §1983 plaintiff

did not have to exhaust state remedies.

The basis of the

plaintiff's challenge was that the administrative remedy provided
by the state was inadequate.

The Court relied upon this factor

to excuse his failure to exhaust, rather than a blanket noexhaustion rule.

The CA also relied upon Gibson v. Berryhill,

411 U.S. 564 (1973) which also stated that exhaustion is not
required when a §1983 plaintiff challenges the adequacy of the
administrative remedy itself.
TheCA admitted that language appears in many of the Court's
opinions stating a categorical rule that adminsitrative remedies
need not be eahausted.

It distinguished all of these cases,

however, either by stating that the language was dictum, because
judicial rather than administrative remedies were at issue, or by
stating that failure to exhaust would have been excused under the
traditional exhaustion doctrine because the administrative
remedies were inadequate.

TheCA also cited Justice Rehnquist's

dissent from denial of certiorari in City of Columbus v. Leonard,
443 U.S. 905 (1979)

(Burger, C.J. and Blackmun, J. concurring),

which expressed the view that the exhaustion doctrine in §1983
cases deserved re-examinaton.

TheCA concluded that this Court's

cases left open the question whether exhaustion of administrative
remedies could be required in §1983 actions
The Court then considered the purposes of §1983, relying
upon Monroe v. Pape, which stated that the statute was passed to
override certain inconsistent state laws, to provide a

f~deral

remedy where state law was inadequate, and to provide a federal

- 5 T

remedy where the state remedy was available in theory but not in
practice.

365 U.S. at 173-74.

Requiring exhaustion is

consistent with the second and third purposes, since it would
require federal intervention only when state remedies were
inadequate.

Furthermore, state administrative proceedings "carry

no res judicata or collateral estoppel baggage into federal
court."

Therefore, requiring exhaustion would not preclude

federal protection of federally created rights.

In addition, the

CA identified five policy considerations favoring an exhaustion
requirement: 1.) better allocation of judicial

resources~

2.)

assurance that the action complained of is final, rather than the
result of a subordinate official's

decision~

3.) incentives for

states to create adequate administrative remedies for the
vindication of constitutional

rights~

4.) reliance by litigants

upon the adminstrative process, which is generally simpler,
speedier and less

expensive~

5.) considerations of comity and

federalism.
The CA then

standards which an

adminstrative remedy must meet before ex aust1on should be
required.
review or
with the
period of

The remedy must include: 1.) an orderly system of
appeal~
claim~

time~

2.) relief that is more or less commensurate

3.) relief that is available within a reasonable
4.) procedures that are fair and

unburdensome~

5.) the possibility of interim relief in appropriate cases.

If

these standards are met, a court must consider the particular
administrative scheme, and balance the nature of the interest the
plaintiff seeks to protect against the values served by the

- 6 1

exhaustion doctrine to determine if the plaintiff should be
required to exhaust.

Because the record contained no information

about the operation of the grievance procedure available to petr,
the CA remanded the case for the DC to consider the adequacy of
the remedy.
Judge Rubin filed a dissent, joined by Judges Vance, Frank
Johnson, Hatchett and Sam Johnson.

He cited 11 cases in which

the Court has stated that exhaustion of administrative remedies
in not required in §1983 cases.

~ ilwordin

In particular, he relied upon

v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971)

(~

curiam).

There,

the Court summarily reversed a CA decision requiring exhaustion

~of

available administrative remedies.

Judge Rubin also noted

that §1983 was enacted because Congress had little faith in the
remedies available under state law.

Therefore, it is incongruous (.LA;(~

to argue that it intended that state administrative remedies be
exhausted.
Judge Kravitch filed a short dissent, arguing that the
question of exhaustion was foreclosed by this Court's previous
opinions.

She concluded that the CA was not free to adopt an

exhaustion requirement on its own.
Judge Hatchett filed a lengthy dissent, joined by Judges
Rubin, Vance, Frank Johnson and Thomas Clark.

He argued that the

Court's language regarding exhaustion has been unequivocal.
Monroe, the Court's

holdin~

In

on exhaustion of judicial remedies

was based on a purpose of §1983 not discussed by the CA majority
_,-

I

-

-- to provide a remedy that is "supplementary to the state
remedy".

365

u.s.

at 183.

The majority did not discusss this

~

- 7 separate purpose of §1983.

Although the majority cited from

Justice Rehnquist's dissent in City of Columbus, which suggested
that Monroe's holding on this point should be re-examined, those
arguments were simply statements in a dissenting opinion.

The

cases extending Monroe's holding to administrative remedies are
consistent with this rationale.

u.s.

416

(1967)

(~

In Damico v. Califronia, 389

curiam), the Court explicitly stated that

administrative remedies need not be exhausted.

In so doing, it

rejected Justice Harlan's argument in dissent that McNeese did
not require this result because the remedy in McNeese was
inadequate.

Judge Hatchett concluded that Damico showed that the

majority's view of McNeese has been rejected by the Court.
Subsequent cases have relied upon Damico in holding that
exhaustion is not required.
392 U.S. 639

(1968)

(~

In particular, Houghton v. Shafer,

curiam), refused to require a state

prisoner filing a §1983 action to exhaust available
administrative remedies.

The Court stated that requiring

exhaustion might be futile, but stated: "In any event, resort to
these remedies is unnecessary in light of [Monroe, McNeese, and
Damico]."
n.4

u.s.

Id. at 640.

See also King v. Smith, 392

u.s.

309, 312

(1968): Wilwording v. Swenson, supra: Carter v. Stanton, 405
669 (1972).

Although the majority relied upon Gibson v.

Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), which suggested that a §1983
plaintiff might be required to exhaust state remedies if the
state begins an administrative proceeding against him before he
commences his action, two post-Gibson cases reiterate the noexhaustion rule: Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472-73

- 8 (1974)~

Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426 (1975).

Furthermore, the

Court in Barry v. Bianchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979), did not retreat
from the flat no-exhaustion rule.
Judghe Hatchett also argued that the overall purpose of
§1983 was to create federal protection for federally created
rights, so that citizens would not be forced to rely upon the
states for protection.

The majority's exhaustion requirement is

inconsistent with that purpose.

Since Congress did not include

an exhaustion requirement, the court should not supply one.
There are a number of policy arguments in favor of a noexhaustion rule, including the danger of discouraging litigants
from pursuing their rights by erecting numerous procedural
barriers, the necessity of time-consuming hearings to determine
the adequacy of a particular remedy, the unavailability of costs
and attorney fees in state administrative proceedings, the
unavailability of class actions, and the friction that may
develop when federal judges evaluate the adequacy of a state
remedy.
CONTENTIONS:

Petr, represented by the ACLU Foundation,

argues that theCA's decision conflicts with the decisions of
this Court cited in the dissenting opinions, and suggests that
summary reversal may be in order.

She also argues that the

recent passage of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons
Act, Pub. L. 96-247 (May 23, 1980), codified in pertinent part at
42 U.S.C. §1997e, indicates that Congress has approved of the
Court's refusal to require exhaustion of administrative
in §1983 suits.

~emedies

The Act allows a DC in which a prisoner's §1983

- 9 -

suit is pending to continue the case for 90 days while the
prisoner exhausts available state administrative remedies, if
those remedies are consistent with standards promulgated by the
Attorney General.

According to petr, the legislative history of

the Act reveals that Congress believed that legislation was
necessary to allow DCs to impose an exhaustion requirement in
§1983 suits.

This indicates that Congress was aware of this

Court's cases in this area and approved of the no-exhaustion
requirement in all types of cases except prisoner's lawsuits.
Petr notes that in Jenkins v. Brewer, No. 80-5116 (2/23/81), the
Court GVR'd for reconsideration in light of the Act after it had
granted cert to decide whether a prisoner should be required to
exhaust administrative remedies.

She suggests that the Court may

wish to take the same action here.

Although the CA's decision

was issued after the passage of the Act, there is no indication
that it was aware of the Act.
Finally, petr argues that resp bore the burden of showing
that the administrative remedy was adequate.

Since the CA found

the record to be silent on this point, petr should prevail.

In

any event, the remedy clearly is inadequate, since it provides
for review ultimately by the state's Director of Personnel and
its Human Rights Commission.
resp to grant her relief.

Neither has the authority to order

The Human Rights Commission may file a

lawsuit, but is not required to do so.

McNeese stated that a

similar procedure was inadequate.

---

Resp states that the case is not ripe for review, because
....

the DC has not yet decided whether petr will be required to

- 10 exhaust.

In addition, the DC has not addressed its 11th

Amendment argument, which is dispositive of this case.

It argues

~~--------------------~----

that there is no real conflict with the prior decisions of this
Court, for the reasons given by theCA's majority.

The 1980

statute is inapplicable, because petr is not a prisoner, and
Congress was concerned only with prisoners' suits.

Resp also

contends that an adequate remedy exists under Title VII, and that
there should be no separate cause of action under §1983 in such
circumstances.

Petr should not be allowed to circumvent the

administrative procedures of Title VII.
Petr replies that the exhaustion issue is ripe for review.
If exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required by
§1983, the CA's remand violates that statute.

She points out

that resp's discussion of the 1980 Act states that Congress
believed that legislation was necessary to allow DCs to require
exhaustion in prisoners' cases.

Finally, she states that the

11th Amendment argument was not decided by the CA.

Even if the

Amendment is applicable here, petr seeks injunctive relief.
Therefore, the suit still may be maintained.

Quern v. Jordan,

440 U.S. 332 (1979); Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union
446 U.S. 719 (1980).

Petr states that the Title VII argument was

not raised below.
DISCUSSION:

Both sides are attempting to press a number of

red herrings upon the Court.

The CA did not decide whether the

administrative remedy is adequate, and I believe that the Court
should decline petr's invitation to do so.

Similarly, the 11th

Amendment and Title VII arguments should be addressed by the DC

,.

- 11 and CA before this Court steps in.

Unlike resp, I believe that

.
.
. r1pe
·
f or d ec1s1on.
· ·
t h e v ex h aust1on
1ssue
1s

As pe t r po1n
· t s ou t ,

if exhaustion may never be required, the remand will be a waste
of time.
The dissenting opinions demonstrate (and the majority
admits) that the CA's holding conflicts with a number of this
Court's statements.

If the Court is not interested in re-

examining this issue, it would seem that summary reversal is
appropriate.

On the other hand, the careful and thorough

consideration of the question by the entire CA may indicate that
the Court should take a closer look.
discuss the 1980 legislation.
~

TheCA, however, does not

That legislation may indicate that

Congress has considered the Court's statements on exhaustion of
admninistrative remedies and intends that exhaustion should be
required only in the cases specified.
an end.

If so, the dispute is at

I think it would be a better use of the Court's time for

the CA to examine this legislation before this Court decides its
effect upon this case.

Therefore, I recommend that the case be

GVR'd for reconsideration in light of §7 of the Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247.
There is a response, along with a reply.

8/4/81

Dean

Opns in petn

~

08/25/81

TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

DICK FALLON

RE:

Patsy v. Board of Regents, No. 80-1874 CFX

I

In your hand-written notes on this cert memo, you asked for

e

R~~

0

~

my judgment on whether the exhaustion question could properly be
reached.

I believe that it could, but there are 11tremendous

\

obstacles not fully developed in the pool memorandum.

r~ted

below, I st"ll rec:m:end a denial.

For

I begin,

however, with the statutory question noted in the original

?

~'&~ ~t>~s
_n./> C

the ~~

~~~

memo~~~~

~ 1""')1 ~
be remanded for reconsideration in light of the~~~
u.s.c. ~e. That statute explicitly creates ~ ~

Like the memo writer, I in it iallyreconunended that the
decision of CAS
enactment of 42

an exhaustion requirement for certain actions brought, by the
government, on behalf of institutionalized persons.

..- 'f.ffi ~
It bears on ~

the case, if at all, as an indication of congressional intent
the exhaustion question.

:."_ therefore

consideration of that question.

~vides

no Jlar to the

r

on~, p~~

~~

The argument for a remand was

to ~~

That concern can

of ~~

course be overridden where there is a powerful reason to want

to ~,~

use the Court's resources most effectively.

take the case.
After looking at the papers, I find the 11th Amendme t
more troublesome.
_______..
injunctive relief.

Petitioner asks for

~

~pi!~~
is~;!; //

monetary and

The suit for monetary relief--which would

JA..

~

apparently come from the State's treasury--is almost certainly
barred by u nd e r Edelman v. Jordan , 41S U. S • 6 41 {19 7 4) •
appear to be hedging slightly, I am.

{If I

CAS did not reach the

-

issue, so there is no factual record of the University's
financial relationship with the State.)

/1 :2~

--------~- · ~ ·~-~......

Edelman does not bar

suits against named State officials for injunctive relief.

But

petitioner here seems not to have named any State officials.

She

Corporate, for and on behalf of, Florida International
University."
importance.

This could well be a pleading error of the first
In Alabama v. Pugh, 438

u.s.

781, 782 {1978), this

Court held that the 11th Amendment barred suit against "the
Alabama Board of Corrections."

See id. at 782 {"There can be no

doubt that suit against the State and its Board of Corrections is
barred by the 11th Amendment.")
It is possible, I suppose, to argue that no 11th Amendment
issue is before the Court, because none was decided by CAS.

It

could be left to the remand to decide the State law question
whether the defendant Board of Regents
11th Amendment purposes.
doubt.

~

an arm of the State for

But the question does not seem much in

1/~~

Also, the II quest1on is plainly jurisdictional, and I would

question the propriety either of ignoring it or of considering it
after the exhaustion question--another possibility for getting to
exhaustion, if the Court wants to do so badly enough.

It is
settled that this Court could reach the jurisdictional issue,

even though it was not considered below.
~~E~~,

u.s.

41S

,,

T

at 667.

t

See Edelman v. Jordan,

__

Finally,

aeother~rob~em

should probably be noted.

Respondent raises a significant question whether this case is not
subject to the exhaustion requirements of Title VII.
~----------~---------~~

1983 creates no substantive rights.

--

--

Section

~

The civil rights asserted by

plaintiff thus seem to be rights arising under the Civil Rights
Act.

If so, there is a question--not briefed or decided below--

whether she was not obliged to begin her action through the EEOC
process.

This is another

jurisdiction~!

question.

In sum, to answer your question: The exhaustion question
could be reached if the Court were insistent, but there are
obstacles.
denied.

~y

I would still recommend that the petition should be

If petitioner somehow surmounts these obstacles in the

lower courts, this Court will get another chance at a later date.

Court ................... .

Voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued . . ................ . , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ................ , 19 . . .

No. 80-1874

PATSY
vs.

BD. OF REGENTS OF FL.

Mr. Ju tice

ehnquist

HOLD
FOR

CERT.
G

Burger, Ch. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brennan,

D

N

POST

DIS

AFF

.V:. ....... ..... .

,/ '# '
J ........................

~~·~t~f~x*~ · · · · · · · · · · · ·

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMENT

..... ... .. ...... .

· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·· · · · ·

White, J . ..................... t/
.. . .. ... .. .. ... .. . .... .

/
Marshall, J ........................

'! ................ .

==~:::,.:. ::.::.:.::.:.:::::.::~ .:....... ::.:
Stevens, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....

,q~~.C?t:l~~r; ! ..~ ~ . . . . . . . . . . . .

t/ .... .... ........ .

v. ........ ........... .

MERITS
REV

AFF

MOTION
G

D

ABSENT

NOT VOTING

80-1874

PATSY v. BD. OF REGENTS

<

Argued 3/2/82

S~(?-e.t)
-f !1'1'7~ ~~~~-

~(~1- /J&~ 1&.-)
A45~k[,~~
I

I

u
-

A

i.vdt-

()

~J

~41
k 6-e.J~ ~c:f.~

.:J~~~~~c::/1~
~;J~-~~~~~

~I

..

Jf/~{z.y-;)~~~

. .(r~J

~~~
(

Wt_~

ICfft

~~JF~~

~~~~~
~_)

~ ~ JJ '!:~~
A.,

/

VL.-

''cbzJ'l~~ ~·

Jf JU_~~,__f~~

-t-~tL# t1.L.-

J I 11;- ~.

..,,.

.

,,,

l

~1-s:

',

Conf. 3/5/82

Patsy v. Bd. of Regents

No. 80-1874

The Chief Justice ~-l.-.,;

S~k • .,c... ~ ~S' ~~~~~~

~~~~ ~~~ , ~~c:.;,·~
~.

UJ~~c..- a~.._.... '~-#' C~.tlo-a-s'<:
~~~A..,,.,.~~

Justice Brennan

d.

t~&L..-4

~

~ ~ P......••.:cltrftJ ~~ ~~/ ..,1~/- ~ ~ ~ "-u..i...~ '
~7171'7~ .~
'K

""

)(..

/I!! et..,.,.~ .. -.-t ~ ~-~·"'-'. /JL ~ ~
~A-~~4 1-.L.~~s~

Justice White

~(

~~k/~!3.
$~~~~~ " V ~~s~. 9/Lt---~. / 1/~d,-.
•• ~~~..,., ~~,~~~
--

~~ / / J::f .::h.-~~~<- 4.. ~ ~ ~ ( ~j

Justice Marshall ~ ,

~~W~/3

Justice Blackmun ~

9f-

~~ ~4~~~..._ ~A?+~:.~~~

~·

~~~~~

!!&.- .... ,(. - ~ ,...,.._,. ...-4 · Cf. .:24. v ?'.u.t ..(
1'3...-L ~ ~ ~ J?.~ •••~.... -t- 4 s l:a..-t:t--

I I

-

1,..4...

-

~tl·

A-

~ ~.

Sh' . . ~•••4e-c ...-4 A..,...,_ ~w.-.e---1-~
Justice Powell

V~ ~ I J ~ ~ ~ •

~ ~---~~ 9~ ~Ac....

s~~~~
..'(

.

"

J&:;ra. { /..k h: 9

Justice Rehnquist

I I J;t ~ ~ ~-1- .Ltfl!.~,
~ ,eL.4-.,.:r ~ ~ ~~~
~ ~...-v J.t::_ ~ ~ ~.
/A.)..c!:.- ~~ ~ ;P ~/L, ~ ~
/J-k~ ~ I:J~ Y7J ek.-c:,;,e~ ~~ i.-:1-~

·i4c.

~1-~.t£...,

s h.i'z .

2-,.< 1111 c. ~I-~ 5' I~ 1'7 ~· ~ ~ ,.,. ~.. .,1 ~

~...~~., ;e-~~ ..

~~ ...,.,...~if- ~ ~ Lc, J..A....::~-~Ic..t..4.~
~ ~r ~u---44~~

_

~

t-.1-

~ ~ ~-J',

~.

Justice Stevens

~ ~····~ L FJO ~ ~ u.

g, ~ 4,~.-.4 6 .. •v•~~~
~~~~~~de·...
1
'~k,{ ~ ~,l.o· ~~ ... ,
Hw.:u

~~~~~~~

..

'

..

~up:rttttt "Jcnrl cf flrt ~b ~talt$'
~rur~ ~. C!f. 2!1,?:'1-~
CHAM BER S OF

JUSTICE

w ...

J . BRENNAN, JR.

RE:

March 8, 1982
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Dear Chief:
Thurgood has agreed to take on the opinion for
the Court in the above.
Sincerely,

'l .

' 2y}

I

'

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

·~

~rtpTrtttt

Q}iffifl' 1ft Oft

~m.ttZt

'Jlttt$Jringtcn. ;!B. Q):.

;!'t1f.U

2llgtJl.~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.

March 9, 1982

,.

80-1874

Pat~y

v. Board of Regents

Dear Chief:
I will be glad to write a dissent in this case.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfpjss

March 9, 1982

80-1874 Patsy v. Board of Regents

Dear Chief:
I will be glad to write a dissent in this case.

Sincl!rely,

The Chief Justice

lfp/ss

Ofourl tltt
Of.

~u.p:rtntt
of ~b ~taftg
JJufri:nght~ ~.
2ll~,.~
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

March 8, 1982

Re:

No. 80-1874 - Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida

Dear Lewis:
You and I seem to be alone in this case.
you take on a dissent?
Regards,

Justice Powell

.'

Will

lfp/ss 03/15/82
Patsy Case

/

Talk to David about obtaining information through
the Library that will enable a comparison of 1983 cases
filed with DC's in fiscal 1981 compared to those filed the
year that Monroe v. Pape was decided and filed the year
Wilwording was decided.
Also was it not Justice Holmes who said that the
"Life of the law is experience"?

April 13, 1982
LEVI GINA-POW

To:

David Levi

From:

LFP, JR.

Subject:

80-1874

Patsy v. Board of Regents

No doubt the Court opinion in this case will rely, as
petitioner argued, on the enactment by Congress of 42

u.s.c.

§1997 that provides for exhaustion of remedies by state
prisoners but only where the state adopt$intrusive "minimum
standards" for administrative review.

•

The Attorney General

has adopted regulations, as required by the statute.

I

don't have these at hand, but I believe either the statute
or the regulations permit a prisoner to sue under Section
1983 if the administrative process extends beyond some
specified time

(~·~·

90 days).

Section 1997 f requires the Attorney General to report
to Congress.

I suggest that you request the library to

obtain a copy of any reports made by the AG to the Congress.
Also, ask the library to inquire - perhaps through the
administrative office or Justice Department or both whether any statistics are available as to the number of
states that have adopted the standards required by the
Attorney General, and whether there has been any lessening
of the filing of 1983 state prisoner petitions.
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It may be too early for any dependable statistics
(perhaps none at all), but we might check.

LFP,Jr.
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LEVI GINA-POW

To:

David Levi

From:

LFP, JR.
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No doubt the Court opinion in this case will rely, as
petitioner argued, on the enactment by Congress of 42

u.s.c.

§1997 that provides for exhaustion of remedies by state
prisoners but only where the state adopt intrusive "minimum
standards" for administrative review.

The Attorney General

has adopted regulations, as required by the statute.

I

don't have these at hand, but I believe either the statute
or the regulations permit a prisoner to sue unrler Section
1983 if the administrative process extends beyond some
specified time

<~·~·

90 days).

Section 1997 f requires the Attorney General to report
to Congress.

I suggest that you request the library to

obtain a copy of any reports made by the AG to the Congress.
Also, ask the library to inquire - perhaps through the
administrative office or Justice Department or both whether any statistics are available as to the number of
states that have adopted the standards required by the
Attorney General, and whether there has been any lessening
of the filing of 1983 state prisoner petitions.
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 14, 1982
Re:

No. 80-1874

Patsy v. Board of Regents

Dear Thurgood:
Although I voted for the result which your opinion
reaches at Conference, I have some difficulty with your
treatment of the Eleventh Amendment issues in the opinion,
and will await any separate writing that may be forthcoming.
As a last resort, I may write separately myself.
. ,. ·;

Sincerely,

tJlf'L/'L/
Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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May 1.4, 1982

80-1874 Patsy v. Board of Regents

Dear Thurgood:
In due time, I will circulate a dissent.
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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.JUSTICE
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BRENNAN, .JR.

RE:

May 17, 1982

\

No. 80-1874 Patsy v. Board of Regents of the
State of Florida, et al.

Dear Thurgood:
I join your opinion.

Would you, however, please

add the attached statement at the foot of your opinion.
Sincerely,
;1

/(} 'p

/0-~

r

Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference

No. 80-1874 Georgia Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State
of Florida, etc.

I join the Court opinion.

I continue to adhere, however,

to my view that the Eleventh Amendment is not a defense for the
reasons stated in my dissent in Employees v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 309-324 (1973).
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 687 (1974).

See also
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CHAMBERS OF'

-.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

May 17, 1982

Re:

80-1874 - Patsy v. Florida

Dear Thurgood,
Although

I

voted

shall await the dissent.

to

reverse,
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In any event, I may

well write indicating that the no exhaustion
of

administrative

necessarily

mean

administrative
enjoin

and

remedies
that

a

rule

defendant

enforcement

sidetrack

does
in

proceeding

that

proceeding

not
an
may
by

resorting to a §1983 action in federal court.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
cpm
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

May 19, 1982

No. 80-1874

Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State of Florida

Dear Thurgood,
I will await the additional writing in this case before
finally deciding whether to join the Court's opinion.
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall

Copies to the Conference

/

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Marshall
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
No. 80-1874

GEORGIA PATSY, PETITIONER v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, ETC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[May - , 1982]

delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether exhaustion of
state administrative remedies is a prerequisite to an action
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Petitioner Georgia Patsy filed this
action, alleging that her employer, Florida International U niversity (FlU), had denied her employment opportunities
solely on the basis of her race and sex. By a divided vote,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
found that petitioner was required to exhaust "adequate and
appropriate" administrative remedies, and remanded the
case to the District Court to consider the adequacy of the administrative procedures. Patsy v. Florida International
University, 634 F. 2d 900 (CA5 1981) (en bane). We reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
JusTICE MARSHALL

I

Petitioner alleges that even though she is well-qualified
and has received uniformly excellent performance evaluations from her supervisors, she has been rejected for more
than thirteen positions at FlU. 1 She further claims that
'Because this case is here on a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the
factual allegations in petitioner's amended complaint. In her initial complaint, petitioner named FlU as the defendant. Relying on Byron v. Uni-
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FlU has unlawfully filled positions through intentional
discrimination on the basis of race and sex. She seeks declaratory and injunctive relief or, in the alternative,
damages. 2
The United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida granted respondent Board of Regents' motion to
dismiss because petitioner had not exhausted available administrative remedies. On appeal, a panel of the Court of
Appeals reversed, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Patsy v. Florida International University, 612
F. 2d 946 (CA5 1980). The full court then granted respondent's petition for rehearing and vacated the panel decision.
The Court of Appeals reviewed numerous opinions of this
Court holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies
was not required, and concluded that these cases did not preclude the application of a "flexible" exhaustion rule. 634
F. 2d, at 908. After canvassing the policy arguments in favor of an exhaustion requirement, the Court of Appeals decided that a § 1983 plaintiff could be required to exhaust administrative remedies if the following minimum conditions
are met: (1) an orderly system of review or appeal is provided
by statute or agency rule; (2) the agency can grant relief
more or less commensurate with the claim; (3) relief is availversity of Florida, 403 F . Supp. 49 (ND Fla. 1975), the District Court
granted FlU's motion to dismiss, holding that the Board of Regents and
not the individual university had the capacity to sue and be sued under
Florida law. The District Court granted petitioner leave to amend her
complaint.
2
Petitioner requested the District Court to "[rlequire Defendants to
remedy the discrimination practiced upon Plaintiff by promoting her to the
next available position consistent with those previously applied for and for
which she is qualified or in the alternative, to require the Defendants to
pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $500,000 as actual and exemplary damages."
Record 47. Petitioner also requested that the District Court "order further equitable and injunctive relief as it deems appropriate and necessary
to correct the conditions of discrimination complained of herein." Record
48.

80--1874-0PINION
PATSY v. FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS

3

able within a reasonable period of time; (4) the procedures
are fair, are not unduly burdensome, and are not used to harass or discourage those with legitimate claims; and (5) interim relief is available, in appropriate cases, to prevent irreparable injury and to preserve the plaintiff's rights during
the administrative process. Where these minimum standards are met, a court must further consider the particular administrative scheme, the nature of the plaintiff's interest, and
the values served by the exhaustion doctrine in order to determine whether exhaustion should be required. I d., at
912-913. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the
District Court to determine whether exhaustion would be appropriate in this case.
II
At the outset, we address the contention that the Eleventh
Amendment bars even the injunctive and declaratory feiief
sought Tn this complaint. 3 Respondent Board of Regents
3
The Eleventh Amendment defense was not raised in the District
Court; it was briefed to the panel on appeal, but was not included in the
brief on rehearing en bane. In this Court, the defense was not briefed,
but respondent asserted it in its response in opposition to the petition for
certiorari. At oral argument, the state attorney general stated that this
Court should affirm the Court of Appeals solely on the exhaustion holding.
However, he also stated that the Eleventh Amendment was still an issue in
this case, and he admitted that even if we affirmed the Court of Appeals,
the case would be remanded for consideration of the adequacy of the administrative procedures, thus subjecting respondent to further proceedings in the District Court.
We have held that "the Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar" that it may be raised at any point
in the proceedings, and that waiver of this defense will not be lightly inferred from the State's litigation strategy. Edelman v. Jordan , 415 U. S.
651, 678 (1974). See Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459
(1945). We have never addressed the question whether the Eleventh
Amendment defense can be raised, neglected, and then reargued at the
whim of the person raising this defense. Certainly, permitting this practice would greatly increase the uncertainty and potential for wasted litiga-
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suggests that, as a state corporation, it should be viewed as
the State itself for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. It
relies on Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978), where this
Court held that the Eleventh Amendment bars a suit brought
directly against the State and its Board of Corrections, even
when only declaratory and injunctive relief is requested. 4
However, it is well-settled that the Eleventh Amendment
does not bar actions against state officials or state corporations when the plaintiff is not seeking monetary relief that
must be paid from public fundSTnth~ry. Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911);
Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908). 5
In Hopkins, supra, this Court squarely decided that a

-

tion already inherent in the rule that the defense can be raised at any time.
In any event, our Eleventh Amendment precedents are clear, and a remand is not required to determine unanswered questions of fact or state
law, at least with respect to the injunctive and declaratory relief requested. Thus, we need not address the procedural question posed by respondent's perplexing litigation strategy.
'The issue decided in Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978)-whether
a state agent is the State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment and
thus cannot be brought into court for any reason absent a waiver of sovereign immunity-is distinct from the question addressed in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 662-669 (1974)-whether the Eleventh Amendment
forbids a suit against a state agent because the suit seeks to impose a damage award that must be paid out of funds in the state treasury. See also
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979). Here, we decide the first question, and hold that respondent is not the State in the sense intended in Alabama v. Pugh.
5
Consistent with this theory, we have heard numerous suits requesting
injunctive or declaratory relief against state universities or boards of regents or trustees, without discussing a possible Eleventh Amendment bar.
See e. g., Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S. 478 (1978) (§ 1983 action); University of California Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265,
287 (1978) (POWELL, J., announcing the judgment of the Court) ("decisions
based on race or ethnic origin by faculties and administrations of state universities are reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment") (citing
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637 (1950), Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950), Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631
(1948), and Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938));

j

r
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state corporate body such as respondent was not entitled to
the full immunity accorded the State by the Eleventh
Amendment. 6 There, the petitioner sued the state college,
claiming that the college and its board of trustees had committed both a tort and an unconstitutional taking of his property. The respondent college argued that the Eleventh
Amendment barred the suit. Framing the issue as "whether
a public corporation can avail itself of the State's immunity
from suit," 221 U. S., at 642, the Court rejected this defense
with respect to the college and its board of trustees, established by the State as a "body corporate." 7
The Court recognized that "[w]ith the exception named in
the Constitution, every State has absolute immunity from
suit," and cannot be sued in any court without its consent.
Ibid. The Court also noted that even when the State is not
named as the party defendent, the Eleventh Amendment applies when the suit is, in reality, one against the State. The
Court then reasoned:
"But immunity from suit is a high attribute of sovereignty-a perogative of the State itself-which cannot
be availed of by public agents when sued for their own
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972) (§ 1983 action).
6
The Courts of Appeals have been virtually unanimous in allowing suits
for declaratory or injunctive relief against state universities or their
boards. See, e. g., Gay Student Services v. Texas A & M University, 612
F. 2d 160 (CA5 1980); New England Patriots Football Club, Inc. v. University of Colorado, 592 F. 2d 1196 (CAl 1979). Cf. Skehan v. Board of
Trustees, 590 F. 2d 470 (CA3 1978). However, they have divided on
whether monetary relief can be awarded against these entities, depending
on whether they have funds independent of the state treasury or on
whether the State has waived its immunity. Compare SON! v. Board of
Trustees, 513 F. 2d 347 (CA61975) and Goss v. Jacinto Junior College, 588
F . 2d 96 (CA5 1979), with Jagnandan v. Giles, 538 F. 2d 1166 (CA5 1976).
7
The state charter establishing the college and its board of trustees is in
relevant part remarkably similar to that of the Board of Regents in this
case, see note 9, infra. See Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College,
221 u. s. 637, 638-639 (1911).
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torts. The Eleventh Amendment was not intended to
afford them freedom from liability in any case where,
under color of their office, they have injured one of the
State's citizens. To grant them such immunity would be
to create a privileged class free from liability for wrongs
inflicted or injuries threatened. . . . The whole frame
and scheme of the political institutions of this country,
state and Federal, protest against extending to any
agent the sovereign's exemption from legal process."
I d., at 642-642.
Mter discussing cases in which the Court had uniformly
denied Eleventh Amendment immunity to public officials, 8
the Court considered whether public corporations should receive similar treatment:
It is said, however, that, in the cases referred to, the officers were held liable to suit because in the transaction
complained of, the statute being unconstitutional, they
could not be treated as agents of the State. And it is
argued that these authorities have no application to suits
against those public corporations which exist, and can
act, in no other capacity than as governmental agencies,
or political subdivisions of the State itself. But neither
public corporations nor political subdivisions are clothed
with that immunity from suit which belongs to the State
alone by virtue of its sovereignty. In County of Lincoln
v. Luning, 133 U. S. 529, 530, the Court ... held that
the Eleventh Amendment was limited to those cases in
which the State is the real party, or party on the record,
but that counties were corporations which might be
sued ....
Corporate agents or individual officers of the State
The cases cited and discussed by the Court included Ex Parte Young,
209 U. S. 123 (1908), Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204 (1897); and United
States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196 (1882).
8
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stand in no better position than officers of the General
Government .... " I d., at 644-645 (citations omitted).
The Court went on to recognize that agents of the State,
whether corporate or individual, might have defenses not
available to private corporations or individuals, but these defenses serve to prevent ultimate liability or recovery, and are
not barriers to initiating the litigation. The Hopkins Court
thus approached the application of the Eleventh Amendment
to a state university and board of trustees, established as a
"body corporate" of the State, in the same manner it had approached this defense in cases involving other state officials
or corporations: the Eleventh Amendment was not a bar to
the suit as long as the suit did not seek damages that must be
paid out of public funds in the state treasury and did not seek
to restrain the state agent from obeying a constitutional command of the State. I d., at 644.
This approach is consistent with that taken in our more recent cases. For example, in Monell v. New York City Dept.
ofSocial Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), this Court addressed
whether muncipal corporations were "persons" within the
meaning of § 1983. In holding that they were, the Court
found it significant that the Congress which enacted the
predecessor to § 1983 recognized that "there was no distinction of constitutional magnitude between officers and
agents-including corporate agents-of the State." Id., at
682. See also Mount Healthy City School District Board of
Education v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280-281 (1977) (local
school board, like a municipal corporation, not entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity). Cf. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S.
391, 400-401 (1979) (agency created by a compact between
two States with congressional approval not necessarily entitled to the same immunity as the States themselves).
Here, as in Hopkins, respondent Board of Regents is a
"body corporate with all the powers of a body corporate."
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Fla. Stat. § 240.205. 9 Furthermore, under Fla. Stat.
§ 20.15, respondent Board of Regents is designated as "the
director of the Division of Universities," one of five divisions
of the Department of Education, while the directors of the
other divisions are appointed by the Commissioner of Education. As a result, the Board of Regents stands in the same
position as a state official, not only because it is a corporate
agent by virtue of its status as a "body corporate," but also
because the corporate body itself is designated as the director
of a subdivision of the Department of Education, a position
generally held by an individual official.
Finding that respondent is entitled to no more immunity
than a state official means only that it may be sued for unconstitutional or unauthorized actions, as long as the plaintiff is
not seeking monetary relief that must be paid out of the state
treasury. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974).
As we noted earlier, petitioner' sought injunctive and declaratory relief, and only requested damages in the alternative.
See note 2, supra. Clearly, the Eleventh Amendment does
not bar this suit with respect to the injunctive and declaratory relief.
• Section 240.205 provides in full:
"The Board of Regents is hereby created as a body corporate with all the
powers of a body corporate for all the purposes created by, or that may
exist under, the provisions of this chapter or laws amendatory hereof and
shall:
(1) Have a corporate seal.
(2) Elect a corporate secretary.
(3) Have and employ a staff attorney and other authorized personnel.
(4) Have power to contract and be contracted with, to sue and be sued,
and to plead and be impleaded in all courts of law and equity.
(5) Receive donations.
(6) Make purchases of real and personal property and contract for the
sale and disposal of same, but the title to all real property, however acquired, shall be vested in the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund and shall be transferred and conveyed by it."
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It is inappropriate to consider at this time whether an
award of monetary relief would be permissible under
Edelman, since there are unresolved questions of fact and
state law with respect to this issue. It is unclear whether
the State has waived its sovereign immunity with respect to
actions against respondent. 10 If the State has not waived
such immunity, it is unclear whether a judgment against the
Board must be paid out of the State treasury. 11 These unsettled questions should be decided by the District Court on remand should it find that petitioner is entitled to recover, and
should it further consider awarding monetary relief. The
question whether the Eleventh Amendment bars a damage
award is one of ultimate relief not of jurisdiction, once it is
established that respondent may be sued at least with respect to the request for injunctive relief. See Hopkins v.
Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S., at 648.

III
The question whether exhaustion of administrative remedies should ever be required in a § 1983 action has prompted
vigorous debate and disagreement. See, e. g., Turner,
When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Cases
in the Federal Courts, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 610 (1979); Note, 8
Ind. L. Rev. 565 (1975); Note, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 537 (1974).
Our resolution of this issue, however, is made much easier
See, e. g., Fla. Stat. § 240.205(4) (respondent authorized "to sue and be
sued, and to plead and be impleaded in all courts of law and equity"); Fla.
Stat. § 240.213 (respondent may secure liability insurance, and immunity is
waived to the extent of the insurance); Fla. Stat. § 240.215 (respondent
may pay costs of civil actions against board members or employees and
may procure insurance to cover such losses or expenses). The application
of these provisions to actions in federal courts and to actions not involving
tort liability is unclear.
11
The Board has certain funds not derived from the State that are exempt from deposit with the state treasury. See Fla. Stat. §§ 240.277,
240.781.
10

:
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because we are not writing on a clean slate. This Court has
addressed this issue, as well as related issues, on several
prior occasions.
Respondent suggests that our prior precedents do not control our decision today, arguing that these cases can be distinguished on their facts or that this Court did not "fully" consider the question whether exhaustion should be required.
This contention need not detain us long. Beginning with
McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668, 671-673
(1963), we have on numerous occasions rejected the argument that a § 1983 action should be dismissed where the
plaintiff has not exhausted state administrative remedies.
See Barry v. Bachi, 443 U. S. 55, 63 n. 10 (1979); Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 574 (1973); Carter v. Stanton, 405
U. S. 669, 671 (1972); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249;
251 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U. S. 639, 640 (1968);
King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 312 n. 4 (1968); Damico v.
California, 389 U. S. 416 (1967). Cf. Fair Assessment in
Real Estate Association v. McNary,-- U.S.--,-(1981); id., at - - (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 473 (1974)
("[w]hen federal claims are premised on[§ 1983]-as they are
here-we have not required exhaustion of state judicial or
administrative remedies, recognizing the paramount role
Congress has assigned to the federal courts to protect constitutional rights"). Respondent may be correct in arguing
that several of these decisions could have been based on traditional exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine. N evertheless, this Court has stated categorically that exhaustion is not
a prerequiste to an action under § 1983, and we have not deviated from that position in the 19 years since McNeese.
Therefore, we do 2& &&& ££ QU€btlb:trpresented in this
case as one of first impression.
IV
Respondent argues that we should reconsider these decisions and adopt the Court of Appeals' exhaustion rule, which
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was based on McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185 (1969).
This Court has never announced a definitive formula for
determining whether prior decisions should be overruled or
reconsidered. However, in Monell v. New York City Dept.
of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 69&-701 (1978), we articulated four factors that should be considered. Two of these
factors-whether the decisions in question misconstrued the
meaning of the statute as revealed in its legislative history
and whether overruling these decisions would be inconsistent
with more recent expressions of congressional intent-are
particularly relevant to our decision today. 12 Both concern
legislative purpose, which is of paramount importance in the
exhaustion context because Congress is vested with the
power to prescribe the basic procedural scheme under which
claims may be heard in federal courts. Of course, courts
play an important role in determining the parameters of an
exhaustion requirement and may impose such a requirement
even where Congress has not expressly so provided. However, the initial question whether exhaustion is required
should be answered by reference to congressional intent; and
a court should not defer the exercise of jurisdiction under a
federal statute unless it is consistent with that intent. 13
12
·
The other factors discussed in M onell-whether the decisions in question constituted a departure from prior decisions and whether overruling
these decisions would frustrate legitimate reliance on their holdings--do
not support overruling these decisions. MeN eese was not a departure
from prior decisions-this Court had not previously addressed the application of the exhaustion rule to § 1983 actions. Overruling these decisions
might injure those § 1983 plaintiffs who had foregone or waived their state
administrative remedies in reliance on these decisions.
1
" Congressional intent is important in determining the application of the
exhaustion doctrine to cases in which federal administrative remedies are
available, as well as to those in which state remedies are available. Of
course, exhaustion is required where Congress provides that certain administrative remedies shall be exclusive. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938). Even where the statutory requirement of exhaustion is not explicit, courts are guided by congressional
intent in determining whether application of the doctrine would be consist-
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Therefore, in deciding whether we should reconsider our
prior decisions and require exhaustion of state administrative
remedies, we look to congressional intent as reflected in the
legislative history of the predecessor to § 1983 and in recent
congressional activity in this area.
A

In determining whether our prior decisions misconstrued
the meaning of § 1983, we begin with a review of the legislative history to § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13,
the precursor to § 1983. 14 Although we recognize that the
1871 Congress did not expressly contemplate the exhaustion
question, we believe that the tenor of the debates over § 1
supports our conclusion that exhaustion of administrative
remedies in § 1983 actions should not be judicially imposed.
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, along with the Fourteenth
Amendment it was enacted to enforce, were crucial ingredients in the basic alteration of our federal system accomplished during the Reconstruction era. During that time,
the Federal Government was clearly established as a guarantor of the basic federal rights of individuals against incursions
by state power. As we recognized in Mitchum v. Foster,
407 U. S. 225, 242 (1972) (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100
ent with the statutory scheme. In determining whether exhaustion of federal administrative remedies is required, courts generally focus on the role
Congress has assigned to the particular federal agency, and tailor the exhaustion rule to fit the particular administrative scheme created by Congress. See McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 193-195 (1969).
With state administrative remedies, the focus is not so much on the role
assigned to the state agency, but the role of the state agency becomes important once a court finds that deferring its exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with statutory intent.
" Some of the debates relating to § 2, which created certain federal
crimes in addition to those defined in § 2 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 14
Stat. 27, aimed primarily at the Ku Klux Klan, are also relevant to our discussion of § 1.
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U. S. 339, 346 (1879)), "[t]he very purpose of § 1983 was to
interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights--to protect
the people from unconstitutional action under color of state
law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative, or
judicial.'"
At least three recurring themes in the debates over§ 1 cast
serious doubt on the suggestion that requiring exhaustion of
state administrative remedies would be consistent with the
intent of the 1871 Congress. First, in passing § 1, Congress
assigned to the federal courts a paramount role in protecting
constitutional rights. Representative Dawes expressed this
view as follows:
"The first remedy proposed by this bill is a resort to the
courts of the United States. Is that a proper place in
which to find redress for any such wrongs? If there be
power to call into courts of the United States an offender
against these rights, privileges, and immunities, and
hold him to an account there, either civilly or criminally,
for their infringement, I submit to the calm and candid
judgment of every member of this House that there is no
tribunal so fitted, where equal and exact justice would
be more likely to be meted out in temper, in moderation,
in severity, if need be, but always according to the law
and the fact, as that great tribunal of the Constitution."
Gong. Globe, 42d Gong., 1st Sess. 476 (1871) (hereinafter
Globe).
See also id., at 332 (Rep. Hoar); id., at 375 (Rep. Lowe); id.,
at 448-449 (Rep. Butler); id., at 459 (Rep. Coburn). 15
15
Opponents of the bill also recognized this purpose and complained that
the bill would usurp the States' power, centralize the government and perhaps ultimately destroy the States. See, e. g., Globe 337, 338 (Rep.
Whitthorne); id., at 352 (Rep. Beck); i d. , at 361 (Rep. Swann); i d., at 365
(Rep. Arthur); i d., at 385 (Rep. Lewis); i d., at 429, 431 (Rep. McHenry);
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The 1871 Congress intended § 1 to "throw open the doors of
the United States courts" to individuals who were threatened
with, or who had suffered, the deprivation of constitutional
rights, Globe 376 (Rep. Lowe), and to provide these individuals immediate access to the federal courts notwithstanding
any provision of state law to the contrary. For example,
Senator Edmunds, who introduced the bill in the Senate,
stated in his closing remarks that the bill was similar in principle to an earlier act upheld by this Court in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539 (1842):
"[T]he Supreme Court decided ... that it was the solemn duty of Congress under the Constitution to secure
to the individual, in spite of the State, or with its aid, as
the case might be, precisely the rights that the Constitution gave him, and that there should be no intermediate
authority to arrest or oppose the direct performance of
this duty by Congress." Globe 692 (emphasis added).
Similarly, Representative Elliott viewed the issue as
whether "the Government of the United States [has] the
right, under the Constitution, to protect a citizen in the exercise of his vested rights as an American citizen by ... the assertion of immediate jurisdiction through its courts, without
the appeal or agency of the State in which the citizen is domiciled." !d., at 389 (emphasis added). See, e. g., id., at 459
(Rep. Coburn); id., at 807 (Rep. Garfield); id., at 609 (Sen.
Pool); Globe App. 141 (Rep. Shanks). 16
id., at 454 (Rep. Cox); id., at 510, 511 (Rep. Eldridge); Cong. Globe, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess., App. 46 (Rep. Kerr) (hereinafter Globe App.); id., at 216
(Sen. Thurman); id., at 243 (Sen. Bayard).
'"Opponents criticized this provision on this very ground. For example, Rep. Storm lamented:
"[Section one] does not even give the State courts a chance to try questions, or to show whether they will try the questions that might come before them under the first section of the fourteenth amendment, fairly or
not. It takes the whole question away from them in the beginning."
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A second theme in the debates further suggests that the
1871 Congress would not have wanted to impose an exhaustion requirement. A major factor motivating the expansion
of federal court jurisdiction through §§ 1 and 2 of the bill was
the belief of the 1871 Congress that the state authorities had
been unable or unwilling to protect the constitutional rights
of individuals or to punish those who violated these rights.
See, e. g., Globe 321 (Rep. Stroughton) ("[t]he State authorities and local courts are unable or unwilling to check the evil
or punish the criminals"); id., at 374 (Rep. Lowe) ("the local
administrations have been found inadequate or unwilling to
apply the proper corrective"); id., at 459 (Rep. Coburn); id.,
at 609 (Sen. Pool); id., at 687 (Sen. Shurz); id., at 691 (Sen.
Edmunds); Globe App. 185 (Rep. Platt). 17 Of primary importance to the exhaustion question was the mistrust that the
1871 Congress held for the fact-finding processes of state institutions. See, e. g., Globe 320 (Testimony of Hon. Thomas
Settle, Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court, before
the House Judiciary Committee) ("[t]he defect lies not so
much with the courts as with the juries"); id., at 394 (Rep.
Rainey); Globe App. 311 (Rep. Maynard). This Congress
Globe App. 86.
See also Globe 416 (Rep. Biggs) ("for the violation of the rights, privileges,
and immunities of the citizen a civil remedy is to be had by proceedings in
the Federal courts, State authorization in the premises to the contrary notwithstanding"); id., at 337 (Rep. Whitthorne); id., at 373 (Rep. Archer);
Globe App. 216 (Sen. Thurman).
17
This view was expressed in the Presidential message urging the passing of corrective legislation. See Globe 244 ("That the power to correct
these evils is beyond the control of State authorities I do not doubt.") (Message of Pres. Grant). The inability of state authorities to protect constitutional rights was also expressed in the findings of the House Judiciary
Committee, which had been directed to investigate the situation. See id.,
at 320. The resolution introduced by Senator Sherman instructing the
Senate Judiciary Committee to report a bill expressed a similar view. See
Globe App. 210 (state "courts are rendered utterly powerless by organized
perjury to punish crime").
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believed that federal courts would be less susceptible to local
prejudice and to the existing defects in the fact-finding processes of the state courts. See, e. g., Globe 322 (Rep.
Stoughton); id., at 459 (Rep. Coburn). 18 This perceived defect in the States' fact-finding processes is particularly relevant to the question of exhaustion of administrative remedies: exhaustion rules are often applied in deference to the
superior fact-finding ability of the relevant administrative
agency. See, e. g., McKart v. United States, 395 U. S., at
192-196.
A third feature of the debates relevant to the exhaustion
question is the fact that many legislators interpreted the bill
to provide dual or concurrent forums in the state and federal
system, enabling the plaintiff to choose the forum in which to
seek relief. Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 183 (1961)
("[t]he federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy,
and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the
federal one is invoked"). For example, Senator Thurman
noted:
"I object to [§ 1], first, because of the centralizing tendency of transferring all mere private suits, as well as
the punishment of offenses, from the State into the Federal courts. I do not say that this section gives to the
Federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. I do not suppose
that it is so understood. It leaves it, I presume, in the
option of the person who imagines himself to be injured
to sue in the State court or in the Federal court, an option that he who has been the least injured, but who has
some malice to gratify, will be the most likely to avail
himself of." Globe App. 216.
18

Opponents viewed the bill as a declaration of mistrust for state tribunals. See, e. g., Globe 360 (Rep. Swann); id., at 397 (Rep. Rice); id., at
454 (Rep. Cox); Globe App. 216 (Sen. Thurman). Representative McHenry found particularly offensive the removal of the fact-finding function
from the local institutions. See Globe 429.
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See also Globe 578, 694-695 (Sen. Edmunds); id., at 334
(Rep. Hoar); id., at 514 (Rep. Farnworth); Globe App. 85
(Rep. Bingham) ("[a]dmitting that the States have concurrent power to enforce the Constitution of the United States
within their respective limits, must we wait for their
action?").
This legislative history supports the conclusion that our
prior decisions, holding that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action under
§ 1983, did not misperceive the statutory intent: it seems fair
to infer that the 1871 Congress did not intend that an individual be compelled in every case to exhaust state administrative remedies before filing an action under § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act. We recognize, however, that drawing such a
conclusion from this history alone is somewhat precarious:
the 1871 Congress was not presented with the question of exhaustion of administrative remedies, nor was it aware of the
potential role of state administrative agencies. Therefore,
we do not rely exclusively on this legislative history in deciding the question presented here. Congress addressed the
question of exhaustion under § 1983 when it recently enacted
42 U. S. C. § 1997e (1976 ed., Supp. IV). The legislative history to § 1997e provides strong evidence of congressional intent on this issue.
B
The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42
U. S. C. § 1997 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV), was enacted primarily to ensure that the United States Attorney General
has "legal standing to enforce existing constitutional rights
and Federal statutory rights of institutionalized persons."
Conf. Rep. No. 96--897, 96th Gong., 2d Sess. 9 (1980) (Conf.
Rep.). In § 1997e, Congress also created a specific, limited
exhaustion requirement for adult prisoners bringing actions
pursuant to § 1983. Section 1997e and its legislative history
demonstrate that Congress understood that exhaustion is not
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generally required in § 1983 actions, and that it decided to
carve out only a narrow exception to this rUle. A judicially
imposed exhaustion requirement would be inconsistent with
Congress' decision to adopt § 1997e and would usurp policy
judgments that Congress has reserved for itself.
In considering whether an exhaustion requirement should
be incorporated into the bill, Congress clearly expressed its
belief that a decision to require exhaustion for certain § 1983
actions would work a change in the law. Witnesses testifying before the subcommittee that drafted the bill discussed
the decisions of this Court holding that exhaustion was not
required. See, e. g., Hearings on H.R. 2439 and H.R. 5791
before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1977) (1977 Hearings); id., at 47; id.,
at 69, 77; id., at 323; Hearings on H.R. 10 before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Adminstration
of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 48 (1979) (1979 Hearings). During these hearings,
Representative Kastenmeier, Chairman of this subcommittee, stated:
"Another thing that I think requires some discussion
within the committee, and is a point of argument, ... is
whether there ought to be an exhaustion of remedies
requirement .
. . . In fact, I think it has been pointed out that if [we]
were to require it, particularly in 1983, that would constitute regression from the current state of the law. It
would set the law back, because presently it is clearly
held, that is the Supreme Court has held, that in 1983
civil rights suits the litigant need not necessarily fully
exhaust State remedies." 1977 Hearings, at 57-58.
See also id., at 272 (Rep. Drinan) (Rep. Railsback "grounds
his bill on doing something which the Supreme Court has consistently refused to do, namely require exhaustion of reme-
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dies"); 1979 Hearings 26 (Rep. Kastenmeier) (adopting
§ 1997e "was resisted as a possible encroachment on civil liberties; that is to say, in the free, unimpeded resort to 1983").
The debates over adopting an exhaustion requirement also
reflect this understanding. See, e. g., 124 Cong. Rec. H3370
(May 1, 1978) (Rep. Volkmer and Rep. Kastenmeier); id., at
H4624 (May 25, 1978) (Rep. Ertel); id., at H7481 (July 28,
1978) (Rep. Wiggins) ("it is settled law that an exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not required as a precondition of
maintaining a 1983 action"); 125 Cong. Rec. H3641 (May 23,
1979) (Rep. Butler) ("[u]nder existing law ther is no requirement that a complainant first ask the State prison system to
help him"). With the understanding that exhaustion generally is not required, Congress decided to adopt the limited exhaustion requirement of§ 1997e in order to relieve the burden on the federal courts by diverting certain prisoner
petitions back through state and local institutions, and also to
encourage the States to develop appropriate grievance procedures. See, e. g. Conf. Rep. 9; 124 Cong. Rec. H3358 (May
1, 1978) (Rep. Kastenmeier); id., at H3358, H3365 (Rep.
Railsback); id., at H4621 (May 25, 1978) (Rep. Kastenmeier);
id., at H4624 (Rep. Ertel); id., at H7477 (July 28, 1978) (Rep.
Kastenmeier); id., at H7480-H7481 (Rep. Butler); id., at
H7481 (Rep. Ertel). Implicit in this decision is Congress'
conclusion that the no-exhaustion rule should be left standing
with respect to other § 1983 suits.
A judicially imposed exhaustion requirement would also be
inconsistent with the extraordinarily detailed exhaustion
scheme embodied in§ 1997e. Section 1997e carves out a narrow exception to the general no-exhaustion rule to govern
certain prisoner claims, and establishes a procedure to ensure
that the administrative remedies are adequate and effective.
The exhaustion requirement is expressly limited to § 1983 actions brought by an adult convicted of a crime. 42 U. S. C.
§ 1997e(a)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). 19 Section 1997e(b)(1) in19

Representative Kastenmeier explains why juveniles were not included
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structs the Attorney General to "promulgate minimum standards for the development and implementation of a plain,
speedy, and effective system" of administrative remedies,
and § 1997e(b)(2) specifies certain minimum standards that
must be included. 20 A court may require exhaustion of administrative remedies only if "the Attorney General has certified or the court has determined that such administrative
remedies are in substantial compliance with the minimum acceptable standards promulgated under subsection (b)."
§ 1997e(a)(2). Before exhaustion may be required, the court
must further conclude that it "would be appropriate and in
the interests of justice." § 1997e(a)(1). 21 Finally, in those
in § 1997e:
"I think very candidly we should admit that the first reluctance to resort to
this mechanism embodied in[§ 1997e] was resisted as a possible encroachment on civil liberties; that is to say, in the free, unimpeded resort to 1983;
because it does deflect 1983 petitions back into-temporarily in any
event-back into the State system. Therefore, to the extent that it is
even so viewed, notwithstanding the limited form of [§ 1997e], that it
should also extend to juveniles was rejected." 1979 Hearings 26.
20
Section 1997e(b)(2) provides:
The minimum standards shall provide(A) for an advisory role for employees and inmates of any jail, prison, or
other correctional institution (at the most decentralized level as is reasonably possible), in the formulation, implementation, and operation of the
system;
(B) specific maximum time limits for written replies to grievances with
reasons thereto at each decision level within the system;
(C) for priority processing of grievances which are of an emergency nature, including matters in which delay would subject the grievant to substantial risk of personal injury or other damages;
(D) for safeguards to avoid reprisals against any grievant or participant
in the resolution of a grievance; and
(E) for independent review of the disposition of grievances, including alleged reprisals, by a person or other entity not under the direct supervision
or direct control of the institution."
21
The Committee Reports state that Congress did not intend that every
§ 1983 action brought by an adult prisoner in institutions with appropriate
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§ 1983 actions meeting all the statutory requirements for exhaustion, the district court may not dismiss the case, but may
only "continue such case for a period of not to exceed ninety
days in order to require exhaustion." Ibid. This detailed
scheme is inconsistent with discretion to impose, on an ad hoc
basis, a judicially developed exhaustion rule in other cases.
Congress hoped that § 1997e would improve prison conditions by stimulating the development of successful grievance
mechanisms. See, e. g., Conf. Rep. 9; H.R. Rep. No. 96--80,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979); 1979 Hearings 4 (Rep. Railsback); 124 Cong. Rec. H3354 (May 1, 1978) (Rep. Railsback);
125 Cong. Rec. H3637 (May 23 1979) (Rep. Drinan); 126
Cong. Rec. H3497 .(May 12, 1980) (Rep. Kastenmeier). To
further this purpose, Congress yielded primary jurisdiction
over certain § 1983 claims to state prisons only on the condition that these prisons develop adequate procedures. This
purpose would be frustrated by judicial discretion to impose
exhaustion generally: the States would have no incentive to
adopt grievance procedures capable of certification, because
prisoner § 1983 cases could be diverted to state administrative remedies in any event.
In sum, the exhaustion provisions of the Act make sense,
and are not superfluous, only if exhaustion could not be required before its enactment and if Congress intended to
carve out a narrow exception to this no-exhaustion rule.
grievance procedures be delayed pending exhaustion:
"It is the intent of the Congress that the court not find such a requirement
appropriate in those situations in which the action brought pursuant to
[§ 1983] raises issues which cannot, in reasonable probability, be resolved
by the grievance resolution system, including cases where imminent danger to life is alleged. Allegations unrelated to conditions of confinement,
such as those which center on events outside of the institution, would not
appropriately be continued for resolution by the grievance resolution system." Conf. Rep. 15.
See also H.R. Rep. No. 9{Hl0, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1979); S. Rep. No.
96-416, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1979).
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The legislative history to§ 1997e demonstrates that Congress
has taken the approach of carving out specific exceptions to
the general rule that federal courts cannot require exhaustion
under § 1983. It is not our province to alter the balance
struck by Congress in establishing the procedural framework
for bringing actions under § 1983.

c
Respondent and the Court of Appeals argue that exhaustion of administrative remedies should be required because it
would further various policies. They argue that an exhaustion requirement would lessen the perceived burden that
§ 1983 actions impose on federal courts; 22 would further the
goal of comity and improve federal-state relations by postponing federal court review until after the state administrative agency had passed on the issue; 23 and would enable
the agency, which presumably has expertise in the area at
issue, to enlighten the federal court's ultimate decision.
As we noted earlier, policy considerations alone cannot justify judicially imposed exhaustion unless exhaustion is consistent with congressional intent. See
, supra.
Furthermore, as the debates over incorporating the exhaustion requirement in § 1997e demonstrate, the relevant policy
considerations do not invariably point in one direction, and
there is vehement disagreement over the validity of the as22

Of course, this burden alone is not sufficient to justify a judicial decision to alter congressionally imposed jurisdiction. See Thermtron Products, Inc . v. Hermansdorjer, 423 U. S. 336, 344 (1976); United Steelworkers v. Bouligny, 382 U. S. 145, 150-151 (1965). In any event, it is by no
means clear that judicial discretion to impose an exhaustion requirement in
§ 1983 actions would lessen the case-load of the federal courts, at least in
the short run. See and n. 27, infra.
23
The application of these federalism principles to actions brought pursuant to § 1983 has prompted criticism by several commentators. See, e. g.,
Koury, Section 1983 and Civil Comity: Two for the Federalism Seesaw, 25
Loyola L. Rev. 659 (1979); Note, 39 N.Y. U. L. Rev. 838 (1964) .

....
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sumptions underlying many of them. 24 The very difficulty of
these policy considerations, and Congress' superior institutional competence to pursue this debate, suggest that legislative not judicial solutions are preferable. Cf. Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 317 (1980); United Steelworkers
v. Bouligny, 382 U. S. 146, 150, 153 (1965).
Beyond these difficult policy issues that must be resolved
in deciding whether to require exhaustion, there are equally
difficult questions concerning the design and scope of an exhaustion requirement. These questions include how to define those categories of § 1983 claims in which exhaustion
might be desirable; how to unify and centralize the standards
for judging the kinds of administrative procedures that
should be exhausted; 25 what tolling requirements and time
For example, there is serious disagreement over whether judicial or
administrative procedures offer § 1983 plaintiffs the swiftest, least costly,
and most reliable remedy. See, e. g., 1977 Hearings 263-264; id., at
232-233; Note, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1201, 1207 (1968). Similarly, there is
debate over whether the specialization of federal courts in constitutional
law is more important than the specialization of administrative agencies in
their areas of expertise, and over whether the symbolic and institutional
function of federal courts in defining, legitimizing, and enforcing constitutional claims outweighs the educational function that state and local agencies can serve. See, e. g., Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 Mich. L.
Rev. 5, 23 (1980); Note, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1201, 1208 (1968). Fjnally, it is
uncertain whether the present "free market" system, under which litigants
are free to pursue administrative remedies if they truly appear to be
cheaper, more efficient, and more effective, is more likely to induce the
creation of adequate remedies than a McKart-type standard under which
plaintiffs have no initial choice. See, e. g., Note, 8 Ind. L. Rev. 565 (1975).
Cf. 1977 Hearings 21, 34, 51; Hearings on S.1393 before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 442 (1977).
25
Section 1997e resolved this problem by directing the Attorney General
to promulgate minimum standards and to establish a procedure by which
prison administrative remedies could be reviewed and certified.
§ 1997e(b) & (c). If a procedure has not been certified, the court is directed to compare the procedure with the Attorney General's standards
2
'

80-1874-0PINION
24

PATSY v. FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS

limitations should be adopted; 26 what is the res judicata and
collateral estoppel effect of particular administrative determinations; what consequences should attach to the failure to
comply with procedural requirements of administrative proceedings; and whether federal courts could grant necessary
interim injunctive relief and hold the action pending exhaustion, or proceed to judgment without requiring exhaustion
even though exhaustion might otherwise be required, where
the relevant administrative agency is either powerless or not
inclined to grant such interim relief. These and similar
questions might be answered swiftly and surely by legislation, but would create costly, remedy-delaying, and courtburdening litigation if answered incrementally by the judiciary in the context of diverse constitutional claims relating
to thousands of different state agencies. 27
and to continue the case pending exhaustion only if the procedure is in substantial compliance with the standards of the Attorney General.
§ 1997e(a)(2).
26
Unless the doctrine that statutes of limitations are not tolled pending
exhaustion, see Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S. 478 (1980), were
overruled, a judicially imposed exhaustion requirement might result in the
effective repeal of§ 1983. Congress avoided this problem in § 1997e by directing the court to merely continue the case for a period not to exceed 90
days.
27
The initial bill proposing to include an exhaustion requirement in
§ 1997e provided:
"Relief shall not be granted by a district court in an action brought pursuant to [§ 1983] by an individual involuntarily confined in any State institution . . . , unless it appears that the individual has exhausted such plain,
speedy, and efficient State administrative remedy as is available." H.R.
5791, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
Congress declined to adopt this McKart-type standard after witnesses testified that this procedure would bog down the courts in massive procedural
litigation thereby frustrating the purpose of relieving the caseloads of the
federal courts, that state procedures are often not effective and take too
much time, and that the court would have to judge a myriad of state procedures without much guidance. See, e. g., 1977 Hearings 34-35, 51,
164-165, 169-170, 263-264, 323; 1979 Hearings 48-49.
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The very variety of claims, claimants, and state agencies
involved in § 1983 cases argues for congressional consideration of the myriad of policy considerations, and may explain
why Congress, in deciding whether to require exhaustion in
certain § 1983 actions brought by adult prisoners, carved out
such a narrow, detailed exception to the no-exhaustion rule.
After full debate and consideration of the various policy arguments, Congress adopted § 1997, taking the largest class of
§ 1983 actions and constructing an exhaustion requirement
that differs substantially from the McKart-type standard
urged by respondents and adopted by the Court of Appeals.
See note 27, supra. It is not for us to say whether Congress
will or should create a similar scheme for other categories of
§ 1983 claims or whether Congress will or should adopt an altogether different exhaustion requirement for nonprisoner
§ 1983 claims.

v
Based on the legislative histories of both § 1983 and
§ 1997e, we conclude that exhaustion of state administrative
remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing
an action pursuant to § 1983. We decline to overturn our
prior decisions holding that such exhaustion is not required.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-1874

GEORGIA PATSY, PETITIONER v. BOARD OF
REGENTS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, ETC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[May - , 1982]

delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether exhaustion of
state administrative remedies is a prerequisite to an action
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Petitioner Georgia Patsy filed this
action, alleging that her employer, Florida International University (FlU), had denied her employment opportunities
solely on the basis of her race and sex. By a divided vote,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
found that petitioner was required to exhaust "adequate and
appropriate" administrative remedies, and remanded the
case to the District Court to consider the adequacy of the administrative procedures. Patsy v. Florida International
University, 634 F. 2d 900 (CA5 1981) (en bane). We reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
JUSTICE MARSHALL

I

Petitioner alleges that even though she is well-qualified
and has received uniformly excellent performance evaluations from her supervisors, she has been rejected for more
than thirteen positions at FlU. 1 She further claims that
' Because this case is here on a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the
factual allegations in petitioner's amended complaint. In her initial complaint, petitioner named FlU as the defendant. Relying on Byron v. Uni-
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FlU has unlawfully filled positions through intentional discrimination on the basis of race and sex. She seeks declaratory and injunctive relief or, in the alternative, damages. 2
The United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida granted respondent Board of Regents' motion to
dismiss because petitioner had not exhausted available administrative remedies. On appeal, a panel of the Court of
Appeals reversed, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Patsy v. Florida International University, 612
F. 2d 946 (CA5 1980). The full court then granted respondent's petition for rehearing and vacated the panel decision.
The Court of Appeals reviewed numerous opinions of this
Court holcling that exhaustion of administrative remedies
was not required, and concluded that these cases did not preclude the application of a "flexible" exhaustion rule. 634
F. 2d, at 908. After canvassing the policy arguments in favor of an exhaustion requirement, the Court of Appeals decided that a § 1983 plaintiff could be required to exhaust administrative remedies if the following minimum conditions
are met: (1) an orderly system of review or appeal is provided
by statute or agency rule; (2) the agency can grant relief
more or less commensurate with the claim; (3) relief is availversity of Florida, 403 F. Supp. 49 (ND Fla. 1975), the District Court
granted FlU's motion to dismiss, holding that the Board of Regents and
not the individual university had the capacity to sue and be sued under
Florida law. The District Court granted petitioner leave to amend, and '
she amended her complaint to name the Board of Regents "on behalf of'
FlU.
2
Petitioner requested the District Court to "[r]equire Defendants to
remedy the discrimination practiced upon Plaintiff by promoting her to the
next available position consistent with those previously applied for and for
which she is qualified or in the alternative, to require the Defendants to
pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $500,000 as actual and exemplary damages."
Record 47. Petitioner also requested that the District Court "order further equitable and injunctive relief as it deems appropriate and necessary
to correct the conditions of discrimination complained of herein." Record
48.
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able within a reasonable period of time; (4) the procedures
are fair, are not unduly burdensome, and are not used to harass or discourage those with legitimate claims; and (5) interim relief is available, in appropriate cases, to prevent irreparable injury and to preserve the plaintiffs rights during
the administrative process. Where these minimum standards are met, a court must further consider the particular administrative scheme, the nature of the plaintiffs interest, and
the values served by the exhaustion doctrine in order to determine whether exhaustion should be required. !d., at
912-913. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the
District Court to determine whether exhaustion would be appropriate in this case.
II
At the outset, we address the contention that the Eleventh
Amendment bars even the injunctive and declaratory relief
sought in this complaint. 3 Because this case is here on a mo- l
3
The Eleventh Amendment defense was not raised in the District
Court; it was briefed to the panel on appeal, but was not included in the
brief on rehearing en bane. In this Court, the defense was not briefed,
but respondent asserted it in its response in opposition to the petition for
certiorari. At oral argument, the state attorney general stated that this
Court should affirm the Court of Appeals solely on the exhaustion holding.
However, he also stated that the Eleventh Amendment was still an issue in
this case, and he admitted that even if we affirmed the Court of Appeals,
the case would be remanded for consideration of the adequacy of the administrative procedures, thus subjecting respondent to further proceedings in the District Court.
We have held that "the Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar" that it may be raised at any point
in the proceedings, and that waiver of this defense will not be lightly inferred from the State's litigation strategy. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S.
651, 678 (1974). See Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459
(1945). We have never addressed the question whether the Eleventh
Amendment defense can be raised, neglected, and then reargued at the
whim of the person raising this defense. Certainly, permitting this practice would greatly increase the uncertainty and potential for wasted litiga-

.,. ¥
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tion to dismiss, we are reviewing the Eleventh Amendment
isuse in a most unique posture. The merits of peitioner's
allegations have not even been adjudicated, and, of course,
no court has considered what form of relief, either injunctive,
declaratory, or monetary, might be awarded. Petitioner's
request for relief is broad enough to encompass equitable relief which is prospective only in its application. As a result,
we adress onl the question whether the Boar f Regents
e so tnat it cannot be held
shou d e v1ew a t e
accounta le in federal court for any of its actions, and we express no opinion on whether the Eleventh Amendment bars
certain forms of the relief requested by petitioner.
Respondent Board of Regents suggests that, as a state corporate body, it should be viewed as the State itself for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. It relies on Alabama v.
Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978), where this Court held that the
Eleventh Amendment bars a suit brought directly against
the State and its Board of Corrections, even when only declaratory and injunctive relief is requested. 4 However, it is
well-settled that the Eleventh Amendment does not necessarily bar actions against state officials or state bodies corpo- \

-==--

j' - '

tion already inherent in the rule that the defense can be raised at any time.
In any event, our Eleventh Amendment precedents are clear, and a remand is not required to determine unanswered questions of fact or state
law, at least with respect to th re ie prospective 'requested. Thus, we
need not address the procedural question pose y respondent's perplexing
litigation strategy.
• The issue decided in Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978)-whether
a state agent is the State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment and
thus cannot be brought into court for any reason absent a waiver of sovereign immunity- is distinct from the question addressed in Edelnwn v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 662-669 (1974)-whether the Eleventh Amendment
forbid s a suit against a state agent because the suit seeks to impose a retro- \
active award that must be paid out of funds in the state treasury. See also
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979). Here, we decide the first question, and hold that respondent is not the State in the sense intended in Alabama v. Pugh.
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rate and politic when the plaintiff is not seeking retroactive ~
relief that must be paid from public funds in the state treasury. See, e. g., Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U. S. 274 (1977); County of Lincoln v. Luning, 133 U. S. 529
(1890); Hopkins v. Clentson Ag1'icultuml College, 221 U. S.
636 (1911); Ex Pa1·te Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908). 6
In Hopkins, supm, this Court decided that a state corporate body such as respondent was not entitled to the full sovereign immunity accorded the State. 6• There, the petitioner
• Consistent with this theory, we have heard numerous suits requesting
injunctive or declaratory relief against slate universities or boards of regents or trustees, without discussing a possible Eleventh Amendment bar.
See e. g., Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S. 478 (1978) (§ 1983 action); University of California Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265,
287 (1978) (POWELL, J., announcing the judgment of the Court) ("decisions
based on r-ace or ethnic origin by faculties and administrations of state universities are reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment") (citing
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637 (1950), Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950), Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631
(1948), and Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938));
Boa1·d of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972) (§ 1983 action). Of course,
the fact that other state officials may have been named in some of these
suits is irrelevant to the federal court's ability to award even prospective
relief against the State itself. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978).
6
The dissent's attempt to distinguish 4opk~ns on the ground that the
Court there inaccurately treated the State s sovereign immunity defense as
an Eleventh Amendment issue when the action had been initiated in state
and not federal court is unpersuasive. The Hopkins Court addressed the
sovereign immunity issue as though it had been raised in federal court
under the Eleventh Amendment, and persuasively explained why a state
college and its board of regents, established as a body corporate, was not
shielded by the full immunity accorded to the State. The fact that the
State's defense in that case is more accurately viewed as a "pure" sovereign immunity question, and not one arising under the Eleventh Amendment, does not make the decision a "non-precedent" nor does it invalidate
the analysis. We have often relied on cases discussing the sovereign im·
munity of the Federal Government when deciding Eleventh Amendment
issues. See, e. g., Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204, 213 (1897); Flo1-ida
Dept. of State v. Treasw·e Salvors, Inc.,-- U. S. - -, - - n.20 (1982).
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sued the state college, claiming that the college and its board
of trustees had committed both a tort and an unconstitutional
taking of his property. The respondent college argued that \
the State's sovereign immunity barred the suit. Framing
the issue as "whether a public corporation can avail itself of
the State's immunity from suit," 221 U. S., at 642, the Court
rejected this defense with respect to the college and its board
of trustees, established by the State as a "body corporate." 7
The Court recognized that "[w]ith the exception named in
the Constitution, every State has absolute immunity from
suit," and cannot be sued in any court without its consent.
Ibid. The Court also noted that even when the State is not
named as the party defendent, the Eleventh Amendment applies when the suit is, in reality, one against the State. The
Court then reasoned:
"But immunity from suit is a high attribute of soverSimilarly, the analysis employed by the Hopkins Court should be viewed
as strong precedent for Eleventh Amendment cases presentin reci ly
the same issue. Several recent lower courts have cite or re Jed on Hopkvns wFien addressing the application of the Eleventh Amendment to
boards ofregents. See, e. g., New England Patriots Football Club, Inc.
v. Unive1·sity of Colorado, 592 F. 2d 1196 (CA11979); Rutledge v. Arizona
BoaTd of Regents, 660 F. 2d 1345 (CA9 1981).
The dissent's further claim that Hopkins was overruled sub silentio by
Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn, 450 U. S. 147
(1981), is misplaced. Florida Dept of Health was an unargued summary
reversal, which did not even cite or discuss the Hopkins decision. Furthermore, Florida Dept of Health addressed only the question whether a
plaintiff could recover retroactive relief from the petitioner-an issue we
do not decide with respect to the Board of Regents in this case. The prospective relief awarded by the Court of Appeals in that case was not even
considered by this Court. See note 13, infra.
'The state charter establishing the college and its board of trustees is in
relevant part remarkably similar to that of the Board of Regents in this
case, see note 10, infra. See Hopkins v. Clem,son Agricultural College,
221 u. s. 637, 638-639 (1911).
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eignty-a perogative of the State itself-which cannot
be availed of by public agents when sued for their own
torts. The Eleventh Amendment was not intended to
afford them freedom from liability in any case where,
under color of their office, they have injured one of the
State's citizens. To grant them such immunity would be
to create a privileged class free from liability for wrongs
inflicted or injuries threatened. Public agents must be \
liable to the law, unless they are to be put above the law.
. . . 'The whole frame and scheme of the political institutions of this country, state and Federal, protest'
against extending to any agent the sovereign's exemption from legal process." Id., at 642-:-643 (quoting
Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U. S. 270, 191 (1885)).
After discussing cases in which the Court had uniformly
denied Eleventh Amendment immunity to public officials, 8
the Court considered whether public corporations should receive similar treatment:
It is said, however, that, in the cases referred to, the officers were held liable to suit because in the transaction
complained of, the statute being unconstitutional, they
could not be treated as agents of the State. And it is
argued that these authorities have no application to suits
against those public corporations which exist, and can
act, in no other capacity than as governmental agencies,
or political subdivisions of the State itself. But neither
public corporations nor political subdivisions are clothed
with that immunity from suit which belongs to the State
alone by virtue of its sovereignty. In County of Lincoln
v. Luning, 133 U. S. 529, 530, the Court ... held that
8
The cases cited and discussed by the Court included Ex Parte Young,
209 U. S. 123 (1908), Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204 (1897); and United
States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196 (1882).
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the Eleventh Amendment was limited to those cases in
which the State is the real party, or party on the record,
but that counties were corporations which might be
sued ....
Corporate agents or individual officers of the State
stand in no better position than officers of the General
Government .... " I d., at 644-645 (citations omitted).
The Court went on to recognize that agents of the State,
whether corporate or individual, might have defenses not
available to private corporations or individuals, but these defenses serve to prevent ultimate liability or recovery, and are
not barriers to initiating the litigation. I d., at 645-646.
The Hopkins Court thus approached the application of the
Eleventh Amendment to a state university and board of
trustees, established as a "body corporate" of the State, in
the same manner it had approached this defense in cases involving other state officials or corporations: the Eleventh
Amendment was not a bar to the suit as long as the suit did \
not seek to impose a retroactive award against the State itself and did not seek to restrain the state agent from obeying
a constitutional command of the State. I d., at 644.
This approach is consistent with that taken in our more recent cases. 9 For example, in Monell v. New York City
• The Courts of Appeals have been virtually unanimous in allow~ suits
for declaratory or injunctive relief again~t state tr'iiversities (2l? their
boards. See, e. g., Lee v. Boa1·d of Regents of State Colleges, 441 F. 2d
1257 (CA7 1971); Gay Student Services v. Texas A & M University, 612 F.
2d 160 (CA5 1980); New England Patriots Football Club, Inc. v. University of Colm·ado, 592 F. 2d 1196 (CAl 1979). Cf. Skehan v. Bom·d of
Tntstees, 590 F. 2d 470 (CA3 1978). Rutledge v. An:zona Board of Regents, 660 F. 2d 1345 (CA9 1981) and Ronwin v. Shapiro, 657 F. 2d 1071
(CA9 1981), cited by the dissent to the contrary, post, a t - , n. 4, are
distinguishable. Each of these cases involved requests for monetary relief, and the courts addressed only the question whether Edelman v. Jordan, supra, precluded such relief.
The Courts of Appeals have divided
on whether monetary relief can be awarded, depending on whethe'r they

7.,
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Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978), this Court addressed whether muncipal corporations were "persons"
within the meaning of§ 1983. In holding that they were, the
Court found it significant that the Congress which enacted
the predecessor to § 1983 recognized that "there was no distinction of constitutional magnitude between officers and
agents-including corporate agents-of the State." I d., at
682. See also Mount Healthy City School District Board of
Education v. Doyle, supra, (local school board, like a municipal corporation, not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity). Cf. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 400-401 (1979) (agency created by a compact between two States with congressional approval not necessarily entitled to the same immunity as the
States themselves).
Here, as in Hopkins, respondent Board of Regents is a
"body corporate with all the powers of a body corporate."
Fla. Stat. § 240.205. 10 The State has thus established the \
have funds independent of the state treasury or on whether the State has \
waived its immunity. Compare SON! v. Board of Trustees, 513 F. 2d 347
(CA6 1978) and Goss v. Jacinto Junior College, 588 F. 2d 96 (CA5 1979)
with Jagnandan v. Giles, 538 F. 2d 1166 (CA5 1976).
0
' Section 240.205 provides in full:
"The Board of Regents is hereby created as a body corporate with all the
powers of a body corporate for all the purposes created by, or that may
exist under, the provisions of this chapter or laws amendatory hereof and
shall:
(1) Have a corporate seal.
(2) Elect a corporate secretary.
(3) Have and employ a staff attorney and other authorized personnel.
(4) Have power to contract and be contracted with, to sue and be sued,
and to plead and be impleaded in all courts of law and equity.
(5) Receive donations.
(6) Make purchases of real and personal property and contract for the
sale and disposal of same, but the title to all real property, however acquired, shall be vested in the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund and shall be transferred and conveyed by it."

'
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Board of Regents as a ££_rnora~ agent, a juristic p ~son, with
the capacity to "sue and be sued, and to pleadand be impleaded, in all courts oflaw and equity," ibid., and with corporate powers not bestowed on other de )artments diViSiOns,
or agencies o e State. This separate corporate an juristic status se'ts1'Ile BO'ard of Regents apart from the supervising boards of the other divisions of the State Department of
Education, none of which en.i9y a similar status. See, e. g.,
Fla. Stat. §240.305;1'2"4~.33T;.. §229.8g; s~ .545; §233.07.
Although the Board of Regents performs many supervising
functions over the Division of Universities similar to those
performed by boards in other subdivisions of the Department
of Education, it has the privilege of engaging in corporate activities and is responsible for numerous employment and
other decisions, which have no counterpart in the other divisions of the Det artment of' Education. il """The Board of Regen1'8,""a'n a not t e local universities, is the legal entity which
the State has authorized to sue and be sued. See Byron v.
University of Florida, 403 F. Supp. 49, 54 (ND Fla 1975).
For example the Board of Regents performs functions performed by
local school boards, established as bodies corporate, within the Divisions of
Public Schools and Vocational Education. See, e. g., Fla. Stat. § 230.21;
§ 235.02; § 235.05; § 237.071; § 237.081. Similarly, Board of Regents performs functions performed by the individual community colleges and their
boards of trustees, established as bodies corporate, within the Division of
Community Colleges. See, e. g., Fla. Stat. § 240.313; § 240.315; § 240.319.
Furthermore, the power granted to the Board of Regents "to sue and be
sued, and to plead and be impleaded, in all courts of law and equity," Fla.
Stat. § 240.205(4), is unparallelled in its breadth when compared to other
provisions relating to the Department of Education, including those relating to local school boards and boards of the community colleges. See, e.
g., Fla. Stat. § 230.21; § 240.315; § 242.331. It is also broader than
§ 402.34, which we found insufficient to waive immunity with respect to
retroactive relief in Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home
Assn, 450 U. S. 141 (1981). Of course, we express no opinion whether
§ 240.205(4) is broad enough to encompass a waiver of immunity from retroactive liability. See injm, at notes 14 and 15.
11
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As a result of its unique status, the Board of Regents has
often appeared in federal court, as both a plaintiff and defendant ·without raising any Eleventh Amendment objection.
See, e. g., Board of Regents v. Califano, 586 F. 2d 451 (CA5
1978); Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F. 2d 1073 (CA5 1976);
She1man v. Board of Regents, 451 F. 2d 572 (CA5 1971).
~ Of course, the State could have structured this particular division of the Department of Education in a manner similar to
that chosen for its other divisions, thus entitling the Board of
Regents to claim that the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity enabled it to avoid all accountability in federal court.
For example, in the Community Colleges division, the Community College Coordinating Board performs only those
supervising and coordinating functions performed by the
Board of Regents-it does not enjoy separate corporate status and has not been granted many of the privileges bestowed upon the Board of Regents, including the power to
sue and be sued in all courts of law and equity. See Fla.
Stat. § 240.305; § 240.311. Each individual college within
that division is "an independent, separate, legal entity,"
§ 240.313, with its own local board of trustees, which is established as a "body corporate" and retains autonomous status
and responsibilities. With the Division of Universities, however, the State has chosen not to endow the individual local
universities with separate corporate existence or with the authority to sue and be sued with respect to the type of issue
presented here, vesting that authority in the separate
jurisitic, corporate body which is the Board of Regents.
See, e. g. Byron v. University of Florida, supra, at 54. It
was this very structure chosen by the State which led petitioner to name the Board of Regents in this suit. Initially,petitioner named FlU, the individual university by whom she
was employed, as the defendant in this action. Because the
State had provided that the Board of Regents was the appropriate legal entity with the capacity to litigate, the District
Court dismissed the individual university, and the Board of

I
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Regents was named as the defendant "on the behalf of' FlU.
See note 1, supra.
Another aspect of State law sets the Board of Regents
apart from the boards governing"' ot'Fie rOiVis'ions ()f"tne Depa;fmenf o"'tEOucatTcin. Under Fla. Stat. § 20.15, respondent Board of Regents is designated as "the director of the DiVISIOn of Universities," one of five divisions of the
Department of Education, while the directors of the other divisions are appointed by the Commissioner of Education.
As a result, the Board of Re ents stands in the same osition
as a state official, no on y ecause it is a corporate agent by
virfii"e ofi'G' status as a "body corporate," but also because
the corpor.ate body itself is designated as the director of a
subdivision of the Department of Education, a position generally held by an individual official.
The dissent argues that allowing this Board of Regents to
be sued· for prospective injunctive relief under the analysis
employed to allow suits against state officials when sued in
their official capacity announces "a new doctrine" with wideranging implications. 12 The dissent asserts two primary
12
None of the cases cited by the dissent have held or even implied that
the Eleventh Ame,1dment forbids a federal court from awardin ros ective equit ble elief against a sta e cor ora e o y, crea e as a juristic entity WI the au onty to sue and be sued in all courts of law and equity.
G1·eat Northern Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944), involved a suit
brought against the Insurance Commissioner seeking the recovery of insw·ance taxes; Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of TreasU17J, 323 U. S. 459 (1944),
and Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 327 U. S. 573 (1946) involved
suits brought against the department of treasury or the tax commission,
and state officials in their official capacity, seeking a tax refund; and
Pa1·den v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184 (1964), where the Eleventh
Amendment was found not to prohibit the action, was a personal-injury
damage action brought against a state-owned railroad. Similarly misplaced is the dissent's reliance on Bmgg v. Board of Public Instruction, 36
So. 2d 222 (Fla. 1948), which held only that the fact that a state agent is a
corporate body does not necessarily waive the State's immunity from tort
liability. We express no opinion on whether the State has waived its immunity from retroactive liabiity with respect to the Board of Regents.

I
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complaints: that this decision exposes all "instrumentalities of
the State itself to suit in federal court," post, at 11, and that
they "may be sued for damages on the fiction that their segregated assets are not the State's," id., at 12. Although
these concerns would be legitimate if presented by this decision, such is simply not the case. The dissent premises its
arguments on the assumption that this particular board is indistinguishable from any "state welfare board, highway department or any other agency, board or department of a
state." Post, at 9. As we noted earlier, however, the
Board of Regents is accorded a ~tatus under Florida
law, which distinguishes it from the supervising boards of the
other divisions of the Department of Education, from most
state agencies, and, of course, from the state departments
and their divisions. It is established as a body corporate, a
separate juristic entity, ·with the capacity to sue and be sued
in all courts of law and equity. In so establishing the Board
of Regents, the State has displaced a large portion f the litigating ca acit that might o erw1se e enJoye by the mdiVl ua umver~es~ _ m_ e sa e s~ em.
s a resu t,
when a p"FF1'eSS&, an effi'i5I<5Yee7"or a student has a complaint
against an individual university, the State has designated the
Board of Regents as the appropriate party to be named "on
behalf of' the individual university. Similarly, if an individual university or a division of a university desires to litigate a
claim, the Board of Regents brings the action "on behalf of'
that entity, and may do so in federal court. See, e. g., Board
of Regents v. Califano, supra. The dissent proffers no principled reason for treating this particular corporate agent of
the State, which acts as the director of the Division of Universities, differently than the individual directors of the
other divisions would be treated when sued in their official
capacity.
Furthermore, nothing in our decision today implies that \
See infra, at and notes 14 & 15. However, it is clear that some im- \
munity from tort liability has been waived by virlue of Fla. Stat. § 240.213.
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this Board of Regents, much less some other agency or sta.t e
department, may be held liable for damages in federal court.
In finding that the Board of Re ents should be tre ted as a
state official when sued in his o ficial capacity for purposes of
tlie E lev enth Amendment, we hold only that it may be sued
for unconstitutional or unauthorized actions insofar as the
plaintiff seeks prospective relief as a remedy. The dissent's
fears that this holding opens the door for awarding damages
that must be paid from state funds is misplaced. As is demonstrated by our numerous decisions which consider whether
certain forms of relief may be awarded against a state official
when sued in his official capacity, the fact that a state agent
may be held accountable in federal court for unconstitutional
or unauthorized actions does not answer the question
whether retroactive relief may be awarded. See, e. g.,
E delnwn v. J o1·dan, supra. 13
Because this case is here on a motion to dismiss, it is inappropriate to consider at this time whether anything other
than an award for prospective relief is permissible. There
For this reason, the dissent's reliance on Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn, 450 U. S. 141 (1981) (per curiam, summary reversal) is also misplaced. In that case, we addressed only that portion of
the ruling of the Court of Appeals which held that retroactive relief could
be awarded against the state agency because it was a "body corporate ...
[with] the power to sue and be sued in action ex contractu but not in torts,"
Fla. Stat. § 402.34, and because it had "agreed to recognize and abide by all
State and Federal Laws, Regulations, and Guidelines applicable to participation in, and administration of, the Title XIX Medicaid Program," 450
U. S., at 149. In addition to awarding retroactive relief, the Court of Appeals opinion had invalidated an agency regulation because it was inconsistent with federal law, and had rejected the agency's argument that the
Eleventh Amendment prohibited the district court from directing the state
agency to submit a plan for reimbursing the plaintiff in accordance with the
requirements of the Medicaid statute. See Florida Nursing Home Assn
v. Page, 616 F. 2d 1355, 1361-1362 (CA5 1980). That portion of the Court
of Appeals decision was not even considered by this Court. See 450 U. S.,
at 149, n. 2.
13
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are unresolved questions of fact and state law with repect to
whether the Eleventh Amendment serves to bar other forms
of relief under the rationale of Edelman. It is unclear
whether the State has wmved its sovereign immunity with
respect to ~damage awards against respondent. 14 If
the State has not waived such immunity, it is unclear
whether a judgment against the Board must be paid out of
the State treasury. 15 These unsettled questions should be
decided by the District Court on remand should it find that
petitioner is entitled to recover, and should it further consider awarding retroactive monetary relief. The question
whether the Eleventh Amendment bars such an award is one
of ultimate relief not of jurisdiction, once it is established that
respondent may be sued at least with respect to the request
for injunctive relief. See Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultuml
College, 221 U. S., at 648.

III
The question whether exhaustion of administrative remedies should ever be required in a § 1983 action has prompted
vigorous debate and disagreement. See, e. g., Turner,
When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Cases
in the Federal Courts, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 610 (1979); Note, 8
Ind. L. Rev. 565 (1975); Note, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 537 (1974).
"See, e. g., Fla. Stat. § 240.205(4) (respondent authorized "to sue and be
sued, and to plead and be impleaded in all courts of law and equity"); Fla.
Stat. § 240.213 (respondent may secure liability insurance, and immunity is
waived to the extent of the insurance); Fla. Stat. § 240.215 (respondent
may pay costs of civil actions against board members or employees and
may procure insurance to cover such losses or expenses). Whether these
provisions waive the State's immunity from damage awards in actions not \
involving tort liability is unclear, and should be decided by the lower courts
in the first instance.
15
The Board has certain funds not derived from the State that are exempt from deposit with the state treasury. See Fla. Stat. §§ 240.277,
240.781.
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Our resolution of this issue, however, is made much easier
because we are not writing on a clean slate. This Court has
addressed this issue, as well as related issues, on several
.
.
prwr occaswns.
Respondent suggests that our prior precedents do not control our decision today, arguing that these cases can be distinguished on their facts or that this Court did not "fully" consider the question whether exhaustion should be required.
This contention need not detain us long. Beginning with
McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668, 671-673
(1963), we have on numerous occasions rejected the argument that a § 1983 action should be dismissed where the
plaintiff has not exhausted state administrative remedies.
See Barry v. Bachi, 443 U. S. 55, 63 n. 10 (1979); Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 574 (1973); Carter v. Stanton, 405
U. S. 669, 671 (1972); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249,
251 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U. S. 639, 640 (1968);
King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 312 n. 4 (1968); Damico v.
California, 389 U. S. 416 (1967). Cf. Fair Assessment in
Real Estate Association v. McNary,-- U.S.--,-(1981); id., a t - - (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 473 (1974)
("[w]hen federal claims are premised on[§ 1983]-as they are
here-we have not required exhaustion of state judicial or
administrative remedies, recognizing the paramount role
Congress has assigned to the federal courts to protect constitutional rights"). Respondent may be correct in arguing
that several of these decisions could have been based on traditional exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine. N evertheless, this Court has stated categorically that exhaustion is not
a prerequiste to an action under § 1983, and we have not deviated from that position in the 19 years since McNeese.
Therefore, we do not address the question presented in this
case as one of first impression.
IV
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Respondent argues that we should reconsider these decisions and adopt the Court of Appeals' exhaustion rule, which
was based on McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185 (1969).
This Court has never announced a definitive formula for
determining whether prior decisions should be overruled or
reconsidered. However, in Monell v. New York City Dept.
of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 695-701 (1978), we articulated four factors that should be considered. Two of these
factors-whether the decisions in question misconstrued the
meaning of the statute as revealed in its legislative history
and whether overruling these decisions would be inconsistent
with more recent expressions of congressional intent-are
particularly relevant to our decision today. 16 Both concern
legislative purpose, which is of paramount importance in the
exhaustion context because Congress is vested with the
power to prescribe the basic procedural scheme under which
claims may be heard in federal courts. Of course, courts
play an important role in determining the parameters of an
exhaustion requirement and may impose such a requirement
even where Congress has not expressly so provided. However, the initial question whether exhaustion is required
should be answered by reference to congressional intent; and
a court should not defer the exercise of jurisdiction under a
federal statute unless it is consistent with that intent. 17
The other factors discussed in Monell--whether the decisions in question constituted a departure from prior decisions and whether overruling
these decisions would frustrate legitimate reliance on their holdings-do
not support overruling these decisions. McNeese was not a departure
from prior decisions-this Court had not previously addressed the application of the exhaustion rule to § 1983 actions. Overruling these decisions
might injure those§ 1983 plaintiffs who had foregone or waived their state
administrative remedies in reliance on these decisions.
17
Congressional intent is important in determining the application of the
exhaustion doctrine to cases in which federal administrative remedies are
available, as well as to those in which state remedies are available. Of
course, exhaustion is required where Congress provides that certain ad'

6
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Therefore, in deciding whether we should reconsider our
prior decisions and require exhaustion of state administrative
remedies, we look to congressional intent as reflected in the
legislative history of the predecessor to § 1983 and in recent
congressional activity in this area.

A
In determining whether our prior decisions misconstrued
the meaning of § 1983, we begin with a review of the legislative history to § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13,
the precursor to § 1983. 18 Although we recognize that the
1871 Congress did not expressly contemplate the exhaustion
question, we believe that the tenor of the debates over § 1
supports our conclusion that exhaustion of administrative
remedies in § 1983 actions should not be judicially imposed.
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, along with the Fourteenth
Amendment it was enacted to enforce, were crucial ingredients in the basic alteration of our federal system accomplished during the Reconstruction era. During that time,
the Federal Government was clearly established as a guarantor of the basic federal rights of individuals against incursions
ministrative remedies shall be exclusive. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938). Even where the statutory requirement of exhaustion is not explicit, courts are guided by congressional
intent in determining whether application of the doctrine would be consistent with the statutory scheme. In determining whether exhaustion of federal administrative remedies is required, courts generally focus on the role
Congress has assigned to the particular federal agency, and tailor the exhaustion rule to fit the particular administrative scheme created by Congress. See McKa1-t v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 193-195 (1969).
With state administrative remedies, the focus is not so much on the role
assigned to the state agency, but the role of the state agency becomes important once a court finds that deferring its exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with statutory intent.
' ~ Some of the debates relating to § 2, which created certain federal
crimes in addition to those defined in § 2 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 14
Stat. 27, aimed primarily at the Ku Klux Klan, are also relevant to our discussion of § 1.

,,
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by state power. As we recognized in Mitchum v. Foster,
407 U. S. 225, 242 (1972) (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100
U. S. 339, 346 (1879)), "[t]he very purpose of § 1983 was to
interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect
the people from unconstitutional action under color of state
law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative, or
judicial.'"
At least three recurring themes in the debates over § 1 cast
serious doubt on the suggestion that requiring exhaustion of
state administrative remedies would be consistent with the
intent of the 1871 CongTess. First, in passing § 1, Congress
assigned to the federal courts a paramount role in protecting
constitutional rights. Representative Dawes expressed this
view as follows:
"Th~ first remedy proposed by this bill is a resort to the
courts of the United States. Is that a proper place in
which to find redress for any such wrongs? If there be
power to call into courts of the United States an offender
against these rights, privileges, and immunities, and
hold him to an account there, either civilly or criminally,
for their infringement, I submit to the calm and candid
judgment of every member of this House that there is no
tribunal so fitted, where equal and exact justice would
be more likely to be meted out in temper, in moderation,
in severity, if need be, but always according to the law
and the fact, as that great tribunal of the Constitution."
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 476 (1871) (hereinafter
Globe).
See also id., at 332 ( remarks of Rep. Hoar); id., at 375 (remarks of Rep. Lowe); id., at 448-449 (remarks of Rep. Butler); id., at 459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn). 19
'"Opponents of the bill also recognized this purpose and complained that
the bill would usurp the States' power, centralize the government and perhaps ultimately destroy the States. See, e. g., Globe 337, 338 (remarks of
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The 1871 Congress intended § 1 to "throw open the doors of
the United States courts" to individuals who were threatened
with, or who had suffered, the deprivation of constitutional
rights, Globe 376 (remarks of Rep. Lowe), and to provide
these individuals immediate access to the federal courts notwithstanding any provision of state law to the contrary. For
example, Senator Edmunds, who introduced the bill in the
Senate, stated in his closing remarks that the bill was similar
in principle to an earlier act upheld by this Court in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539 (1842):
"[T]he Supreme Court decided ... that it was the solemn duty of Congress under the Constitution to secure
to the individual, in spite of the State, or with its aid, as
the case might be, precisely the rights that the Constitution gave him, and that there should be no intermediate
auth91-ity to an·est or oppose the di1·ect performance of
this duty by Congress." Globe 692 (emphasis added).
Similarly, Representative Elliott viewed the issue as
whether "the Government of the United States [has] the
right, under the Constitution, to protect a citizen in the exercise of his vested rights as an American citizen by ... the assertion of in1-mediate jurisdiction through its courts, without
the appeal or agency of the State in which the citizen is domiciled." Id., at 389 (emphasis added). See, e. g., id., at 459
(remarks of Rep. Coburn); id., at 807 (remarks of Rep. Garfield); id., at 609 (remarks of Sen. Pool); Globe App. 141 (remarks of Rep. Shanks). 20
Rep. Whitthorne); id., at 352 (remarks of Rep. Beck); id., at 361 (remarks
of Rep. Swann); id., at 365 (remarks of Rep. Arthur); id., at 385 (remarks
of Rep. Lewis); id., at 429, 431 (remarks of Rep. McHenry); id., at 454 (remarks of Rep. Cox); id., at 510, 511 (remarks of Rep. Eldridge); Cong.
Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 46 (remarks of Rep. Kerr) (hereinafter
Globe App.); id., at 216 (remarks of Sen. Thurman); id., at 243 (remarks of
Sen. Bayard).
20
Opponents criticized this provision on this very ground. For exam-
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A second theme in the debates further suggests that the
1871 Congress would not have wanted to impose an exhaus-

tion requirement. A major factor motivating the expansion
of federal court jurisdiction through §§ 1 and 2 of the bill was
the belief of the 1871 Congress that the state authorities had
been unable or unwilling to protect the constitutional rights
of individuals or to punish those who violated these rights.
See, e. g., Globe 321 (remarks of Rep. Stroughton) ("[t]he
State authorities and local courts are unable or unwilling to
check the evil or punish the criminals"); id., at 374 (remarks
of Rep. Lowe) ("the local administrations have been found inadequate or unwilling to apply the proper corrective"); id., at
459 (rema1~ks of Rep. Coburn); id., at 609 (remarks of Sen.
Pool); id., at 687 (remarks of Sen. Shurz); id., at 691 (remarks
of Sen. Edmunds); Globe App. 185 (remarks of Rep. Platt). 21
Of primary importance to the exhaustion question was the
pie, Rep. Storm lamented:
"[Section one] does not even give the State courts a chance to try questions, or to show whether they will try the questions that might come before them under the first section of the fourteenth amendment, fairly or
not. It takes the whole question away from them in the beginning."
·
Globe App. 86.
See also Globe 416 (remarks of Rep. Biggs) ("for the violation of the rights,
privileges, and immunities of the citizen a civil remedy is to be had by proceedings in the Federal courts, State authorization in the premises to the
contrary notwithstanding"); id., at 337 (remarks of Rep. Whitthorne); id.,
at 373 (remarks of Rep. Archer); Globe App. 216 (remarks of Sen.
Thurman).
2
' This view was expressed in the Presidential message urging the passing of corrective legislation. See Globe 244 ("That the power to correct
these evils is beyond the control of State authorities I do not doubt.") (Message of Pres. Grant). The inability of state authorities to protect constitutional rights was also expressed in the findings of the House Judiciary
Committee, which had been directed to investigate the situation. See id.,
at 320. The resolution introduced by Senator Sherman instructing the
Senate Judiciary Committee to report a bill expressed a similar view. See
Globe App. 210 (state "courts are rendered utterly powerless by organized
perjury to punish crime").
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mistrust that the 1871 Congress held for the fact-finding processes of state institutions. See, e. g., Globe 320 (Testimony
of Hon. Thomas Settle, Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court, before the House Judiciary Committee) ("[t]he
defect lies not so much with the courts as with the juries");
id., at 394 (remarks of Rep. Rainey); Globe App. 311 (remarks of Rep. Maynard). This Congress believed that federal courts would be less susceptible to local prejudice and to
the existing defects in the fact-finding processes of the state
courts. See, e. g., Globe 322 (remarks of Rep. Stoughton);
id., at 459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn). 22 This perceived defect in the States' fact-finding processes is particularly relevant to the question of exhaustion of administrative remedies: exhaustion rules are often applied in deference to the
superior fact-finding ability of the relevant administrative
agency. See, e. g., McKart v. United States, 395 U. S., at
192-196. '

A third feature of the debates relevant to the exhaustion
question is the fact that many legislators interpreted the bill
to provide dual or concurrent forums in the state and federal
system, enabling the plaintiff to choose the forum in which to
seek relief. Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 183 (1961)
("[t]he federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy,
and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the
federal one is invoked"). For example, Senator Thurman
noted:
"I object to [§ 1], first, because of the centralizing tendency of transferring all mere private suits, as well as
the punishment of offenses, from the State into the Federal courts. I do not say that this section gives to the
22

Opponents viewed the bill as a declaration of mistrust for state tribunals. See, e. g., Globe 360 (remarks of Rep. Swann); id., at 397 (remarks
of Rep. Rice); id., at 454 (remarks of Rep. Cox); Globe App. 216 (remarks
of Sen. Thurman). Representative McHenry found particularly offensive
the removal of the fact-finding function from the local institutions. See
Globe 429.

.
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Federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. I do not suppose
that it is so understood. It leaves it, I presume, in the
option of the person who imagines himself to be injured
to sue in the State court or in the Federal court, an option that he who has been the least injured, but who has
some malice to gratify, will be the most likely to avail
himself of." Globe App. 216.
See also Globe 578, 694-695 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds); id.,
at 334 (remarks of Rep. Hoar); id., at 514 (remarks of Rep.
Farnworth); Globe App. 85 (remarks of Rep. Bingham)
("[a]dmitting that the States have concurrent power to enforce the Constitution of the United States within their respective limits, must we wait for their action?").
This legislative history supports the conclusion that our
prior decisions, holding that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action under
§ 1983, did not misperceive the statutory intent: it seems fair
to infer that the 1871 Congress did not intend that an individual be compelled in every case to exhaust state administrative remedies before filing an action under § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act. We recognize, however, that drawing such a
conclusion from this history alone is somewhat precarious:
the 1871 Congress was not presented with the question of exhaustion of administrative remedies, nor was it aware of the
potential role of state administrative agencies. Therefore,
we do not rely exclusively on this legislative history in deciding the question presented here. Congress addressed the
question of exhaustion under § 1983 when it recently enacted
42 U. S. C. § 1997e (1976 ed., Supp. IV). The legislative history to § 1997e provides strong evidence of congressional intent on this issue.
B
The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42
U. S. C. § 1997 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV), was enacted primarily to ensure that the United States Attorney General

80- 1874-0PINION
24

PATSY v. FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS

has "legal standing to enforce existing constitutional rights
and Federal statutory rights of institutionalized persons."
Conf. Rep. No. 96-897, 96th Gong., 2d Sess. 9 (1980) (Conf.
Rep.). In § 1997e, Congress also created a specific, limited
exhaustion requirement for adult prisoners bringing actions
pursuant to § 1983. Section 1997e and its legislative history
demonstrate that Congress understood that exhaustion is not
genera11y required in § 1983 actions, and that it decided to
carve out only a narrow exception to this rule. A judicia11y
imposed exhaustion requirement would be inconsistent with
CongTess' decision to adopt § 1997e and would usurp policy
judgments that Congress has reserved for itself.
In considering whether an exhaustion requirement should
be incorporated into the bill, Congress clearly expressed its
belief that a decision to require exhaustion for certain § 1983
actions would work a change in the law. Witnesses testifying befoi·e the subcommittee that drafted the bill discussed
the decisions of this Court holding that exhaustion was not
required. See, e. g., Hearings on H.R. 2439 and H.R. 5791
before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Gong., 1st Sess. 20 (1977) (1977 Hearings); id., at 47; id.,
at 69, 77; id., at 323; Hearings on H.R. 10 before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Adminstration
of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Gong.,
1st Sess. 48 (1979) (1979 Hearings). During these hearings,
Representative Kastenmeier, Chairman of this subcommittee, stated:
"Another thing that I think requires some discussion
within the committee, and is a point of argument, . .. is
whether there ought to be an exhaustion of remedies
requirement .
. . . In fact, I think it has been pointed out that if [we]
were to require it, particularly in 1983, that would constitute regression from the current state of the law. It

,.
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would set the law back, because presently it is clearly
held, that is the Supreme Court has held, that in 1983
civil rights suits the litigant need not necessarily fully
exhaust State remedies." 1977 Hearings, at 57-58.
See also id., at 272 (remarks of Rep. Drinan) (Rep. Railsback
"grounds his bill on doing something which the Supreme
Court has consistently refused to do, namely require exhaustion of remedies"); 1979 Hearings 26 (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier) (adopting § 1997e "was resisted as a possible encroachment on civil liberties; that is to say, in the free,
unimpeded resort to 1983").
The debates over adopting an exhaustion requirement also
reflect this·understanding. See, e. g., 124 Gong. Rec. H3370
(May 1, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Volkmer and Rep. Kastenmeier); id., at H4624 (May 25, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Ertel);
id., at H7481 (July 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Wiggins) ("it is
settled law that an exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not required as a precondition of maintaining a 1983 action");
125 Gong. Rec. H3641 (May 23, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Butler) ("[u]nder existing law ther is no requirement that a complainant first ask the State prison system to help him").
With the understanding that exhaustion generally is not required, Congress decided to adopt the limited exhaustion requirement of § 1997e in order to relieve the burden on the
federal courts by diverting certain prisoner petitions back
through state and local institutions, and also to encourage the
States to develop appropriate grievance procedures. See, e.
g. Conf. Rep. 9; 124 Gong. Rec. H3358 (May 1, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier); id., at H3358, H3365 (remarks
of Rep. Railsback); id., at H4621 (May 25, 1978) (remarks of
Rep. Kastenmeier); id ., at H4624 (remarks of Rep. Ertel);
id., at H7477 (July 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier);
id., at H7480-H7481 (remarks of Rep. Butler); id., at H7481
(remarks of Rep. Ertel). Implicit in this decision is Congress' conclusion that the no-exhaustion rule should be left

80-1874-0PINION
PATSY v. FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS

26

standing with respect to other § 1983 suits.
A judicially imposed exhaustion requirement would also be
inconsistent with the extraordinarily detailed exhaustion
scheme embodied in§ 1997e. Section 1997e carves out a narrow exception to the general no-exhaustion rule to govern
certain prisoner claims, and establishes a procedure to ensure
that the administrative remedies are adequate and effective.
The exhaustion requirement is expressly limited to § 1983 actions brought by an adult convicted of a crime. 42 U. S. C.
§ 1997e(a)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). 22 Section 1997e(b)(1) instructs the Attorney General to "promulgate minimum standards for the development and implementation of a plain,
speedy, and effective system" of administrative remedies,
and § 1997e(b)(2) specifies certain minimum standards that
must be included. 24 A court may require exhaustion of adRepresentative Kasten meier explains why juveniles were not included
in§ 1997e:
"I think very candidly we should admit that the first reluctance to resort to
this mechanism embodied in [§ 1997e] was resisted as a possible encroachment on civil liberties; that is to say, in the free, unimpeded resort to 1983;
because it does deflect 1983 petitions back into-temporarily in any
event-back into the State system. Therefore, to the extent that it is
even so viewed, notwithstanding the limited form of [§ 1997e], that it
should also extend to juveniles was rejected." 1979 Hearings 26.
24
Section 1997e(b)(2) provides:
The minimum standards shall provide(A) for an advisory role for employees and inmates of any jail, prison, or
other correctional institution (at the most decentralized level as is reasonably possible), in the formulation, implementation, and operation of the
system;
(B) specific maximum time limits for written replies to grievances with
reasons thereto at each decision level within the system;
(C) for priority processing of grievances which are of an emergency nature, including matters in which delay would subject the grievant to substantial risk of personal injury or other damages;
(D) for safeguards to avoid reprisals against any grievant or participant
in the resolution of a grievance; and
(E) for independent review of the disposition of grievances, including a!23
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ministrative remedies only if "the Attorney General has certified or the court has determined that such administrative
remedies are in substantial compliance with the minimum acceptable standards promulgated under subsection (b)."
§ 1997e(a)(2). Before exhaustion may be required, the court
must further conclude that it "would be appropriate and in
the interests of justice." § 1997e(a)(l). 25 Finally, in those
§ 1983 actions meeting all the statutory requirements for exhaustion, the district court may not dismiss the case, but may
only "continue such case for a period of not to exceed ninety
days in order to require exhaustion." Ibid. This detailed
scheme is inconsistent with discretion to impose, on an ad hoc
basis, a judicially developed exhaustion rule in other cases.
Congress hoped that § 1997e would improve prison conditions by stimulating the development of successful grievance
mechanisms. See, e. g., Conf. Rep. 9; H.R. Rep. No. 96-80,
96th Co.ng., 1st Sess. 4 (1979); 1979 Hearings 4 (remarks of
Rep. Railsback); 124 Cong. Rec. H3354 (May 1, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Railsback); 125 Cong. Rec. H3637 (May 23
1979) (remarks of Rep. Drinan); 126 Cong. Rec. H3497 (May
12, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier). To further this
leged reprisals, by a person or other entity not under the direct supervision
or direct control of the institution."
25
The Committee Reports state that Congress did not intend that every
§ 1983 action brought by an adult prisoner in institutions with appropriate
grievance procedures be delayed pending exhaustion:
"It is the intent of the Congress that the court not find such a requirement
appropriate in those situations in which the action brought pursuant to
[§ 1983] raises issues which cannot, in reasonable probability, be resolved
by the grievance resolution system, including cases " ·here imminent danger to life is alleged. Allegations unrelated to conditions of confinement,
such as those which center on events outside of the institution, would not
appropriately be continued for resolution by the grievance resolution
system." Conf. Rep. 15.
See also H.R. Rep. No. 96-80, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1979); S. Rep. No.
96-416, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1979).
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purpose, Congress yielded primary jurisdiction over certain
§ 1983 claims to state prisons only on the condition that these
prisons develop adequate procedures. This purpose wou1d
be frustrated by judicial discretion to impose exhaustion generally: the States would have no incentive to adopt grievance
procedures capable of certification, because prisoner § 1983
cases could be diverted to state administrative remedies in
any event.
In sum, the exhaustion provisions of the Act make sense,
and are not superfluous, only if exhaustion could not be required before its enactment and if Congress intended to
carve out a narrow exception to this no-exhaustion rule.
The legislative history to§ 1997e demonstrates that Congress
has taken the approach of carving out specific exceptions to
the general rule that federal courts cannot require exhaustion
under §_1983. It is not our province to alter the balance
struck by Congress in establishing the procedural framework
for bringing actions under § 1983.

c
Respondent and the Court of Appeals argue that exhaustion of administrative remedies should be required because it
would further various policies. They argue that an exhaustion requirement would lessen the perceived burden that
§ 1983 actions impose on federal courts/6 would further the
goal of comity and improve federal-state relations by postponing federal court review until after the state administrative agency had passed on the issue/7 and would enable
2G Of course, this burden alone is not sufficient to justify a judicial decision to alter congressionally imposed jurisdiction. See Thenntron P1·oducts, Inc. v. Hennansd01ier, 423 U. S. 336, 344 (1976); United Steelworkers v. Bouligny, 382 U. S. 145, 150-151 (1965). In any event, it is by no
means clear that judicial discretion to impose an exhaustion requirement in
§ 1983 actions would lessen the case-load of the federal courts, at least in
the short run. See- and n. 31, infra.
27
The application of these federalism principles to actions brought pursuant to§ 1983 has prompted criticism by several commentators. See, e. g.,
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the agency, which presumably has expertise in the area at
issue, to enlighten the federal court's ultimate decision.
As we noted earlier, policy considerations alone cannot justify judicially imposed exhaustion unless exhaustion is consistent with congressional intent. See
, supra.
Furthermore, as the debates over incorporating the exhaustion requirement in § 1997e demonstrate, the relevant policy
considerations do not invariably point in one direction, and
there is vehement disagreement over the validity of the assumptions underlying many of them. 28 The very difficulty of
these policy considerations, and Congress' superior institutional competence to pursue this debate, suggest that legislative not judicial solutions are preferable. Cf. Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 317 (1980); United Steelworkers
v. Bouligny, 382 U. S. 146, 150, 153 (1965).
Beyond the policy issues that must be resolved in deciding \
whether· to require exhaustion, there are equally difficult
questions concerning the design and scope of an exhaustion
Koury, Section 1983 and Civil Comity: Two for the Federalism Seesaw, 25
Loyola L. Rev. 659 (1979); Note, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 838 (1964).
:?> For example, there is serious disagreement over whether judicial or
administrative procedures offer § 1983 plaintiffs the swiftest, least costly,
and most reliable remedy. See, e. g., 1977 Hearings 263-264; id., at
232-233; Note, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1201, 1207 (1968). Similarly, there is
debate over whether the specialization of federal courts in constitutional
law is more important than the specialization of administrative agencies in
their areas of expertise, and over whether the symbolic and institutional
function of federal courts in defining, legitimizing, and enforcing constitutional claims outweighs the educational function that state and local agencies can serve. See, e. g., Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 Mich. L.
Rev. 5, 23 (1980); Note, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1201, 1208 (1968). Finally, it is
uncertain whether the present "free market" system, under which litigants
are free to pursue administrative remedies if they truly appear to be
cheaper, more efficient, and more effective, is more likely to induce the
creation of adequate remedies than a McKart-type standard under which
plaintiffs have no initial choice. See, e. g., Note, 8 Ind. L. Rev. 565 (1975).
Cf. 1977 Hearings 21, 34, 51; Hearings on S.1393 before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Con g., 1st
Sess. 442 (1977).
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requirement. These questions include how to define those
categories of § 1983 claims in which exhaustion might be desirable; how to unify and centralize the standards for judging
the kinds of administrative procedures that should be exhausted;29 what tolling requirements and time limitations
should be adopted/0 what is the res judicata and collateral estoppel effect of particular administrative determinations;
what consequences should attach to the failure to comply
with procedural requirements of administrative proceedings;
and whether federal courts could grant necessary interim injunctive relief and hold the action pending exhaustion, or proceed to judgment without requiring exhaustion even though
exhaustion might otherwise be required, where the relevant
administrative agency is either powerless or not inclined to
grant such interim relief. These and similar questions might
be answered swiftly and surely by legislation, but would create costly, remedy-delaying, and court-burdening litigation if
answered incrementally by the judiciary in the context of diverse constitutional claims relating to thousands of different
state agencies. 31
The very variety of claims, claimants, and state agencies
Section 1997e resolved this problem by directing the Attorney General
to promulgate minimum standards and to establish a procedure by which
p1ison administrative remedies could be reviewed and certified.
§ 1997e(b) & (c). If a procedure has not been certified, the court is directed to compare the procedure with the Attorney General's standards
and to continue the case pending exhaustion only if the procedure is in substantial compliance with the standards of the Attorney General.
§ 1997e(a)(2).
30
Unless the doctrine that statutes of limitations are not tolled pending
exhaustion were overruled, see Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S.
478 (1980), a judicially imposed exhaustion requirement might result in the
effective repeal of§ 1983. Congress avoided this problem in § 1997e by directing the court to merely continue the case for a period not to exceed 90
days.
31
The initial bill proposing to include an exhaustion requirement in
§ 1997e provided:
"Relief shall not be granted by a district court in an action brought pursu29
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involved in § 1983 cases argues for congressional consideration of the myriad of policy considerations, and may explain
why Congress, in deciding whether to require exhaustion in
certain § 1983 actions brought by adult prisoners, carved out
such a narrow, detailed exception to the no-exhaustion rule.
After full debate and consideration of the various policy arguments, Congress adopted § 1997, taking the largest class of
§ 1983 actions and constructing an exhaustion requirement
that differs substantially from the M cKart-type standard
urged by respondents and adopted by the Court of Appeals.
See note 31, supra. It is not for us to say whether Congress
will or should create a similar scheme for other categories of
§ 1983 claims or whether Congress will or should adopt an altogether different exhaustion requirement for nonprisoner
§ 1983 claims.

v
Based on the legislative histories of both § 1983 and
§ 1997e, we conclude that exhaustion of state administrative
remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing
an action pursuant to § 1983. We decline to overturn our
prior decisions holding that such exhaustion is not required.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so oTdeTed.
ant to [§ 1983] by an individual involuntarily confined in any State institution ... , unless it appears that the individual has exhausted such plain,
speedy, and efficient State administrative remedy as is available." H.R.
5791, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
Congress declined to adopt this McKa1-t-type standard after witnesses testified that this procedure would bog down the courts in massive procedural
litigation thereby frustrating the purpose of relieving the caseloads of the
federal courts, that state procedures are often not effective and take too
much time, and that the court would have to judge a myriad of state procedures without much guidance. See, e. g., 1977 Hearings 34-35, 51,
164-165, 169-170, 263-264, 323; 1979 Hearings 48-49.
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SUPREl\IE COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-1874

GEORGIA PATSY, PETITIONER v. BOARD OF
REGENTS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, ETC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[June-, 1982]

delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether exhaustion of
state administrative remedies is a prerequisite to an action
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Petitioner Georgia Patsy filed this
action, alleging that her employer, Florida International University (FlU), had denied her employment opportunities
solely on the basis of her race and sex. By a divided vote,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
found that petitioner was required to exhaust "adequate and
appropriate" administrative remedies, and remanded the
case to the District Court to consider the adequacy of the administrative procedures. Patsy v. Florida International
University, 634 F. 2d 900 (CA5 1981) (en bane). We reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
JUSTICE MARSHALL

I

Petitioner alleges that even though she is well-qualified
and has received uniformly excellent performance evaluations from her supervisors, she has been rejected for more
than thirteen positions at FlU. 1 She further claims that
' Because this case is here on a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the
factual allegations in petitioner's amended complaint. In her initial complaint, petitioner named FlU as the defendant. Relying on Byron v. Uni-

80-1874-0PINION
2

PATSY

t'.

FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS

FlU has unlawfully filled positions through intentional discrimination on the basis of race and sex. She seeks declaratory and injunctive relief or, in the alternative, damages. 2
The United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida granted respondent Board of Regents' motion to
dismiss because petitioner had not exhausted available administrative remedies. On appeal, a panel of the Court of
Appeals reversed, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Patsy v. Flo1·ida International Univasity, 612
F. 2d 946 (CA5 1980). The full court then granted respondent's petition for rehearing and vacated the panel decision.
The Court of Appeals reviewed numerous opinions of this
Court holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies
was not required, and concluded that these cases did not preclude the application of a "flexible" exhaustion rule. 634
F. 2d, at 908. After canvassing the policy arguments in favor of an exhaustion requirement, the Court of Appeals decided that a § 1983 plaintiff could be required to exhaust administrative remedies if the following minimum conditions
are met: (1) an orderly system of review or appeal is provided
by statute or agency rule; (2) the agency can grant relief
more or less commensurate with the claim; (3) relief is availversity of Florida, 403 F. Supp. 49 (ND Fla. 1975), the District Court
granted FlU's motion to dismiss, holding that the Board of Regents and
not the indiYiclual uniYersity had the capacity to sue and be sued under
Florida Jaw. The District Court granted petitioner leave to amend, and
she amended her complaint to name the Board of Regents "on behalf of'
FlU.
~ Petitioner requested the District Court to "[r)equire Defendants to
remedy the discrimination practiced upon Plaintiff by promoting her to the
next aYailable position consi stent with those previously applied for and for
which she is qualified or in the alternative, to require the Defendants to
pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $500,000 as actual and exemplary damages."
Record 47. Petitioner also requested that the District Court "order further equitable and injunctive relief as it deems appropriate and necessary
to correct the conditions of discrimination complained of herein." Record
48.
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able within a reasonable period of time; (4) the procedures
are fair, are not unduly burdensome, and are not used to harass or discourage those with legitimate claims; and (5) interim relief is available, in appropriate cases, to prevent irreparable injury and to preserve the plaintiffs rights during
the administrative process. Where these minimum standards are met, a court must further consider the particular administrative scheme, the nature of the plaintiffs interest, and
the values served by the exhaustion doctrine in order to determine whether exhaustion should be required. I d., at
912-913. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the
District Court to determine whether exhaustion would be appropriate in this case.
II
The question whether exhaustion of administrative remedies should ever be required in a § 1983 action has prompted
vigorous debate and disagreement. See, e. g., Turner,
When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Cases
in the Federal Courts, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 610 (1979); Note, 8
Ind. L. Rev. 565 (1975); Note, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 537 (1974).
Our resolution of this issue, however, is made much easier
because we are not writing on a clean slate. This Court has
addressed this issue, as well as related issues, on several
prior occasions.
Respondent suggests that our prior precedents do not control our decision today, arguing that these cases can be distinguished on their facts or that this Court did not "fully" consider the question whe+her exhaustion should be required.
This contention need not detain us long. Beginning with
McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668, 671-673
(1963), we have on numerous occasions rejected the argument that a § 1983 action should be dismissed where the
plaintiff has not exhausted state administrative remedies.
See Barty v. Baclzi, 443 U. S. 55, 63 n. 10 (1979); Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 574 (1973); Carte1· v. Stanton, 405

I
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U. S. 669, 671 (1972); Wilwo1·ding v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249,
251 (1971); Houghton v. Shafe1·, 392 U. S. 639, 640 (1968);
King v. SnLith, 392 U. S. 309, 312 n. 4 (1968); Damico v.
California, 389 U. S. 416 (1967). Cf. Fai1· Assessnwnt in
Real Estate Association v. McNary, - - U. S. - - , - (1981); id., a t - - (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 473 (1974)
("[w]hen federal claims are premised on[§ 1983]-as they are
here-we have not required exhaustion of state judicial or
administrative remedies, recognizing the paramount role
Congress has assigned to the federal courts to protect constitutional rights"). Respondent may be correct in arguing
that several of these decisions could have been based on traditional exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine. N evertheless, this Court has stated categorically that exhaustion is not
a prerequiste to an action under§ 1983, and we have not deviated from that position in the 19 years since McNeese.
Therefore, we do not address the question presented in this
case as one of first impression.

III
Respondent argues that we should reconsider these decisions and adopt the Court of Appeals' exhaustion rule, which
was based on McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185 (1969).
This Court has never announced a definitive formula for
determining whether prior decisions should be overruled or
reconsidered. However, in Monell v. New Y01·k City Dept.
of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 695-701 (1978), we articulated four factors that should be considered. Two of these
factors-whether the decisions in question misconstrued the
meaning of the statute as revealed in its legislative history
and whether overruling these decisions would be inconsistent
with more recent expressions of congressional intent-are
particularly relevant to our decision today. 3 Both concern
3

The other factors discussed in Mo11ell-whether the decisions in ques-
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legislative purpose, which is of paramount importance in the
exhaustion context because Congress is vested with the
power to prescribe the basic procedural scheme under which
claims may be heard in federal courts. Of course, courts
play an important role in determining the parameters of an
exhaustion requirement and may impose such a requirement
even where Congress has not expressly so provided. However, the initial question whether exhaustion is required
should be answered by reference to congressional intent; and
a court should not defer the exercise of jurisdiction under a
federal statute unless it is consistent with that intent. 4
Therefore, in deciding whether we should reconsider our
prior decisions and require exhaustion of state administrative
tion constituted a departure from prior decisions and whether overruling
these decisions would frustrate legitimate reliance on their holdings-do
not support overruling these decisions. McNeese was not a departure
from prior decisions-this Court had not previously addressed the application of the exhaustion rule to § 1983 actions. Overruling these decisions
might injure those § 1983 plaintiffs who had foregone or waived their state
administrative remedies in reliance on these decisions.
'Congressional intent is important in determining the application of the
exhaustion doctrine to cases in which federal administrative remedies are
available, as well as to those in which state remedies are available. Of
course, exhaustion is required where Congress provides that certain administrative remedies shall be exclusive. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Co1·p., 303 U. S. 41 (1938). Even where the statutory requirement of exhaustion is not explicit, courts are guided by congressional
intent in determining whether application of the doctrine would be consistent with the statutory scheme. In determining whether exhaustion of federal administrative remedies is required, courts generally focus on the role
Congress has assigned to the particular federal agency, and tailor the exhaustion rule to fit the particular administrative scheme created by Congress. See McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 19~195 (1969).
With state administrative remedies, the focus is not so much on the role
assigned to the state agency, but the role of the state agency becomes important once a court finds that defen·ing its exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with statutory intent.

..,
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remedies, we look to congressional intent as reflected in the
legislative history of the predecessor to § 1983 and in recent
congressional activity in this area.
A

In determining whether our prior decisions misconstrued
the meaning of § 1983, we begin with a review of the legislative history to § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13,
the precursor to § 1983. 5 Although we recognize that the
1871 Congress did not expressly contemplate the exhaustion
question, we believe that the tenor of the debates over § 1
supports our conclusion that exhaustion of administrative
remedies in § 1983 actions should not be judicially imposed.
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, along with the Fourteenth
Amendment it was enacted to enforce, were crucial ingredients in the basic alteration of our federal system accomplished during the Reconstruction era. During that time,
the Federal Government was clearly established as a guarantor of the basic federal rights of individuals against incursions
by state power. As we recognized in Mitchum v. FosteT,
407 U. S. 225, 242 (1972) (quoting Ex Pmie Virginia, 100
U. S. 339, 346 (1879)), "[t]he very purpose of§ 1983 was to
interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect
the people from unconstitutional action under color of state
law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative, or
judicial.'"
At least three recurring themes in the debates over § 1 cast
serious doubt on the suggestion that requiring exhaustion of
state administrative remedies would be consistent with the
intent of the 1871 Congress. First, in passing § 1, Congress
Some of the debates relating to § 2, which created certain federal
crimes in addition to those defined in § 2 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 14
Stat. 27, aimed primarily at the Ku Klux Klan, are also relevant to our discussion of § 1.
6

r
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assigned to the federal courts a paramount role in protecting
constitutional rights. Representative Dawes expressed this
view as follows:
"The first remedy proposed by this bill is a resort to the
courts of the United States. Is that a proper place in
which to find redress for any such wrongs? If there be
power to call into courts of the United States an offender
against these rights, privileges, and immunities, and
hold him to an account there, either civilly or criminally,
for their infringement, I submit to the calm and candid
judgment of every member of this House that there is no
tribunal so fitted, where equal and exact justice would
be more likely to be meted out in temper, in moderation,
in severity, if need be, but always according to the law
and the fact, as that great tribunal of the Constitution."
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 476 (1871) (hereinafter
Globe).
See also id., at 332 ( remarks of Rep. Hoar); id., at 375 (remarks of Rep. Lowe); id., at 448-449 (remarks of Rep. Butler); id., at 459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn). 6
The 1871 Congress intended § 1 to "throw open the doors of
the United States courts" to individuals who were threatened
with, or who had suffered, the deprivation of constitutional
rights, Globe 376 (remarks of Rep. Lowe), and to provide
these individuals immediate access to the federal courts not6
Opponents of the bill also recognized this purpose and complained that
the bill would usurp the States' power, centralize the government and perhaps ultimately destroy the States. See, e. g., Globe 337, 338 (remarks of
Rep. Whitthorne); id ., at 352 (remarks of Rep. Beck); id., at 361 (remarks
of Rep. Swann); id., at 365 (remarks of Rep. Arthur); id ., at 385 (remarks
of Rep. Lewis); id., at 429, 431 (remarks of Rep. McHenry); id., at 454 (remarks of Rep. Cox); id., at 510, 511 (remarks of Rep. Eldridge); Cong.
Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 46 (remarks of Rep. Ken-) (hereinafter
Globe App. ); id ., at 216 (remarks of Sen. Thurman); id., at 243 (remarks of
Sen. Bayard).
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withstanding any provision of state law to the contrary. For
example, Senator Edmunds, who introduced the bill in the
Senate, stated in his closing remarks that the bill was similar
in principle to an earlier act upheld by this Court in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539 (1842):
"[T]he Supreme Court decided ... that it was the solemn duty of Congress under the Constitution to secure
to the individual, in spite of the State, or \Vith its aid, as
the case might be, precisely the rights that the Constitution gave him, and that there should be no intermediate
autho1-ity to arrest or oppose the direct pe1:{onnance of
this duty by Cong1·ess." Globe 692 (emphasis added).
Similarly, Representative Elliott viewed the issue as
whether "the Government of the United States [has] the
right, under the Constitution, to protect a citizen in the exercise of his vested rights as an American citizen by ... the assertion of imntediate jurisdiction th1·ough its courts, without
the appeal or agency of the State in which the citizen is domiciled." ld., at 389 (emphasis added). See, e. g., id., at 459
(remarks of Rep. Coburn); id., at 807 (remarks of Rep. Garfield); id., at 609 (remarks of Sen. Pool); Globe App. 141 (remarks of Rep. Shanks). 7
7
Opponents criticized this provision on this very ground. For example, Rep. Storm lamented:
"[Section one] does not even give the State courts a chance to try questions, or to show whether they will try the questions that might come before them under the first section of the fourteenth amendment, fairly or
not . It takes the whole question away from them in the beginning."
Globe App. 86.
See also Globe 416 (remarks of Rep. Biggs) ("for the violation of the rights,
privileges, and immunities of the citizen a civil remedy is to be had by proceedings in the Federal courts, State authorization in the premises to the
contrary not\dthstanding"); id., at 337 (remarks of Rep. Whitthorne); id.,
at 373 (remarks of Rep. Archer); Globe App. 216 (remarks of Sen.
Thurman).
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A second theme in the debates further suggests that the
1871 Congress would not have wanted to impose an exhaustion requirement. A major factor motivating the expansion
of federal court jurisdiction through §§ 1 and 2 of the bill was
the belief of the 1871 Congress that the state authorities had
been unable or unwilling to protect the constitutional rights
of individuals or to punish those who violated these rights.
See, e. g., Globe 321 (remarks of Rep. Stroughton) ("[t]he
State authorities and local courts are unable or unwilling to
check the evil or punish the criminals"); id., at 374 (remarks
of Rep. Lowe) ("the local administrations have been found inadequate or unwilling to apply the proper corrective"); id., at
459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn); id., at 609 (remarks of Sen.
Pool); id., at 687 (remarks of Sen. Shurz); id., at 691 (remarks
of Sen. Edmunds); Globe App. 185 (remarks of Rep. Platt). •
Of primary importance to the exhaustion question was the
mistrust that the 1871 Congress held for the fact-finding processes of state institutions. See, e. g., Globe 320 (Testimony
of Hon. Thomas Settle, Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court, before the House Judiciary Committee) ("[t]he
defect lies not so much with the courts as with the juries");
id., at 394 (remarks of Rep. Rainey); Globe App. 311 (remarks of Rep. Maynard). This Congress believed that federal courts would be less susceptible to local prejudice and to
the existing defects in the fact-finding processes of the state
courts. See, e. g., Globe 322 (remarks of Rep. Stoughton);
' This view was expressed in the Presidential message urging the passing of corrective legislation. See Globe 244 ("That the power to correct
these evils is beyond the control of State authorities I do not doubt.") (Message of Pres. Grant). The inability of state authorities to protect constitutional rights was also expressed in the findings of the House Judiciary
Committee, which had been directed to investigate the situation. See id.,
at 320. The resolution introduced by Senator Sherman instructing the
Senate Judiciary Committee to report a bill expressed a similar view. See
Globe App. 210 (state "courts are rendered utterly powerless by organized
perjury to punish crime").
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id., at 459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn). ~ This perceived defect in the States' fact-finding processes is particularly relevant to the question of exhaustion of administrative remedies: exhaustion rules are often applied in deference to the
superior fact-finding ability of the relevant administrative
agency. See, e. g., McKart v. United States, 395 U. S., at
192-196.
A third feature of the debates relevant to the exhaustion
question is the fact that many legislators interpreted the bill
to provide dual or concurrent forums in the state and federal
system, enabling the plaintiff to choose the forum in which to
seek relief. Cf. Monme v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 183 (1961)
("[t]he federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy,
and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the
federal one is invoked"). For example, Senator Thurman
noted:
"I object to [§ 1], first, because of the centralizing tendency of transferring all mere private suits, as well as
the punishment of offenses, from the State into the Federal courts. I do not say that this section gives to the
Federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. I do not suppose
that it is so understood. It leaves it, I presume, in the
option of the person who imagines himself to be injured
to sue in the State court or in the Federal court, an option that he who has been the least injured, but who has
some malice to gratify, will be the most likely to avail
himself of." Globe App. 216.

See also Globe 578, 694-695 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds); id.,
at 334 (remarks of Rep. Hoar); id., at 514 (remarks of Rep.
' Opponents viewed the bill as a declaration of mistrust for state tribunals. See, e. g., Globe 360 (remarks of Rep. Swann); id. , at 397 (remarks
of Rep. Rice); id., at 454 (remarks of Rep. Cox); Globe App. 216 (remarks
of Sen. Thurman). RepresentatiYe McHenry found particularly offensive
the remoYal of the fact-finding function from the local institutions. See
Globe 429.
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Farnworth); Globe App. 85 (remarks of Rep. Bingham)
("[a]dmitting that the States have concurrent power to enforce the Constitution of the United States within their respective limits, must we wait for their action?").
This legislative history supports the conclusion that our
prior decisions, holding that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action under
§ 1983, did not misperceive the statutory intent: it seems fair
to infer that the 1871 Congress did not intend that an individual be compelled in every case to exhaust state administrative remedies before filing an action under § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act. We recognize, however, that drawing such a
conclusion from this history alone is somewhat precarious:
the 1871 Congress was not presented with the question of exhaustion of administrative remedies, nor was it aware of the
potential role of state administrative agencies. Therefore,
we do not rely exclusively on this legislative history in deciding the question presented here. Congress addressed the
question of exhaustion under § 1983 when it recently enacted
42 U. S. C. § 1997e (1976 ed., Supp. IV). The legislative history to § 1997e provides strong evidence of congressional intent on this issue.
B

The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42
U. S. C. § 1997 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV), was enacted primarily to ensure that the United States Attorney General
has "legal standing to enforce existing constitutional rights
and Federal statutory rights of institutionalized persons."
Conf. Rep. No. 96-897, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1980) (Conf.
Rep.). In § 1997e, Congress also created a specific, limited
exhaustion requirement for adult prisoners bringing actions
pursuant to § 1983. Section 1997e and its legislative history
demonstrate that Congress understood that exhaustion is not
generally required in § 1983 actions, and that it decided to
carve out only a narrow exception to this rule. A judicially

r'
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imposed exhaustion requirement would be inconsistent with
Congress' decision to adopt § 1997e and would usurp policy
judgments that Congress has reserved for itself.
In considering whether an exhaustion requirement should
be incorporated into the bill, Congress clearly expressed its
belief that a decision to require exhaustion for certain § 1983
actions would work a change in the law. Witnesses testifying before the subcommittee that drafted the bill discussed
the decisions of this Court holding that exhaustion was not
required. See, e. g., Hearings on H.R. 2439 and H.R. 5791
before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1977) (1977 Hearings); id., at 47; id.,
at 69, 77; id., at 323; Hearings on H.R. 10 before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Adminstration
of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 48 (1979) (1979 Hearings). During these hearings,
Representative Kastenmeier, Chairman of this subcommittee, stated:
"Another thing that I think requires some discussion
within the committee, and is a point of argument, ... is
whether there ought to be an exhaustion of remedies
requirement .
. . . In fact, I think it has been pointed out that if [we]
were to require it, particularly in 1983, that would constitute regression from the current state of the law. It
would set the law back, because presently it is clearly
held, that is the Supreme Court has held, that in 1983
civil rights suits the litigant need not necessarily fully
exhaust State remedies." 1977 Hearings, at 57-58.
See also id., at 272 (remarks of Rep. Drinan) (Rep. Railsback
"grounds his bill on doing something which the Supreme
Court has consistently refused to do, namely require exhaustion of remedies"); 1979 Hearings 26 (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier) (adopting § 1997e "was resisted as a possible en-
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croachment on civil liberties; that is to say, in the free,
unimpeded resort to 1983").
The debates over adopting an exhaustion requirement also
reflect this understanding. See, e. g., 124 Gong. Rec. H3370
(May 1, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Volkmer and Rep. Kastenmeier); id., at H4624 (May 25, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Ertel);
id., at H7 481 (July 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Wiggins) ("it is
settled law that an exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not required as a precondition of maintaining a 1983 action");
125 Gong. Rec. H3641 (May 23, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Butler) ("[u]nder existing law ther is no requirement that a complainant first ask the State prison system to help him").
With the understanding that exhaustion generally is not required, Congress decided to adopt the limited exhaustion requirement of § 1997e in order to relieve the burden on the
federal courts by diverting certain prisoner petitions back
through state and local institutions, and also to encourage the
States to develop appropriate grievance procedures. See, e.
g. Conf. Rep. 9; 124 Gong. Rec. H3358 (May 1, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier); id., at H3358, H3365 (remarks
of Rep. Railsback); id., at H4621 (May 25, 1978) (remarks of
Rep. Kastenmeier); id., at H4624 (remarks of Rep. Ertel);
id., at H7477 (July 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier);
id., at H7480-H7481 (remarks of Rep. Butler); id., at H7481
(remarks of Rep. Ertel). Implicit in this decision is Congress' conclusion that the no-exhaustion rule should be left
standing with respect to other § 1983 suits.
A judicially imposed exhaustion requirement would also be
inconsistent with the extraordinarily detailed exhaustion
scheme embodied in§ 1997e. Section 1997e carves out a narrow exception to the general no-exhaustion rule to govern
certain prisoner claims, and establishes a procedure to ensure
that the administrative remedies are adequate and effective.
The exhaustion requirement is expressly limited to § 1983 ac-
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tions brought by an adult convicted of a crime. 42 U. S. C.
§ 1997e(a)(l) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). 10 Section 1997e(b)(l) instructs the Attorney General to "promulgate minimum standards for the development and implementation of a plain,
speedy, and effective system" of administrative remedies,
and § 1997e(b)(2) specifies certain minimum standards that
must be included. 11 A court may require exhaustion of administrative remedies only if "the Attorney General has certified or the court has determined that such administrative
remedies are in substantial compliance with the minimum acceptable standards promulgated under subsection (b)."
§ 1997e(a)(2). Before exhaustion may be required, the court
must further conclude that it "would be appropriate and in
the interests of justice." § 1997e(a)(l)Y Finally, in those
Representative Kastenmeier explains why juYeniles were not included
in § 1997e:
"I think very candidly we should admit that the first reluctance to resort to
this mechanism embodied in [§ 1997e] was resisted as a possible encroachment on civil liberties; that is to sa~·. in the free, unimpeded resort to 1983;
because it does deflect 1983 petitions back into-temporarily in any
event-back into the State system. Therefore, to the extent that it is
even so viewed, not\\ithstanding the limited form of [§ 1997e], that it
should also extend to juveniles was rejected." 1979 Hearings 26.
11
Section 1997e(b)(2) provides:
The minimum standards shall provide(A) for an advisory role for employees and inmates of any jail, prison, or
other correctional institution (at the most decentralized level as is reasonably possible), in the formulation, implementation, and operation of the
system;
(B) specific maximum time limits for written replies to grieYances with
reasons thereto at each decision level within the system;
(C) for priority processing of grievances which are of an emergency nature, including matters in which delay would subject the grieYant to substantial risk of personal injury or other damages;
(D) for safeguards to avoid reprisals against any grievant or participant
in the resolution of a grievance; and
(E) for independent review of the disposition of grieYances, including alleged reprisals, by a person or other entity not under the direct supervision
or direct control of the institution."
12
The Committee Reports state that Congress did not intend that every
10

.'
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§ 1983 actions meeting all the statutory requirements for exhaustion, the district court may not dismiss the case, but may
only "continue such case for a period of not to exceed ninety
days in order to require exhaustion." Ibid. This detailed
scheme is inconsistent with discretion to impose, on an ad hoc
basis, a judicially developed exhaustion rule in other cases.
Congress hoped that § 1997e would improve prison conditions by stimulating the development of successful grievance
mechanisms. See, e. g., Conf. Rep. 9; H.R. Rep. No. 96-80,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979); 1979 Hearings 4 (remarks of
Rep. Railsback); 124 Cong. Rec. H3354 (May 1, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Railsback); 125 Cong. Rec. H3637 (May 23
1979) (remarks of Rep. Drinan); 126 Cong. Rec. H3497 (May
12, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier). To further this
purpose, Congress yielded primary jurisdiction over certain
§ 1983 claims to state prisons only on the condition that these
prisons develop adequate procedures. This purpose would
be frustrated by judicial discretion to impose exhaustion generally: the States would have no incentive to adopt grievance
procedures capable of certification, because prisoner § 1983
cases could be diverted to state administrative remedies in
any event.
In sum, the exhaustion provisions of the Act make sense,
and are not superfluous, only if exhaustion could not be required before its enactment and if Congress intended to
§ 1983 action brought by an adult prisoner in institutions with appropriate
grieYance procedures be delayed pending exhaustion:
"It is the intent of the Congress that the court not find such a requirement
appropriate in those situations in which the action brought pursuant to
[§ 1983] raises issues which cannot, in reasonable probability, be resolved
by the grievance resolution system, including cases where imminent danger to life is alleged. Allegations unrelated to conditions of confinement,
such as those which center on events outside of the institution, would not
appropriately be continued for resolution by the grievance resolution
system." Conf. Rep. 15.
See also H. R. Rep. No. 96-80, 96th Con g., 1st Sess. 25 (1979); S. Rep. No.
96--416, 96th Con g., 1st Sess. 34 (1979).
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carve out a narrow exception to this no-exhaustion rule.
The legislative history to§ 1997e demonstrates that Congress
has taken the approach of carving out specific exceptions to
the general rule that federal courts cannot require exhaustion
under § 1983. It is not our province to alter the balance
struck by Congress in establishing the procedural framework
for bringing actions under § 1983.

c
Respondent and the Court of Appeals argue that exhaustion of administrative remedies should be required because it
would further various policies. They argue that an exhaustion requirement would lessen the perceived burden that
§ 1983 actions impose on federal courts; 13 would further the
goal of comity and improve federal-state relations by postponing federal court review until after the state administrative agency had passed on the issue; ~ and would enable
the agency, which presumably has expertise in the area at
issue, to enlighten the federal court's ultimate decision.
As we noted earlier, policy considerations alone cannot justify judicially imposed exhaustion unless exhaustion is con, supra.
sistent with congressional intent. See
Furthermore, as the debates over incorporating the exhaustion requirement in § 1997e demonstrate, the relevant policy
considerations do not invariably point in one direction, and
1

11
Of course, this burden alone is not sufficient to justify a judicial decision to alter congressionally imposed jurisdiction. See Thetmiron Products, Inc. Y. Hamansdm:fer, 423 U. S. 336, 344 (1976); United Steelworkers Y. Bouligny, 382 U. S. 145, 150-151 (1965). In any event, it is by no
means clear that judicial discretion to impose an exhaustion requirement in
~ 1983 actions would lessen the case load of the federal courts, at least in the
short run. See-- and n. 18, infra.
"The application of these federalism principles to actions brought pursuant to § 1983 has prompted criticism by several commentators. See, e. g ..
Koury, Section 1983 and Civil Comity: Two for the Federalism Seesaw, 25
Loyola L. ReY. 659 (1979); Note, 39 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 838 (1964).

\
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there is vehement disagreement over the validity of the assumptions underlying many of them. 15 The very difficulty of
these policy considerations, and Congress' superior institutional competence to pursue this debate, suggest that legislative not judicial solutions are preferable. Cf. Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 317 (1980); United Steelwo1·kers
v. Bouligny, 382 U. S. 146, 150, 153 (1965).
Beyond the policy issues that must be resolved in deciding
whethe1· to require exhaustion, there are equally difficult
questions concerning the design and scope of an exhaustion
requirement. These questions include how to define those
categories of § 1983 claims in which exhaustion might be desirable; how to unify and centralize the standards for judging
the kinds of administrative procedures that should be exhausted;16 what tolling requirements and time limitations
16
For example, there is serious disagreement over whether judicial or
administrative procedures offer § 1983 plaintiffs the swiftest, least costly,
and most reliable remedy. See, e. g., 1977 Hearings 263-264; id., at
232-233; Note, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1201, 1207 (1968). Similarly, there is
debate over whether the specialization of federal courts in constitutional
law is more important than the specialization of administrative agencies in
their areas of expertise, and over whether the symbolic and institutional
function of federal courts in defining, legitimizing, and enforcing constitutional claims outweighs the educational function that state and local agencies can serve. See, e. g., Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 Mich. L.
Rev. 5, 23 (1980); Note, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1201, 1208 (1968). Finally, it is
uncertain whether the present "free market" system, under which litigants
are free to pursue administrative remedies if they truly appear to be
cheaper, more efficient, and more effective, is more likely to induce the
creation of adequate remedies than a McKart-type standard under which
plaintiffs have no initial choice. See, e. g. , Note, 8 Ind. L. Rev. 565 (1975).
Cf. 1977 Hearings 21, 34, 51; Hearings on S.l393 before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Con g., 1st
Sess. 442 (1977).
16
Section 1997e resolved this problem by directing the Attorney General
to promulgate minimum standards and to establish a procedure by which
prison administrative remedies could be reviewed and certified.
§ 1997e(b) & (c). If a procedure has not been certified, the court is di-

80--1874-0PINION
18

PATSY v. FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS

should be adopted; 17 what is the res judicata and collateral estoppel effect of particular administrative determinations;
what consequences should attach to the failure to comply
with procedural requirements of administrative proceedings;
and whether federal courts could grant necessary interim injunctive relief and hold the action pending exhaustion, or proceed to judgment without requiring exhaustion even though
exhaustion might otherwise be required, where the relevant
administrative agency is either powerless or not inclined to
grant such interim relief. These and similar questions might
be answered swiftly and surely by legislation, but would create costly, remedy-delaying, and court-burdening litigation if
answered incrementally by the judiciary in the context of diverse constitutional claims relating to thousands of different
state agencies. 1'
rected to compare the procedure with the Attorney General's standards
and to continue the case pending exhaustion only if the procedure is in substantial compliance with the standards of the Attorney General.
§ 1997e(a)(2).
"Unless the doctrine that statutes of limitations are not tolled pending
exhaustion were ove1Tuled, see Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S.
478 (1980), a judicially imposed exhaustion requirement might result in the
effective repeal of§ 1983. Congress avoided this problem in§ 1997e by directing the court to merely continue the case for a period not to exceed 90
days.
'' The initial bill proposing to include an exhaustion requirement in
§ 1997e provided:
"Relief shall not be granted by a district court in an action brought pursuant to [§ 1983] by an individual involuntarily confined in any State institution ... , unless it appears that the individual has exhausted such plain,
speedy, and efficient State administrative remedy as is available." H. R.
5791, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
Congress declined to adopt this McKart-type standard after witnesses testified that this procedure would bog down the courts in massive procedural
litigation thereby frustrating the purpose of relieving the caseloads of the
federal courts, that state procedures are often not effective and take too
much time, and that the court would have to judge a myriad of state procedures without much guidance. See, e. g., 1977 Hearings 34-35, 51,

,,
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The very variety of claims, claimants, and state agencies
involved in § 1983 cases argues for congressional consideration of the myriad of policy considerations, and may explain
why Congress, in deciding whether to require exhaustion in
certain § 1983 actions brought by adult prisoners, carved out
such a narrow, detailed exception to the no-exhaustion rule.
After full debate and consideration of the various policy arguments, Congress adopted § 1997, taking the largest class of
§ 1983 actions and constructing an exhaustion requirement
that differs substantially from the M cKart-type standard
urged by respondents and adopted by the Court of Appeals.
See note 18, supm. It is not for us to say whether Congress
will or should create a similar scheme for other categories of
§ 1983 claims or whether Congress will or should adopt analtogether different exhaustion requirement for nonprisoner
§ 1983 claims. 19
164-165, 169-170, 263-264, 323; 1979 Hearings 48-49.
'"The question was posed from the bench at oral argument whether the
Eleventh Amendment might bar this suit on the ground that the Board of
Regents is an arm of the State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 20. Cf. Alabama\'. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978). Compare Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911) with
Florida Dept of Health \'. Florida Nursing Home Assn, 450 U. S. 147
(1981). The District Court dismissed this action on the pleadings, and no
Eleventh Amendment issue had been raised. The Board of Regents first
raised this issue in its brief to the original panel on appeal, but did not
argue it in its brief on rehearing en bane. Neither the original panel nor
the en bane court addressed this issue. Although the State mentioned a
possible Eleventh Amendment defense in its response in opposition to the
petition for certiorari, it did not brief the issue or press it at oral argument.
Indeed, the state attorney general urged that we affirm the Court of Appeals solely on its exhaustion holding. Tr. of Oral Arg. 24, 27.
We have noted that "the Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar" that it may be raised by the
State for the first time on appeal. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 678
(1974). However, because of the importance of state Jaw in analyzing
Eleventh Amendment questions and because the State may, under certain
circumstances, waive this defense, we have never held that it is jurisdic-
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IV

Based on the legislative histories of both § 1983 and
§ 1997e, we conclude that exhaustion of state administrative
remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing
an action pursuant to § 1983. We decline to overturn our
prior decisions holding that such exhaustion is not required.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

tiona! in the sense that it must be raised and decided by this Court on its
own motion. Cf. Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 279
(1977). Where, as here, the Board of Regents expressly requested that
we address the exhaustion question and not pass on its potential Eleventh
Amendment immunity, and, as a consequence, the parties have not briefed
the issue, we deem it appropriate to address the issue that was raised and
decided below and vigorously pressed in this Court. Nothing in this opinion precludes the Board of Regents from raising its Eleventh Amendment
claim on remand. The District Court is in the best position to address in
the first instance the competing questions of fact and state-law necessary
to resolve the Eleventh Amendment issue, and at this stage it has the discretion to permit amendments to the pleadings that might cure any potential Eleventh Amendment problems.
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delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether exhaustion of
state administrative remedies is a prerequisite to an action
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Petitioner Georgia Patsy filed this
action, alleging that her employer, Florida International University (FlU), had denied her employment opportunities
solely on the basis of her race and sex. By a divided vote,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
found that petitioner was required to exhaust "adequate and
appropriate" administrative remedies, and remanded the
case to the District Court to consider the adequacy of the administrative procedures. Patsy v. Florida International
University, 634 F . 2d 900 (CA5 1981) (en bane). We reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
JUSTICE MARSHALL

I

Petitioner alleges that even though she is well-qualified
and has received uniformly excellent performance evaluations from her supervisors, she has been rejected for more
than thirteen positions at FlU.' She further claims that
' Because this case is here on a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the
factual allegations in petitioner's amended complaint. In her initial complaint, petitioner named FlU as the defendant. Relying on Byron v. Uni-

JUN 1 8 1982.
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FlU has unlawfully filled positions through intentional discrimination on the basis of race and sex. She seeks declaratory and injunctive relief or, in the alternative, damages. 2
The United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida granted respondent Board of Regents' motion to
dismiss because petitioner had not exhausted available administrative remedies. On appeal, a panel of the Court of
Appeals reversed, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Patsy v. Florida International University, 612
F. 2d 946 (CA5 1980). The full court then granted respondent's petition for rehearing and vacated the panel decision.
The Court of Appeals reviewed numerous opinions of this
Court holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies
was not required, and concluded that these cases did not preclude the application of a "flexible" exhaustion rule. 634
F. 2d, at 908. After canvassing the policy arguments in favor of an exhaustion requirement, the Court of Appeals decided that a § 1983 plaintiff could be required to exhaust administrative remedies if the following minimum conditions
are met: (1) an orderly system of review or appeal is provided
by statute or agency rule; (2) the agency can grant relief
more or less commensurate with the claim; (3) relief is availversity of Florida, 403 F. Supp. 49 (ND Fla. 1975), the District Court
granted FlU's motion to dismiss, holding that the Board of Regents and
not the individual university had the capacity to sue and be sued under
Florida law. The District Court granted petitioner leave to amend, and
she amended her complaint to name the Board of Regents "on behalf of'
FlU.
2
Petitioner requested the District Court to "[r lequire Defendants to
remedy the discrimination practiced upon Plaintiff by promoting her to the
next available position consistent with those previously applied for and for
which she is qualified or in the alternative, to require the Defendants to
pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $500,000 as actual and exemplary damages."
Record 47. Petitioner also requested that the District Court "order further equitable and injunctive relief as it deems appropriate and necessary
to correct the conditions of discrimination complained of herein." Record
48.
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able within a reasonable period of time; (4) the procedures
are fair, are not unduly burdensome, and are not used to harass or discourage those with legitimate claims; and (5) interim relief is available, in appropriate cases, to prevent irreparable injury and to preserve the plaintiffs rights during
the administrative process. Where these minimum standards are met, a court must further consider the particular administrative scheme, the nature of the plaintiffs interest, and
the values served by the exhaustion doctrine in order to determine whether exhaustion should be required. I d., at
912--913. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the
District Court to determine whether exhaustion would be appropriate in this case.
II
The question whether exhaustion of administrative remedies should ever be required in a § 1983 action has prompted
vigorous debate and disagreement. See, e. g., Turner,
When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Cases
in the Federal Courts, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 610 (1979); Note, 8
Ind. L. Rev. 565 (1975); Note, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 537 (1974).
Our resolution of this issue, however, is made much easier
because we are not writing on a clean slate. This Court has
addressed this issue, as well as related issues, on several
prior occasions.
Respondent suggests that our prior precedents do not control our decision today, arguing that these cases can be distinguished on their facts or that this Court did not "fully" consider the question whether exhaustion should be required.
This contention need not detain us long. Beginning with
McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668, 671-673
(1963), we have on numerous occasions rejected the argument that a § 1983 action should be dismissed where the
plaintiff has not exhausted state administrative remedies.
See Barry v. Bachi, 443 U. S. 55, 63 n. 10 (1979); Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 574 (1973); Carter v. Stanton, 405
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U. S. 669, 671 (1972); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249,
251 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U. S. 639, 640 (1968);
King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 312 n. 4 (1968); Damico v.
California, 389 U. S. 416 (1967). Cf. Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U. S. 452, 473 (1974) ("[w]hen federal claims are
premised on [§ 1983]-as they are here-we have not required exhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies, recognizing the paramount role Congress has assigned
to the federal courts to protect constitutional rights"). Respondent may be correct in arguing that several of these decisions could have been based on traditional exceptions to the
exhaustion doctrine. Nevertheless, this Court has stated
categorically that exhaustion is not a prerequiste to an action
under § 1983, and we have not deviated from that position in
the 19 years since McNeese. Therefore, we do not address
the question presented in this case as one of first impression.

III
Respondent argues that we should reconsider these decisions and adopt the Court of Appeals' exhaustion rule, which
was based on McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185 (1969).
This Court has never announced a definitive formula for
determining whether prior decisions should be overruled or
reconsidered. However, in Monell v. New York City Dept.
of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 695-701 (1978), we articulated four factors that should be considered. Two of these
factors-whether the decisions in question misconstrued the
meaning of the statute as revealed in its legislative history
and whether overruling these decisions would be inconsistent
with more recent expressions of congressional intent-are
particularly relevant to our decision today. 3 Both concern
The other factors discussed in M onell-whether the decisions in question constituted a departure from prior decisions and whether overruling
these decisions would frustrate legitimate reliance on their holdings-do
not support overruling these decisions. MeN eese was not a departure
from prior decisions-this Court had not previously addressed the applica3

80-1874-0PINION
PATSY v. FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS

5

legislative purpose, which is of paramount importance in the
exhaustion context because Congress is vested with the
power to prescribe the basic procedural scheme under which
claims may be heard in federal courts. Of course, courts
play an important role in determining the limits of an exhaustion requirement and may impose such a requirement even
where Congress has not expressly so provided. However,
the initial question whether exhaustion is required should be
answered by reference to congressional intent; and a court
should not defer the exercise of jurisdiction under a federal
statute unless it is consistent with that intent. 4 Therefore,
in deciding whether we should reconsider our prior decisions
and require exhaustion of state administrative remedies, we
look to congressional intent as reflected in the legislative history of the predecessor to § 1983 and in recent congressional
activity in this area.

A
In determining whether our prior decisions misconstrued
tion of the exhaustion rule to § 1983 actions. Overruling these decisions
might injure those § 1983 plaintiffs who had foregone or waived their state
administrative remedies in reliance on these decisions.
' Congressional intent is important in determining the application of the
exhaustion doctrine to cases in which federal administrative remedies are
available, as well as to those in which state remedies are available. Of
course, exhaustion is required where Congress provides that certain administrative remedies shall be exclusive. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938). Even where the statutory requirement of exhaustion is not explicit, courts are guided by congressional
intent in determining whether application of the doctrine would be consistent with the statutory scheme. In determining whether exhaustion of federal administrative remedies is required, courts generally focus on the role
Congress has assigned to the relevant federal agency, and tailor the exhaustion rule to fit the particular administrative scheme created by Congress. See McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 193-195 (1969).
With state administrative remedies, the focus is not so much on the role
assigned to the state agency, but the role of the state agency becomes important once a court finds that deferring its exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with statutory intent.
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the meaning of § 1983, we begin with a review of the legislative history to § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13,
the precursor to § 1983. 5 Although we recognize that the
1871 Congress did not expressly contemplate the exhaustion
question, we believe that the tenor of the debates over § 1
supports our conclusion that exhaustion of administrative
remedies in § 1983 actions should not be judicially imposed.
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, along with the Fourteenth
Amendment it was enacted to enforce, were crucial ingredients in the basic alteration of our federal system accomplished during the Reconstruction era. During that time,
the Federal Government was clearly established as a guarantor of the basic federal rights of individuals against incursions
by state power. As we recognized in Mitchum v. Foster,
407 U. S. 225, 242 (1972) (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100
U. S. 339, 346 (1879)), "[t]he very purpose of § 1983 was to
interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect
the people from unconstitutional action under color of state
law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative, or
judicial.'"
At least three recurring themes in the debates over § 1 cast
serious doubt on the suggestion that requiring exhaustion of
state administrative remedies would be consistent with the
intent of the 1871 Congress. First, in passing § 1, Congress
assigned to the federal courts a paramount role in protecting
constitutional rights. Representative Dawes expressed this
view as follows:
"The first remedy proposed by this bill is a resort to the
courts of the United States. Is that a proper place in
which to find redress for any such wrongs? If there be
Some of the debates relating to § 2, which created certain federal
crimes in addition to those defined in § 2 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 14
Stat. 27, aimed primarily at the Ku Klux Klan, are also relevant to our discussion of § 1.
5

•

h
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power to call into courts of the United States an offender
against these rights, privileges, and immunities, and
·hold him to an account there, either civilly or criminally,
·for their infringement, I submit to the calm and candid
judgment of every member of this House that there is no
tribunal so fitted, where equal and exact justice would
be more likely to be meted out in temper, in moderation,
in severity, if need be, but always according to the law
and the fact, as that great tribunal of the Constitution."
Gong. Globe, 42d Gong., 1st Sess. 476 (1871) (hereinafter
Globe).
See also id., at 332 (remarks of Rep. Hoar); id., at 375 (remarks of Rep. Lowe); id., at 448-449 (remarks of Rep. Butler); id., at 459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn). 6
The 1871 Congress intended § 1 to "throw open the doors of
the United States courts" to individuals who were threatened
with, or who had suffered, the deprivation of constitutional
rights, Globe 376 (remarks of Rep. Lowe), and to provide
these individuals immediate access to the federal courts notwithstanding any provision of state law to the contrary. For
example, Senator Edmunds, who introduced the bill in the
Senate, stated in his closing remarks that the bill was similar
in principle to an earlier act upheld by this Court in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539 (1842):
"[T]he Supreme Court decided . . . that it was the sol6
Opponents of the bill also recognized this purpose and complained that
the bill would usurp the States' power, centralize the government and perhaps ultimately destroy the States. See, e. g., Globe 337, 338 (remarks of
Rep. Whitthorne); id., at 352 (remarks of Rep. Beck); id., at 361 (remarks
of Rep. Swann); id., at 365 (remarks of Rep. Arthur); id., at 385 (remarks
of Rep. Lewis); id., at 429, 431 (remarks of Rep. McHenry); id., at 454 (remarks of Rep. Cox); id., at 510, 511 (remarks of Rep. Eldridge); Cong.
Globe, 42d Con g., 1st Sess., App. 46 (remarks of Rep. Kerr) (hereinafter
Globe App. ); id., at 216 (remarks of Sen. Thurman); id., at 243 (remarks of
Sen. Bayard).

I

•
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emn duty of Congress under the Constitution to secure
to the individual, in spite of the State, or with its aid, as
the case might be, precisely the rights that the Constitution gave him, and that there should be no intermediate
authority to arrest or oppose the direct performance of
this duty by Congress." Globe 692 (emphasis added).
Similarly, Representative Elliott viewed the issue as
whether "the Government of the United States [has] the
right, under the Constitution, to protect a citizen in the exercise of his vested rights as an American citizen by . . . the assertion of immediate jurisdiction through its courts, without
the appeal or agency of the State in which the citizen is domiciled." ld., at 389 (emphasis added). See, e. g., id., at 459
(remarks of Rep. Coburn); id., at 807 (remarks of Rep. Garfield); id., at 609 (remarks of Sen. Pool); Globe App. 141 (remarks of Rep. Shanks). 7
A second theme in the debates further suggests that the
1871 Congress would not have wanted to impose an exhaustion requirement. A major factor motivating the expansion
of federal court jurisdiction through §§ 1 and 2 of the bill was
the belief of the 1871 Congress that the state authorities had
been unable or unwilling to protect the constitutional rights
of individuals or to punish those who violated these rights.
7
Opponents criticized this provision on this very ground. For example, Rep. Storm lamented:
"[Section one] does not even give the State courts a chance to try questions, or to show whether they will try the questions that might come before them under the first section of the fourteenth amendment, fairly or
not. It takes the whole question away from them in the beginning."
Globe App. 86.
See also Globe 416 (remarks of Rep. Biggs) ("for the violation of the rights,
privileges, and immunities of the citizen a civil remedy is to be had by proceedings in the Federal courts, State authorization in the premises to the
contrary notwithstanding''); i d., at 337 (remarks of Rep. Whitthorne); id.,
at 373 (remarks of Rep. Archer); Globe App. 216 (remarks of Sen.
Thurman).
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See, e. g., Globe 321 (remarks of Rep. Stroughton) ("[t]he
State authorities and local courts are unable or unwilling to
check the evil or punish the criminals"); id., at 374 (remarks
of Rep. Lowe) ("the local administrations have been found inadequate or unwilling to apply the proper corrective"); id., at
459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn); id., at 609 (remarks of Sen.
Pool); id., at 687 (remarks of Sen. Shurz); id., at 691 (remarks
of Sen. Edmunds); Globe App. 185 (remarks of Rep. Platt). 8
Of primary importance to the exhaustion question was the
mistrust that the 1871 Congress held for the fact-finding processes of state institutions. See, e. g., Globe 320 (Testimony
of Hon. Thomas Settle, Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court, before the House Judiciary Committee) ("[t]he
defect lies not so much with the courts as with the juries");
id., at 394 (remarks of Rep. Rainey); Globe App. 311 (remarks of Rep. Maynard). This Congress believed that federal courts would be less susceptible to local prejudice and to
the existing defects in the fact-finding processes of the state
courts. See, e. g., Globe 322 (remarks of Rep. Stoughton);
id., at 459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn). 9 This perceived defect in the States' fact-finding processes is particularly rele8
This view was expressed in the Presidential message urging the passing of corrective legislation. See Globe 244 ("That the power to correct
these evils is beyond the control of State authorities I do not doubt.") (Message of Pres. Grant). The inability of state authorities to protect constitutional rights was also expressed in the findings of the House Judiciary
Committee, which had been directed to investigate the situation. See id.,
at 320. The resolution introduced by Senator Sherman instructing the
Senate Judiciary Committee to report a bill expressed a similar view. See
Globe App. 210 (state "courts are rendered utterly powerless by organized
perjury to punish crime").
9
Opponents viewed the bill as a declaration of mistrust for state tribunals. See, e. g., Globe 360 (remarks of Rep. Swann); id., at 397 (remarks
of Rep. Rice); id., at 454 (remarks of Rep. Cox); Globe App. 216 (remarks
of Sen. Thurman). Representative McHenry found particularly offensive
the removal of the fact-finding function from the local institutions. See
Globe 429.
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vant to the question of exhaustion of administrative remedies: exhaustion rules are often applied in deference to the
superior fact-finding ability of the relevant administrative
agency. See, e. g., McKart v. United States, 395 U. S., at
192-196.
A third feature of the debates relevant to the exhaustion
question is the fact that many legislators interpreted the bill
to provide dual or concurrent forums in the state and federal
system, enabling the plaintiff to choose the forum in which to
seek relief. Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 183 (1961)
("[t]he federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy,
and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the
federal one is invoked"). For example, Senator Thurman
noted:
"I object to [§ 1], first, because of the centralizing tendency of transferring all mere private suits, as well as
the punishment of offenses, from the State into the Federal courts. I do not say that this section gives to the
Federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. I do not suppose
that it is so understood. It leaves it, I presume, in the
option of the person who imagines himself to be injured
to sue in the State court or in the Federal court, an option that he who has been the least injured, but who has
some malice to gratify, will be the most likely to avail
himself of." Globe App. 216.
See also Globe 578, 694-695 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds); id.,
at 334 (remarks of Rep. Hoar); id., at 514 (remarks of Rep.
Farnworth); Globe App. 85 (remarks of Rep. Bingham)
("[a]dmitting that the States have concurrent power to enforce the Constitution of the United States within their respective limits, must we wait for their action?").
This legislative history supports the conclusion that our
prior decisions, holding that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action under
§ 1983, did not misperceive the statutory intent: it seems fair
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to infer that the 1871 Congress did not intend that an individual be compelled in every case to exhaust state administrative remedies before filing an action under § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act. We recognize, however, that drawing such a
conclusion from this history alone is somewhat precarious:
the 1871 Congress was not presented with the question of exhaustion of administrative remedies, nor was it aware of the
potential role of state administrative agencies. Therefore,
we do not rely exclusively on this legislative history in deciding the question presented here. Congress addressed the
question of exhaustion under§ 1983 when it recently enacted
42 U. S. C. § 1997e (1976 ed., Supp. IV). The legislative history to § 1997e provides strong evidence of congressional intent on this issue.
B

The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42
U. S. C. § 1997 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV), was enacted primarily to ensure that the United States Attorney General
has "legal standing to enforce existing constitutional rights
and Federal statutory rights of institutionalized persons."
Conf. Rep. No. 9~97, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1980) (Conf.
Rep.). In § 1997e, Congress also created a specific, limited
exhaustion requirement for adult prisoners bringing actions
pursuant to § 1983. Section 1997e and its legislative history
demonstrate that Congress understood that exhaustion is not
generally required in § 1983 actions, and that it decided to
carve out only a narrow exception to this rule. A judicially
imposed exhaustion requirement would be inconsistent with
Congress' decision to adopt § 1997e and would usurp policy
judgments that Congress has reserved for itself.
In considering whether an exhaustion requirement should
be incorporated into the bill, Congress clearly expressed its
belief that a decision to require exhaustion for certain § 1983
actions would work a change in the law. Witnesses testifying before the subcommittee that drafted the bill discussed

~

...
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the decisions of this Court holding that exhaustion was not
required. See, e.g_., Hearings on H.R. 2439 and H.R. 5791
before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1977) (1977 Hearings); id., at 47; id.,
at 69, 77; id., at 323; Hearings on H.R. 10 before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Adminstration
of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 48 (1979) (1979 Hearings). During these hearings,
Representative Kastenmeier, Chairman of this subcommittee, stated:
"Another thing that I think requires some discussion
within the committee, and is a point of argument, ... is
whether there ought to be an exhaustion of remedies
requirement .
. . . In fact, I think it has been pointed out that if [we]
were to require it, particularly in 1983, that would constitute regression from the current state of the law. It
would set the law back, because presently it is clearly
held, that is the Supreme Court has held, that in 1983
civil rights suits the litigant need not necessarily fully
exhaust State remedies." 1977 Hearings, at 57-58.
See also id., at 272 (remarks of Rep. Drinan) (Rep. Railsback
"grounds his bill on doing something which the Supreme
Court has consistently refused to do, namely require exhaustion of remedies"); 1979 Hearings 26 (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier) (adopting § 1997e "was resisted as a possible encroachment on civil liberties; that is to say, in the free,
unimpeded resort to 1983").
The debates over adopting an exhaustion requirement also
reflect this understanding. See, e. g., 124 Cong. Rec. H3370
(May 1, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Volkmer and Rep. Kastenmeier); id., at H4624 (May 25, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Ertel);
id., at H7481 (July 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Wiggins) ("it is
settled law that an exhaustion of administrative remedies is
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not required as a precondition of maintaining a 1983 action");
125 Cong. Rec. H3641 (May 23, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Butler) ("[u]nder existing law ther is no requirement that a complainant first ask the State prison system to help him").
With the understanding that exhaustion generally is not required, Congress decided to adopt the limited exhaustion requirement of § 1997e in order to relieve the burden on the
federal courts by diverting certain prisoner petitions back
through state and local institutions, and also to encourage the
States to develop appropriate grievance procedures. See, e.
g. Conf. Rep. 9; 124 Cong. Rec. H3358 (May 1, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier); id., at H3358, H3365 (remarks
of Rep. Railsback); id., at H4621 (May 25, 1978) (remarks of
Rep. Kastenmeier); id., at H4624 (remarks of Rep. Ertel);
id., at H7477 (July 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier);
id., at H7480-H7481 (remarks of Rep. Butler); id., at H7481
(remarks of Rep. Ertel). Implicit in this decision is Congress' conclusion that the no-exhaustion rule should be left
standing with respect to other § 1983 suits.
A judicially imposed exhaustion requirement would also be
inconsistent with the extraordinarily detailed exhaustion
scheme embodied in§ 1997e. Section 1997e carves out a narrow exception to the general no-exhaustion rule to govern
certain prisoner claims, and establishes a procedure to ensure
that the administrative remedies are adequate and effective.
The exhaustion requirement is expressly limited to § 1983 actions brought by an adult convicted of a crime. 42 U. S. C.
§ 1997e(a)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). 10 Section 1997e(b)(1) inRepresentative Kastenmeier explains why juveniles were not included
in§ 1997e:
"I think very candidly we should admit that the first reluctance to resort to
this mechanism embodied in[§ 1997e] was resisted as a possible encroachment on civil liberties; that is to say, in the free, unimpeded resort to 1983;
because it does deflect 1983 petitions back inter-temporarily in any
event-back into the State system. Therefore, to the extent that it is
even so viewed, notwithstanding the limited form of [§ 1997e], that it
10

'.

'

'
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structs the Attorney General to "promulgate minimum standards for the development and implementation of a plain,
speedy, and effective system" of administrative remedies,
and § 1997e(b)(2) specifies certain minimum standards that
must be included. 11 A court may require exhaustion of administrative remedies only if "the Attorney General has certified or the court has determined that such administrative
remedies are in substantial compliance with the minimum acceptable standards promulgated under subsection (b)."
§ 1997e(a)(2). Before exhaustion may be required, the court
must further conclude that it "would be appropriate and in
the interests of justice." § 1997e(a)(1). 12 Finally, in those
§ 1983 actions meeting all the statutory requirements for exshould also extend to juveniles was rejected." 1979 Hearings 26.
"Section 1997e(b)(2) states:
The minimum standards shall provide(A) for an advisory role for employees and inmates of any jail, prison, or
other correctional institution (at the most decentralized level as is reasonably possible), in the formulation, implementation, and operation of the
system;
(B) specific maximum time limits for written replies to grievances with
reasons thereto at each decision level within the system;
(C) for priority processing of grievances which are of an emergency nature , including matters in which delay would subject the grievant to substantial risk of personal injury or other damages;
(D) for safeguards to avoid reprisals against any grievant or participant
in the resolution of a grievance; and
(E) for independent review of the disposition of grievances, including alleged reprisals, by a person or other entity not under the direct supervision
or direct control of the institution."
12
The Committee Reports state that Congress did not intend that every
§ 1983 action brought by an adult prisoner in institutions with appropriate
grievance procedures be delayed pending exhaustion:
"It is the intent of the Congress that the court not find such a requirement
appropriate in those situations in which the action brought pursuant to
[§ 1983] raises issues which cannot, in reasonable probability, be resolved
by the grievance resolution system, including cases where imminent danger to life is alleged. Allegations unrelated to conditions of confinement,
such as those which center on events outside of the institution, would not
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haustion, the district court may not dismiss the case, but may
only "continue such case for a period of not to exceed ninety
days in order to require exhaustion." Ibid. This detailed
scheme is inconsistent with discretion to impose, on an ad hoc
basis, a judicially developed exhaustion rule in other cases.
Congress hoped that § 1997e would improve prison conditions by stimulating the development of successful grievance
mechanisms. See, e. g., Conf. Rep. 9; H.R. Rep. No. 96-80,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979); 1979 Hearings 4 (remarks of
Rep. Railsback); 124 Cong. Rec. H3354 (May 1, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Railsback); 125 Cong. Rec. H3637 (May 23
1979) (remarks of Rep. Drinan); 126 Cong. Rec. H3497 (May
12, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier). To further this
purpose, Congress provided for the deferral of the exercise of
federal jurisdiction over certain § 1983 claims only on the condition that the state prisons develop adequate procedures.
This purpose would be frustrated by judicial discretion to impose exhaustion generally: the States would have no incentive to adopt grievance procedures capable of certification,
because prisoner § 1983 cases could be diverted to state administrative remedies in any event.
In sum, the exhaustion provisions of the Act make sense,
and are not superfluous, only if exhaustion could not be required before its enactment and if Congress intended to
carve out a narrow exception to this no-exhaustion rule.
The legislative history to§ 1997e demonstrates that Congress
has taken the approach of carving out specific exceptions to
the general rule that federal courts cannot require exhaustion
under § 1983. It is not our province to alter the balance
struck by Congress in establishing the procedural framework
for bringing actions under § 1983.
appropriately be continued for resolution by the grievance resolution
system." Conf. Rep. 15.
See also H.R. Rep. No. 96-80, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1979); S. Rep. No.
96-416, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1979).
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Respondent and the Court of Appeals argue that exhaustion of administrative remedies should be required because it
would further various policies. They argue that an exhaustion requirement would lessen the perceived burden that
§ 1983 actions impose on federal courts; 13 would further the
goal of comity and improve federal-state relations by postponing federal court review until after the state administrative agency had passed on the issue; 14 and would enable
the agency, which presumably has expertise in the area at
issue, to enlighten the federal court's ultimate decision.
As we noted earlier, policy considerations alone cannot justify judicially imposed exhaustion unless exhaustion is consistent with congressional intent. See 4-5 and n. 4, supra.
Furthermore, as the debates over incorporating the exhaustion requirement in § 1997e demonstrate, the relevant policy
considerations do not invariably point in one direction, and
there is vehement disagreement over the validity of the assumptions underlying many of them. 15 The very difficulty of
13
Of course, this burden alone is not sufficient to justify a judicial decision to alter congressionally imposed jurisdiction. See Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Herrnansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336, 344 (1976); United Steelworkers v. Bouligny, 382 U. S. 145, 150-151 (1965). In any event, it is by no
means clear that judicial discretion to impose an exhaustion requirement in
§ 1983 actions would lessen the caseload of the federal courts, at least in the
short run. See 17-18 and n. 18, infra.
14
The application of these federalism principles to actions brought pursuant to§ 1983 has prompted criticism by several commentators. See, e. g.,
Koury, Section 1983 and Civil Comity: Two for the Federalism Seesaw, 25
Loyola L. Rev. 659 (1979); Note, 39 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 838 (1964).
15
For example, there is serious disagreement over whether judicial or
administrative procedures offer § 1983 plaintiffs the swiftest, least costly,
and most reliable remedy. See, e. g., 1977 Hearings 263--264; id. , at
232-233; Note, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1201, 1207 (1968). Similarly, there is
debate over whether the specialization of federal courts in constitutional
law is more important than the specialization of administrative agencies in
their areas of expertise, and over whether the symbolic and institutional
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these policy considerations, and Congress' superior institutional competence to pursue this debate, suggest that legislative not judicial solutions are preferable. Cf. Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 317 (1980); United Steelworkers
v. Bouligny, 382 U. S. 146, 150, 153 (1965).
Beyond the policy issues that must be resolved in deciding
whether to require exhaustion, there are equally difficult
questions concerning the design and scope of an exhaustion
requirement. These questions include how to define those
categories of § 1983 claims in which exhaustion might be desirable; how to unify and centralize the standards for judging
the kinds of administrative procedures that should be exhausted;16 what tolling requirements and time limitations
should be adopted; 17 what is the res judicata and collateral esfunction of federal courts in defining, legitimizing, and enforcing constitutional claims outweighs the educational function that state and local agencies can serve. See, e. g., Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 Mich. L.
Rev. 5, 23 (1980); Note, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1201, 1208 (1968). Finally, it is
uncertain whether the present "free market" system, under which litigants
are free to pursue administrative remedies if they truly appear to be
cheaper, more efficient, and more effective, is more likely to induce the
creation of adequate remedies than a McKart-type standard under which
plaintiffs have no initial choice. See, e. g., Note, 8 Ind. L. Rev. 565 (1975).
Cf. 1977 Hearings 21, 34, 51; Hearings on S.1393 before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 442 (1977).
16
Section 1997e resolved this problem by directing the Attorney General
to promulgate minimum standards and to establish a procedure by which
prison administrative remedies could be reviewed and certified.
§ 1997e(b) & (c). If a procedure has not been certified, the court is directed to compare the procedure with the Attorney General's standards
and to continue the case pending exhaustion only if the procedure is in substantial compliance with the standards of the Attorney General.
§ 1997e(a)(2).
17
Unless the doctrine that statutes of limitations are not tolled pending
exhaustion were overruled, see Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S.
478 (1980), a judicially imposed exhaustion requirement might result in the
effective repeal of§ 1983. Congress avoided this problem in§ 1997e by di-

".J.' .;
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toppel effect of particular administrative determinations;
what consequences should attach to the failure to comply
with procedural requirements of administrative proceedings;
and whether federal courts could grant necessary interim injunctive relief and hold the action pending exhaustion, or proceed to judgment without requiring exhaustion even though
exhaustion might otherwise be required, where the relevant
administrative agency is either powerless or not inclined to
grant such interim relief. These and similar questions might
be answered swiftly and surely by legislation, but would create costly, remedy-delaying, and court-burdening litigation if
answered incrementally by the judiciary in the context of diverse constitutional claims relating to thousands of different
state agencies. 18
The very variety of claims, claimants, and state agencies
involved in § 1983 cases argues for congressional consideration of the myriad of policy considerations, and may explain
why Congress, in deciding whether to require exhaustion in
certain § 1983 actions brought by adult prisoners, carved out
such a narrow, detailed exception to the no-exhaustion rule.
recting the court to merely continue the case for a period not to exceed 90
days.
18
The initial bill proposing to include an exhaustion requirement in
§ 1997e provided:
"Relief shall not be granted by a district court in an action brought pursuant to [§ 1983] by an individual involuntarily confined in any State institution . . . , unless it appears that the individual has exhausted such plain,
speedy, and efficient State administrative remedy as is available." H. R.
5791, 95th Gong., 1st Sess. (1977).
Congress declined to adopt this McKart-type standard after witnesses testified that this procedure would bog down the courts in massive procedural
litigation thereby frustrating the purpose of relieving the caseloads of the
federal courts, that state procedures are often not effective and take too
much time, and that the court would have to judge a myriad of state procedures without much guidance. See, e. g., 1977 Hearings 34-35, 51,
164-165, 169-170, 263-264, 323; 1979 Hearings 48-49.
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After full debate and consideration of the various policy arguments, Congress adopted § 1997, taking the largest class of
§ 1983 actions and constructing an exhaustion requirement
that differs substantially from the M cKart-type standard
urged by respondents and adopted by the Court of Appeals.
See note 18, supra. It is not for us to say whether Congress
will or should create a similar scheme for other categories of
§ 1983 claims or whether Congress will or should adopt an altogether different exhaustion requirement for nonprisoner
§ 1983 claims. 19
The question was posed from the bench at oral argument whether the
Eleventh Amendment might bar this suit on the ground that the Board of
Regents is an arm of the State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 20. Cf. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978). Compare Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911), with
Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn, 450 U. S. 147
(1981). The District Court dismissed this action on the pleadings, and no
Eleventh Amendment issue had been raised. The Board of Regents first
raised this issue in its brief to the original panel on appeal, but did not
argue it in its brief on rehearing en bane. Neither the original panel nor
the en bane court addressed this issue. Although the State mentioned a
possible Eleventh Amendment defense in its response in opposition to the
petition for certiorari, it did not brief the issue or press it at oral argument.
Indeed, the assistant state attorney general urged that we affirm the
Court of Appeals solely on its exhaustion holding. Tr. of Oral Arg. 24, 27.
We have noted that "the Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar" that it may be raised by the
State for the first time on appeal. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 678
(1974). However, because of the importance of state law in analyzing
Eleventh Amendment questions and because the State may, under certain
circumstances, waive this defense, we have never held that it is jurisdictional in the sense that it must be raised and decided by this Court on its
own motion. Cf. Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 279
(1977). Where, as here, the Board of Regents expressly requested that
we address the exhaustion question and not pass on its potential Eleventh
Amendment immunity, and, as a consequence, the 12!!-~ have not bri ~fed
t~ , we deem it appropriate to address the issue that was raised and
decided below and vigorously pressed in this Court. Nothing in this opinion precludes the Board of Regents from raising its Eleventh Amendment
19
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IV
Based on the legislative histories of both § 1983 and
§ 1997e, we conclude that exhaustion of state administrative
remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing
an action pursuant to § 1983. We decline to overturn our
prior decisions holding that such exhaustion is not required.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

claim on remand. The District Court is in the best position to address in
the first instance the competing questions of fact and state law necessary to
resolve the Eleventh Amendment issue, and at this stage it has the discretion to permit amendments to the pleadings that might cure any potential
Eleventh Amendment problems.
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, 1982]

JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The Court holds that the Board of Regents of the State of
Florida, a state instrumentality, is subject to suit in federal
court notwithstanding the bar of the Eleventh Amendment.
The Court reaches this conclusion through an unprecedented- and far reaching- expansion of the holding in Ex
Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908). As I consider the
Court's holding a serious departure from established constitutional doctrine, this dissent addresses primarily the
Eleventh Amendment issue.
I dissent also from the Court's rejection of the rule of "flexible" exhaustion of state administrative remedies developed
and stated persuasively by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, sitting en bane. In disagreeing \vith the 17 judges
of the Court of Appeals who adopted the flexible exhaustion
principle, this Court places mistaken reliance on the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1997 et '· .
seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV). I disagree \Vith both portions of the
Court's holding and therefore dissent.
I The Eleventh Amendment
A
In this "reverse discrimination" action, petitioner, an employee of the Florida International University, brought suit

~-
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under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against the Board of Regents of the
State of Florida. 1 She did not name the individual regents
as defendants. She sued for $500,000 in damages, and for
injunctive and other equitable relief.2. The Board filed a motion to dismiss arguing that petitioner's suit was premature
in light of her failure to exhaust availabl~ &:lministrative remedies. The District Court agreed and ~~hted the motion to
1
dismiss.
\ ~
On petitioner's appeal, the Board added the bar of the
Eleventh Amendment to its defense. 3 It argued that as an
instrumentality of the State, the Board could not be subjected to suit in federal court absent a v;aiver of immunity.~
'As the Court notes, see ante, at - -, n. 1, petitioner originally named
the Florida International University as defendant. Because the Florida
International University lacks the capacity to sue or be sued, the District
Court found that it was not a proper defendant. Petitioner was permitted
to amend her complaint, and she simply substituted the Board of Regents.
In addition to racial discrimination, petitioner also claimed that she had
been discriminated against on the basis of her sex.
2
Petitioner sought a declaratory judgment "declaring that the Plaintiff
has suffered from acts of discrimination." In addition, she asked the court
to "[r]equire Defendants to remedy the discrimination practiced upon
Plaintiff by promoting her to the next available position consistent with
. those previously applied for and for which she is qualified or in the alternative, to require the Defendants to pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $500,000
as actual and exemplary damages." She requested such further equitable
and injunctive relief as the court deems appropriate. App. 38--40.
3
The Eleventh Amendment provides:
"The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State."
The Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional in miture, and the defense of
the Amendment may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 678 (1974) ("Eleventh Amendment defense
sufficienty partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not
be raised in the trial court.")
• "As a corporate state agency and component of state government, the
[Board] operates ,,·ith state funds, directs the [State UniYersity System],

~----
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And it asserted that there had teen no waiver. Although
the Board of Regents was created ·as a body corporate with
power "to sue and be sued ... to plead and be impleaded in
all courts of law and equity," Fla. Stat. §240.042(1), it is
well established that language such as tl:lis does not operate
to waive the defense of the Eleventh )Amendment. 5 In
t

~

\

'·~~-

and is local neither in character nor operation. As"the 'arm of the state'
\Vhich manages the Division of Universities of the Depa1tment of Education, it is clearly part of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes."
Brief at 18.
The Board of Regents of the Division of Universities of the Department
of Education is established by the Florida Education Code as a part of the
State University System. Fla. Stat. 240.2011. The Board consists of the
Commissioner of Education and twelve citizens appointed by the Governor,
approved by three members of the Cabinet, and confirmed by the Senate.
Fla. Stat. 240.207. The chief administrative officer of the Board is the
Chancellor, who serves by appointment of the Board.
The Board has general supervisory authority over the State University
System. Fla. Stat. 240.209. Among its duties are the appointment of
university presidents, the review of budget requests of each university in
the state system, the preparation of an aggregated budget for the State
University System, the development of a master plan, and the establishment of a systemwide personnel classification and pay plan. Fla. Stat.
§ 240.209.
The Board is an agency of the State of Florida. Fla. Stat. § 216.011.
See Relyea v. State, 385 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. App. 1980). The Board may
claim the defense of sovereign immunity in suits under state law. See id.
Numerous courts of appeals have held state universities or state Boards
of Regents immune from suit in federal court by reason of the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e. g., Rutledge v. Arizona Boa,rd of Regents, 660 F. 2d
1345, 1349 (CA9 1981); Brennan v. University of Kansa,s, 451 F. 2d 1287
(CA10 1971); Ronwin v. Shapiro, 657 F. 2d 1071 (CA9 1981).
"See Fl01·ida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Hom~. 450 U. S. 147,
150 (1981); Petty v. Tennes see-Missouri BJ-idge Commn, 359 U. S. 275,
276-277 (1959) ("The conclusion that there has been a waiver of immunity
will not be lightly inferred. . . And where a public instrumentality is created with the right 'to sue and be sued' that waiver of immunity in the particular setting may be restJicted to suits or proceedings of a special character in the state, not the federal courts"); Great Northern Insurance Co. v. '·.
Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54. See Bmgg Y. Bom·d of Public Instntction, 36 So.

/
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reply, petitioner argued that whether the statute creating
the Board amounted to a waive;- and petitioner believed
that it did-the Eleventh Amendment simply was irrelevant
to the equitable claims she had lodged against the State.
See Reply Brief at 3-4.
Neither the Court of Appeals panel nor the Court of Ap<
peals en bane addressed the Board's E}~venth
Amendment
defense. They directed their attention ~l~ly to the question
of exhaustion of administrative remedies."· The panel held
that there was no exhaustion requirement in § 1983 suits and
remanded to the District Court for consideration of the
Board's Eleventh Amendment argument. 612 F. 2d 946
(CA5 1980). The Court of Appeals, sitting en bane, reversed
holding that § 1983 plaintiffs must exhaust available and reasonable administrative remedies. 634 F. 2d 900 (CA5 1981).
Again the court did not consider the Board's Eleventh
Amendment defense.
The Eleventh Amendment question ,,·as fu·st raised before
this Com;t in the Board's response to the petition for \Vrit of
certiorari. The Board argued, as it had on appeal, that it
was an arm of the State and that it had not waived its immunity from suit in federal court. Again petitioner argued that
at most the Eleventh Amendment defense would bar her
claim for damages. And, even as to this claim, petitioner
now argued that the Amendment would not bar damages if
the Board could meet the claim out of its "own funds"-e. g.,
from gifts and bequests-rather than from the State Treasury. These arguments were repeated at oral argument. 6
As the Court acknowledges, the Eleventh Amendment
question is jurisdictional and must be confronted at the outset. See ante, a t - -.

•• - .j

2d 222 (Fla. 1948) ("The mere fact that the Board of Public Instruction is
created as a body corporate with power to sue and be sued does not affect
its immunity from tort").
"Tr. of Oral Argument 25-28, 4~1.
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B{
In interpreting the Eleventh Amendment, the Court has
sought to accommodate both the principle of sovereign immunity embodied in the Amendment and the states' duty to
obey-and the federal courts to enforc~~federallaw . Thus,
it is well established that the State is no{ "divested of its immunity 'on the mere ground that the cak1is one arising under
the Constitution or laws of the United St~tes."' Parden v.
Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184, 186 (1964), quoting, Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 10 (1890).' It also is settled that
when a State itself is not named as a party to the suit, the
Amendment nevertheless applies if the State is the real party
in interest. See Ford Motor Co. v. Departnwnt of Treasury,
323 U. S. 459 (1945).8
On the other hand, the Court has not interpreted the
Amendment to bar federal court jurisdiction when the State
has consented to suit, 9 or to bar review by this Court of an

1j
l

. !

'I

_l

7
In Hans the Court also held that the Amendment bars suits brought
against an unconsenting State by its own citizens, although by its terms the
Am endment does not apply to this situation. Cf. Monaco v. Mississippi,
292 U. S. 313 (1934) (Ele\'enth Amendment applies to federal suits against
an unconsenting state by a foreign nation). By contrast, the Amendment
has not been applied to suits against a State brought by another State or by
the United States. Nm'lh Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U. S. 365 (1923);
United States v. Mississippi, 380 U. S. 128 (1965).
8
In Ford Motor the plaintiff sued the Department of Treasury of the
State of Indiana, and the three officials- the Governor, Treasurer, and Auditor- who constituted the Board of the Department of Treasury. The
plaintiff sought a refund of gross income taxes paid to the department.
Suit was brought in federal District Court. The Court held that the suit
was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The plaintiff was seeking a refund from the state not a personal judgn1ent against the individual officials:
"[W]hen the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the
state, the state is the real party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants." 323 U. S., at 464. See Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 663;
Great Northern Life Insumnce Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47 (1944).
'·
• See Clark v. Banwrd, 108 U. S. 436, 447 (1883); Parden v. Tenninal
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action brought against the State in slate court. 1° Congress
may lift the bar of the Amendment ~'hen exercising powers
granted to it by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). Counties and
municipalities may not claim immunity under the Amendment. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U, S. 529 (1890);
Mt. Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U ~ l 274, 279:-281
(1977) And under Ex parte Young, 209 U~ S. 123 (1908), a
federal court may order state officials to ob~Y:·federal law in
the future. 11
Application of these settled principles to the present case is
straightforward. This is an action under § 1983, and Congress has not removed the bar of the Eleventh Amendment
R. Co., 377 U. S. 184 (1964).
10
See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 445 (1900); Great Northern Life
Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 57 (1944); Chandler v. Di.x, 194 U. S. 590,
592 (1904). The Court's assumption of jwisdiction in University of Califomia Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978), a case originating
in state court, thus provides no support for today's decision. For the same
reason, the Court's reliance upon Hopkins \'. Clemson AgricultU?·al College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911), is misplaced. See infm.
11
Under the theory, some would say fiction, of Ex parte Young, the
Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against state officers because
when a state officer "comes into conflict with the superior authority of [the]
Constitution, ... he is ... stripped of his official or representative character." I d., at 159. On this analysis, a prospective injunction requiring the
official to conform his future behavior to federal Jaw, does not require anything of the State and therefore does not b1ing the Eleventh Amendment
to bear. The granting of retroactive relief, on the other hand, would require the official to take action in his offical capacity. Thus, if the official is
required to pay damages from state funds, the State is directly affected.
See Edelman v. Jordan, supm. Similarly, retroactive injunctive relief
may require the official to take action in his official capacity and also would
be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Cf. Larson ' '· Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). Ofcom·se, in addition to prospective injunctive relief, a plaintiff may seek damages from the individual
officer in his personal capacity. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232,
237- 238 (1974).
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in such actions. See Quern v. ~ordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979).
Petitioner seeks relief from the Board of Regents of the State
of Florida, an instrumentality or agency of the State. The
Board is not a local political body but bears responsibility for
the State university system as a whole.. Cf. Mt. Healthy Bd.
of Ed. v. Doyle, supm. Petitioner's ar~ment that the statute incorporating the Board should be :ubderstood
to waive
' ,
the Eleventh Amendment is foreclose<\ "FJY numerous decisions of this Court. See, e. g., Florida 'Dept of Health v.
Florida Nursing Honu Assn, 450 U. S. 147 (1981). 12 Similarly, petitioner's suggestion that the Eleventh Amendment
does not apply to equitable claims against a state is incorrect.
See Cory v. White, - - U.S. - - (1982).
Thus, unless the rule in Ex parte Young, supra, is extended beyond any previous decision of this Court, the Eleventh Amendment bars this suit. The theory in Ex pane
Young, supra, has no application to the State itself or to an
instrumentality of the State. If petitioner had sued the individual members of the Board, her claim for damages against
them would not have been barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Nor would her claim for equitable relief have been
barred to the extent it were limited to future conduct. But
petitioner did not sue the members of the Board. She sued
only the Board itself, an arm of the State of Florida. Moreover, the }\J-iJ:aeiple relief sought by petitioner would impose~

In Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn, 450 U. S.
147 (1981), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the Florida
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services had consented to suit.
The court based its finding of waiver, in part, on the fact that the Department was a "body corporate" with the capacity to "sue and be sued" under
state law. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 402.34. This Court reversed holding that a
general waiver of sovereign immunity does not amount to a waiver of the
Eleventh Amendment. See id., at 150. See note 5, supra.
Without distinguishing Florida Dept of Health, supm, the Court leaves
open the question of whether the Board has consented to suit. See ante,
at 9 & n. 10.
12

.,
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in the alternative--an affirmative du~y on the Board to promote her to the next available posftion of comparable status
to those to which she had applied 1 ·or would "require the
[Board] to pay to [petitioner] the sum of $500,000 as actual
and exemplary damages." App., 39. See n. 3, ante.
One would have thought that Ex parte Young was simply
irrelevant in these circumstances. Althbugh an individual
official may be viewed as acting on his owri:,ahd v.rithout State
authority when acting against federal lawJ the State- or an
agency of the State- cannot act other than in its official State
capacity. Similarly, an action for damages against the state,
or an arm of the state, seeks damages that must be paid from
the state 1s own coffers. Whether the damages come directly
from the State's general fund or from some other State fund,
the money is no less the State's. Indeed, direct application
of Ex parte Young to the State and its instrumentalities
\\'ould read the Eleventh Amendment out of the Constitution.
If the bar of the Amendment is lifted merely upon the naming
of a State board, commission, agency or corporation- opening the way to damages as well as to injunctive relief- then
the Amendment no longer would afford constitutionally pre. scribed protection to the states.

c
Despite the weight of these considerations, the Court concludes that this action is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Indeed, the Court undertakes to apply Ex parte
Young to the Board of Regents itself. Relying upon the decision in Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S.
636 (1911), the Court reasons that the Board of Regents, as a
body corporate, is no different from a state official. The
Court attempts to bolster this novel conclusion by observing
that under Florida law the Board of Regents is termed the
"director" of the Division of Universities. The Court concludes that, just as in Ex pa1ie Young, the Board of Regents
"may be sued for unconstitutional or unauthorized actions, as ... .

---------
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...
long as the plaintiff is not seeking monetary relief that must
be paid out of the state treasury." hnte, at 8.
The Court's conclusion is supported neither by reason nor
precedents of this Court. As indicated above, the rationale
of Ex parte Young does not apply to a Stci.te or State instillmentality. The State cannot be "stripped" ofjts o~ authority. Moreover, if the Board of Regents is &tate agencyand it clearly is- then its assets are also those' bf the State's.
Yet the Court's decision exposes the Board's ~s~ets to a damage award on the double fiction that the Boai·d is really an
"official" and that its separate assets somehow belong to this
fictitious being rather than to the State. On such a theory, a
state welfare board, highway department or any other
agency, board or department of a state with any separate
funds or income could be sued for damages. Such a conclusion is at odds with the Court's holding in Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. Tax Conmm, 327 U. S. 573 (1946), that the segregated funds of the State Tax Commission were State monies
subject to ·the Eleventh Amendment.
Nor does the Board of Regents' corporate status under
state law support the Court's holding. State governments
consist in major part of a variety of boards, commissions,
agencies, and corporations. These State entities are no less
instruments of the State because they may be vested under
state law with the power to contract, to sue and be sued.
This Court repeatedly has held the Eleventh Amendment to
bar suit against such state corporate agencies. See Great
·Northern Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47; Ford Motor
Co. v. Depart?nent of Treasury, 323 U. S. 454 (1945);
Kennecott Coppper Corp. v. State Tax Commn, 327 U. S.
572 (1946).
Thus, in Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184
(1964), the Court assumed that a state owned railroad- as an
instrumentality of the State- was immune from suit in federal court absent a waiver. The railway in Parden was authorized to operate "as though it were an ordinary common .... ·
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carrier." 377 U. S. 185. It perfo'rmed services for profit
and had contracts and agreemenfi> with various labor organizations. It was "indisputably a common carrier ... engaging in interstate commerce." /d.: at 185. No suggestion
was made that as a State body, with separate funds, the railroad was no longer an instrumentality of_the State but was
merely a State official. And just last te~m the Court held
. .'
that the Fl01ida Department of Health, ·a !'body corporate"
under State law was immune from suit.\ '':Florida Dept of
Health v. Florida Nursing Horne Assn, 450 U. S. 147 (1981).
Cf. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) ("There can be no
doubt ... that suit against the State and its Board of Corrections is barred by the Eleventh Amendment"). The Court's
' conclusion that corporate status converts a State body into a
State official, subject to suit, cannot be reconciled with these
well established precedents.
D
I am unav,•are of any prior decision of this Court that supports the Court's application of Ex parte Young to State instrumentalities. Hopkins v. Clemson College, supm, relied
upon so heavily by the Court, is simply irrelevant. In that
case suit was brought against a state college in state court to
recover damages caused by the college's construction of a
dyke. The state courts held that the college was protected
from suit by the state law of sovereign immunity. Although
the Court discussed the Eleventh Amendment in some detail,
there was simply no Eleventh Amendment question in that
case. 13 It was clear before Hopkins that the Eleventh
"The state college recognized that there was no Eleventh Amendment
question. In its brief it noted : "It is difficult to see how either Section 2 of
Article III, of the Constitution of the United States or the Eleventh
amendment has any application to the inquiry whether a suit by a citizen of
a State in its own Courts is a suit against that State. That seems to be
purely a question oflocallaw to be determined by the State Court." Brief
at 20.
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Amendment did not apply to bar revie~ in this Court of any
federal question presented in a suit against a State in state
court. See note 10, supra. However th~ holding in Hopkins
may be viewed, no Eleventh Amendment question was presented to the Court. 14 It therefore is no surprise that the
opinion has never been cited by this Court for the proposition
that the Eleventh Amendment is no bar to ~suit against a
state agency in federal court. If the case co).Ifg be viewed as
standing for the proposition that state agenc1e~. may be sued
as if they were state officials, the case long s1nce has been
overruled sub silento by subsequent decisions. See Florida
Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn, supra.
Hopkins does not deserve the pride of place given to it by the
majority. 15 It is in fact a non-precedent.
The Court today simply announces a new doctrine, one
that exposes the instrumentalities of the State itself to suit in
federal court. 16 After today's decision, state boards and
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"Hopkins has been viewed primarily as standing for a principle of
agency law. See La1·son v. Domestic & F01·eign Corp ., 337 U. S. 682,
694 (1949) ("agent's liabiity for torts committed by him cannot be aYoided
by pleading the direction or authorization of his principal"); Hamilton Mfg.
Co. v. Trustees of State Colleges in Colorado, 356 F. 2d 599, 601 n. 1 (CAlO
1966).
,. The irrelevance of Hopkins is further indicated by the fact that the College's activities in that case were viewed as prop1ietary in nature:
"(T]his is not an action against the College for a tort committed in the prosecution of any governmental function. The fee was in the State, but the
corporation, as equitable owner, was in possession, use and enjoyment of
the property. For protecting the bottom land the College, for its own corporate purposes and advantage, constructed the dyke. In so doing it was
not acting in any governmental capacity. The embankment was in law
similar to one which might have been built for private purposes by the
plaintiff on the other side of the river. 221 U. S., at 647._
Cf. Employees v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U. S.
279 (1973) (distinguishing Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184
(1964), on the basis that Parden concerned State proprietary activity).
16
The Court suggests that in prior decisions the Court has permitted suit
against State Boards of Regents. See ante, at 5. Yet in none of these ....
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commissions may be sued for injunctive relief. The Court
also holds that such bodies may b~ sued for damages on the
fiction that their segregated assets are not the State's. 17 The
Court's extension of Ex parte Young to the State itself destroys the rationale of that decision. It also undermines the
careful balance worked out in this sensitive area of the law.
"'
:- ji

.

..

suits was the jurisdictional issue posed as it is her\:,·
. A. Thus, for example, in
University of Californi.a Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 26S (1978),
the Eleventh Amendment issue was not present because the case was here
on petition to the California Supreme Court. See note S, supra. And in
each of the other cases cited by the Court, the plaintiff had the good sense
to name other defendants in addition to the particular state board. See, e.
g., Board of Regents v. Tom..anio, 446 U. S. 478 (1978); McLaurin v. Okl.ahom.a St.ate Regents, 339 U. S. 637 (19SO).
The Court also argues that the courts of appeals are split on the question
of whether damages can be awarded against state uniYersities. Yet the
two cases cited by the Court to demonstrate a split on this question do not
support the Court's assertion. In SONI v. Board of Tru.stees, S13 F. 2d
347 (CA6 197S) the court found that the Board of Trustees had waived its
immunity to suit, while in Goss v. Jacinto Junior College, S88 F. 2d 96,
98-99 (CAS 1979) the court reasoned that the particular junior college was
similar to a county or municipality, an "independent 'political subdivision'
as a matter of Texas statutory and common law." The Court suggests as
well that the courts of appeals are agreed that injunctive relief may be
awarded against state universities and state boards of regents. Again the
cases cited provide little support for the Court's assertion. In New Engl.and Patriots Football Club, Inc. v. University of Colorado, S92 F. 2d
1196, 1201 (CA11979), the court held that individual members of the Board
of Regents might be sued for prospective injunctive relief. It did not hold,
as the Court implies, that the University itself might be sued. Rather, it
accepted "the University's identification \\1th the state." And in Gay Student Services v. Texas A & M University, 612 F. 2d 160, 16S (CAS 1980), it
is unclear that the court held more than that officials of the University
could be sued for injunctive relief. Unlike the situation in those two cases,
petitioner sued only the Board of Regents. Numerous courts of appeals
have held state board of regents to be immune from suit in federal court by
reason of the Eleventh Amendment. See n. 4, supra.
"Whether a State board, like a State official, may claim good faith immunity is not clear but of substantial significance. See Owen v. City of Jnde- ... .
pendence, 44S U. S. 622 (1980).
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The decision is simply wrong. The Court should dismiss
the suit on the basis of the Eleventb Amendment.
II Exhaustion of Remedies
In view of my belief that this case should be dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds, I address the exh?,.ustion question
only briefly. Seventeen judges joined in':' the
Court of Ap..
peal's persuasive opinion adopting a rule of(S.exible" exhaustion of administrative remedies in § 1983.. suits. Other
Courts of Appeals have adopted a similar rule. See e. g.,
Ei.sen v. Eastrnan, 421 F. 2d 560 (CA2 1969); Secret v.
Brierton,_584 F. 2d 823 (CA 7 1978). The opinjon for the en
bane court carefully reviewed the exhaustion doctrine in general and as applied to § 1983 actions. It found that the prior
decisions of this Court did not clearly decide the question. 18
See Barry v. Bm·chi, 443 U. S. 55, 63 n. 10 (1979); Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 575 n. 14 (1973). And it concluded
that the exhaustion of adequate and appropriate state administrative r emedies would promote the achievement of the
rights protected by § 1983.
·
I agree with the Court of Appeals' opinion. The requirement that a § 1983 plaintiff exhaust adequate state administrative remedies was the accepted rule of law until quite recently. See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S.
210, (1908) (opinion of Justice Holmes). The rule rests on
sound considerations. It does not defeat federal court jurisdiction, it merely defers it. 19 It permits the states to correct

-t

•• "[I)n all the ca ses in which the Supreme Court has articulated its noexhau sbon rule, the state administr~ve r emedies were sufficiently inadequate that exhaustion would not have been appropriate in any event."
Dev elopm ents in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv. L. Rev.
1133, 1274 (1977).
'"Cf. Fair Assess m-ent in Real Estate v. McNary, - - U.S. - -, (1982) (BREt..TNAN, J., concuning) (exhau stion requirement in§ 1983 cases
can be justified by "a somewhat lesser showing ... where ... we are concerned not \\ith the di splacement of the § 1983 remedy, but with the defer-'"". ·
.:
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violations through their own procedures, and it encourages
the establishment of such procedures. It is consistent with
the principles of comity that apply whenever federal courts
are asked to review state action or supersede state proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S.. 37 (1971).
Moreover, and highly relevant to th~·· clfective functioning
of the overburdened federal court systerp~';the rule conserves
and supplements scarce judicial resource1Jl In 1961, the year
that Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (196l),' was decided, only
270 civil rights actions were begun in th~deral district
courts. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative
Office c,>f the U. S. Courts 238 (1961). In 1981, over 30,000
such suits were commenced. 2ll Annual Report of the Director of)fhe Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts 63, 68
(1981). Such a dramatic increase in litigation imposes a
heavy burden on the federal courts to the detriment of all federal court litigants, including those whose constitutional
rights in fact have been infringed.
The Court argues that past decisions of the Court categorically hold that there is no exhaustion requirement in § 1983
suits. But as the Court of Apeals demonstrates, and as the
Court recognizes, many of these decisions can be explained as
applications of traditional exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. See McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S.
668 (1963). Other decisions speak to the question in an offhand and conclusory fashion. See Dant-ico v. California, 389
U. S. 416 (1967) (unargued per curiam). Moreover, a categorical no-exhaustion rule would seem inconsistent with the
decision in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), prescrib-

.

raJ of federal court consideration pending exhaustion of the state administrative process").
"'Of the approximately 30,000 civil rights (iili$filed in fiscal year 1981,
15,639 were filed by state prisoners under§ 1983. The remainder involved
a variety of civil rights suits. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527, 554 n.~
13 (1981) (POWELL, J., concurring).
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ing abstention when state criminal proceedings are pending.
At least where administrative ""proceedings are pending,
Younger would seem to suggest the approp1'1ateness of exhaustion. Cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 574--575
(1973). Yet the Court today adopts . P flat rule without
exception.
The Court seeks to support its no exh?ii?tion rule with indications of congressional intent. Findi~~; nothing/on point
in the history of the Civil Rights Act itself, the Court places
primary reliance on the recent Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1997 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp.
IV). This legislation was designed to authorize the Attorney
General to begin civil rights actions on behalf of institutionalized persons. § 1997a. The Act also placed certain limits on
the existing authority ofthe Attorney General to intervene in
suits begun by institutionalized persons. See § 1997c. In
addition, in § 1997e, the Act sets fmth an exhaustion requirement for § 1983 claims brought by adult prisoners.
On the basis of the exhaustion provision in § 1997e, andremarks prima1ily by Representative Kastenmeier, the Court
contends that Congress has endorsed a general no exhaustion
rule. The irony in this reasoning should be obvious. The
concern that prompted the Department of Justice to support,
and the Congress to adopt, § 1997e was the vast increase in
§ 1983 suits brought by state prisoners in federal courts.
There has been a year-by-year increase in these suits since
the mid-1960's. The increase in fiscal 1981 over fiscal 1980
was some 26%, resulting in a total of 15,639 such suits filed in
1981 as compared \vith 12,397 in 1980. The 1981 total constituted over 11% of the total federal district court docket.
Although most of these cases present frivolous claims, many
are litigated through the courts of appeals to this Court.
The burden on the system fairly can be described as enormous with few, if any, benefits that would not be available in
me1'1to1'1ous cases if exhaustion of appropdate state adminis~-"'
trative remedies were required p1'1or to any federal court liti-
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gation. It was primarily this problem that prompted enact'::
ment of§ 1997e.
Moreover, it is clear from the legislative history that Congress simply was not addressing the exhaustion problem in
any general fashion. The concern focused on the problem of
prisoner petitions. The new Act had ·R,ual purpose in this
respect. In addition to requiring pridr~exhaustion of adequate state remedies, Congress v.'ished.'fP~.authorize the Attorney General to act when necessary to protect the constitutional rights of prisoners, but at the same time minimize the
need for federal action of any kind by requiring prior exhaustion. Both sponsors of the Act in the Senate made this clear.
Senator Hatch explained § 1997e as foJlows:
"In actions relating to alleged violations of the constitutional rights of prisoners, such persons may be required
to exhaust internal grievance procedures before the Attorn.ey General can become involved pursuant to [the
Act]." Congressional Record S1713, Feb1·uary 26,
1980. 21

a

Senator Bayh, the author of the Act, decribed the exhaustion
provision in similar terms:
"[l]n the event of a prison inmate's rights being al1eged
to be violated ... then before the Justice Department
could intervene or initiate suits, the prison inmate or
"Senator Hatch offered the same explanation on several other occasions
in the course of the debate. See Congressional Record S4293, April 29,
1980 ("Section 7 would establish specific procedures that would be applicable before the Attorney General could enter into an action in behalf of an
impri soned or incarcerated person. Such person would first have had to
fully exh ~ all internal grievance mechanisms that existed in the in stitution in which he was confined"); Congressonal Record S4626, May 6, 1980
("Section 7(D) further clarifies that the administrative grie\·ance procedures established in section 7 are only for the purposes of requiring prisoners to exhaust internal grievance mechanisms before the Attorney General ,
... .
can litigate on his behalf').
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class of inmates would have
to pursue all of their
,
adiminstrative remedies within the State law before the
Justice Department could intervene under the provisions
of [the Act]." Congressional Record S1859, February
27, 1980.
\ -

'

.

-

In short, in
enacting the Civil RightS:,,of
Institutionalized
.
. 1
Act Congress was focussing on the poy.'~rs of the Attorney
General, and the particular question ofi.Pnsoners' suits, not
on the general question of exhaustion in·§ l983 actions. Also
revealing as to the limited purpose of § 1997e is Congress'
consistent refusal to adopt legislation imposing a general noexhaustion requirement. Thus, for example, in 1979, a bill
was introduced into the Senate providing:
"No court of the United States shall stay or dismiss any
civil action brought under this Act on the ground that
the party bringing such action failed to exhaust the remedies available in the courts or the administrati\'e agencies of any State." 8.1983, 96th Congress, 1st Session.
The bill was never reported out of committee.
.
The requirement that plaintiffs exhaust available and adequate administrative remedies-subject to well developed
exceptions- is firmly established in virtually every area of
the law. This is dictated in § 1983 actions by common sense,
as well as by comity and federalism, where adequate state
administrative remedies are available.
If the exhaustion question were properly before us, I
would affirm the Court of Appeals.

'
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The Court holds that the limitations on federal judicial
power embodied in the Eleventh Amendment and in the doctrine of sovereign immunity are not jurisdictional. 1 consider this holding to be a serious departure from established
constitutional doctrine.
I dissent also from the Court's rejection of the rule of "flexible" exhaustion of state administrative remedies developed
and stated persuasively by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, sitting en bane. In disagreeing with the 17 judges
of the Court of Appeals who adopted the flexible exhaustion
principle, this Court places mistaken reliance on the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1997 et
seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV). I disagree with both portions of the
Court's holding and therefore dissent.
I. The Eleventh Amendment~
A
In this "reverse discrimination" action, petitioner, an em-

I

' The Eleventh Amendment provides:
"The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State. "
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ployee of the Florida International University, brought suit
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against the Board of Regents of the
State of Florida. 2 She did not name the individual regents
as defendants. She sued for $500,000 in damages, and for
injunctive and other equitable relief. See ante, at - - , n. 2.
The Board filed a motion to dismiss arguing that petitioner's
suit was premature in light of her failure to exhaust available
.administrative remedies. The District Court agreed and
granted the motion to dismiss.
On petitioner's appeal, the Board added the bar of the
Eleventh Amendment to its defense. 3 It argued that as an
2
As the Court notes, see ante, at--. n. 1, petitioner originally named
the Florida International University as defendant. Because the Florida
International University lacks the capacity to sue or be sued, the District
Court found that it was not a proper defendant. Petitioner was permitted
to amend her complaint, and she simply substituted the Board of Regents.
In addition to racial discrimination. petitioner also claimed that she had
been discriminated against on the basis of her sex.
' The Court repeatedly has held that the defense of the Eleventh
Amendment may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651. 678 (1974) ("Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be
raised in the trial court").
The Board's brief on appeal was divided into three parts. Part III was
devoted to the argument that "the Eleventh Amendment precludes subject
matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs complaint." /d., at 17. A lengthy statutory addendum was attached in support of the arguments advanced in this
section of the brief. After the case was scheduled for rehearing en bane.
the parties filed short-e. g. four and ten page-supplemental briefs to be
considered in addition to the main briefs already submitted to the Court of
Apeals. The supplemental briefs did not add to the discussion of the Eleventh Amendment issue. But the question was placed before the Court of
Appeals en bane, as it had been placed before the panel, through the thorough discussion in the main briefs.
This Court's explanation for not addressing the Eleventh Amendment
issue is that it was not considered below. Seen. 19, ante. But contrary
to the implication in the Court's explanation, the issue-as shown herewas urged by the Board and argued here.

''
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instrumentality of the State, the Board could not be subjected to suit in federal court absent a waiver of immunity.~
And it asserted that there had been no waiver. Although
the Board of Regents was created as a body corporate with
power "to sue and be sued ... to plead and be impleaded in
all courts of law and equity," Fla. Stat. § 240.042(1), it is well
established that language such as this does not operate to
waive the defense of the Eleventh Amendment. 5 In reply,
' The Board of Regents of the Division of Universities of the Department of Education is established by the Florida Education Code as a part
of the State University System. Fla. Stat. § 240.2011. The Board consists of the Commissioner of Education and twelve citizens appointed by
the Governor. Fla. Stat. § 240.207. The Board has general supen;sory
authority over the State University System.
Fla. Stat. § 240.209.
Among its duties are the appointment of university presidents, the review
of budget requests of each university in the state system. the preparation
of an aggregated budget for the State University System, the development
of a master plan, and the establishment of a systemwide personnel classification and pay plan. Fla. Stat. § 240.209.
The Board is an agency of the State of Florida. Fla. Stat. § 216.011 .
See Relyea v. State , 385 So. 2d 1378 <Fla. App. 1980). It may claim the
defense of sovereign immunity in suits under state Jaw. See ibid.
Numerous courts of appeals have held state universities or state Boards
of Regents immune from suit in federal court by reason of the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e. g., Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents , 660 F. 2d
1345, 1349 (CA9 1981); Brennan v. University of Ka11 ·s. 451 F. 2d 1287
(CAlO 1971); Ronwin v. Shapiro, 657 F. 2d 1071 (CA9 1981).
•See Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursi ng Hom e, 450 U.S. 147,
150 (1981); Petty v. Ten nessee-M issouri Bridge Commn , 359 U. S. 275,
276-277 (1959) ("The conclusion that there has been a waiver of immunity
will not be lightly inferred ... And where a public instrumentality is created with the right 'to sue and be sued' that waiver of immunity in the particular setting may be restricted to suits or proceedings of a special character in the state, not the federal courts"); Kennecott Cooper Corp . v. Sta te
Tax Commn, 327 U. S. 573 (1946) (language in state statute providing for
suit in "any court of competent jurisdiction" will not be understood as a
waiver of the Eleventh Amendment); Jagnandan v. Giles , 538 F . 2d 1166,
1177 (CA5 1976). Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 , 673 (1974 ) ("In
deciding whether a state has waived its constitutional protection under the
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petitioner argued that whether the statute creating the
Board amounted to a waiver-and petitioner believed that it
did-the Eleventh Amendment simply was irrelevant to the
equitable claims she had lodged against the State. See
Reply Brief at 3-4.
Neither the Court of Appeals panel nor the Court of Appeals en bane addressed the Board's Eleventh Amendment
defense. They directed their attention solely to the question
of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The panel held
that there was no exhaustion requirement in § 1983 suits and
remanded to the District Court for consideration of the
Board's Eleventh Amendment argument. 612 F. 2d 946
(CA51980). The Court of Appeals, sitting en bane, reversed
holding that § 1983 plaintiffs must exhaust available and reasonable administrative remedies. 634 F. 2d 900 (CA5 1981).
Again the court did not consider the Board's Eleventh
Amendment defense.
The Eleventh Amendment question was raised before this
Court, at the first opportunity after the Court of Appeals' decision, in the Board's response to the petition for writ of certiorari. The Board argued, as it had on appeal, that it was
Eleventh Amendment, we will find waiver only where stated 'by the most
express language or b:v such overwhelming implications from the text as
[will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction."').
At oral argument here the Assistant Attorney General of Florida stated
that the Florida legislature had not waived the Eleventh Amendment and
had waived the defense of sovereign immunity "only in selected tort cases."
Tr. at 26. See Bragg v. Board of Public Instruction , 36 So. 2d 222 (Fla.
1948) ("The mere fact that the Board of Public Instruction is created as a
body corporate with power to sue and be sued does not affect its immunity
from tort"); Relyea v. State, supra (Board of Regents retains defense of
sovereign immunity): Fla. Stat. § 111.0il(i)(b)(3) (provision for payment by
the state of civil rights judgments against state officers-including judgments under 42 U. S. C. § 1983--<loes not waive sovereign immunity "or
any other defense or immunity" to such lawsuits). Cf. Long v. Richardson,
525 F. 2d 74, 79 (CA6 1975) (state university's immunity from suit under
state law disposes of Eleventh Amendment question).

;
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an arm of the State and that it had not waived its immunity
from suit in federal court. 6 Again petitioner answered that
at most the Eleventh Amendment defense would bar her
claim for damages. And, even as to this claim, petitioner
now argued that the Amendment would not bar damages if
the Board could meet the claim out of its "own funds"-e. g.,
from gifts and bequests-rather than from the State Treasury. These arguments were repeated at oral argument.'
B
The Court views the jurisdictional question presented by
the Eleventh Amendment as if it were of little or no importance. Its entire discussion of the question is relegated to a
conclusory note at the end of the opinion. See ante, at--,
n. 19. The Court concedes that the Amendment and the bar
of sovereign immunity are "jurisdictional," but only in the
sense that the State may raise the claim at any point in the
proceedings. The statement is then made that the Amendment is not jurisdictional "in the sense that it must be raised
and decided by this Court on its own motion." Ante, at--,
n. 19. ~ The Court cites to no authority in support of this
• See Reply Brief at 23 ("Should this Court grant the writ, the Board
respectfully submits that review should be limited to the jurisdictional issues discussed below and this Court should vacate the Fifth Circuit's decision with instructions to dismiss [petitioner's] suit for lack of
jurisdiction.").
The Court in note 19, ante, attaches importance to the Assistant Attor·
ney General's statement at oral argument that the Board wanted the exhaustion issue decided. This must be viewed, however, in light of the
Board's unsuccessful attempt to have this Court first decide the Eleventh
Amendment issue. Moreover. a party's request-short of a binding
waiver-cannot relieve this Court of its duty to resolve a jurisdictional
question.
' Tr. of Oral Argument 25-28, 40-41. At oral argument, the Board
stated that the Eleventh Amendment question had not been addressed in
its main briefs to this Court "because of the grant of certiorari." I d., at
27.
8
In view of the Board's repeated efforts to raise the Eleventh Amend-
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statement, 9 and it would be surprising if any existed. The
reason that the Eleventh Amendment question may be raised
at any point in the proceedings is precisely because it places
limits on the basic authority of federal courts to entertain
suits against a state. The history and text of the Eleventh
Amendment, the principle of sovereign immunity exemplified
by it, and the well established precedents of this Court make
clear that today's decision misconceives our jurisdiction and
the purpose of this Amendment.
A basic principle of our constitutional system is that the
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Their authority extends only to those matters within the judicial
power of the United States as defined by the Constitution.
In language that could not be clearer, the Eleventh Amendment removes from the judicial power, as set forth in Article
III, suits "commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States." When an Amendment to the Constitution
ment question, and its specific request that this Court vacate the decision
of the Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction, see note 6 supra, it is hardly
correct to say that the Court must now raise the question of jurisdiction on
its own motion. Cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393. 396 n. 2 (1975). In any
event, "we are obliged to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to
the existence of federal jurisdiction." Mt . Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle ,
429 u. s. 274, 278 (1977).
"The Court cites, with a "compare" signal, to Mt. Healthy City Board of
Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 279 (1977) . The Mt. Healthy Court in no way
suggested that the Eleventh Amendment and the principle of sovereign
immunity embodied in Article III were less than jurisdictional. Indeed.
t~e Court found it necessary to resolve the Eleventh Amendment question
in that case prior to reaching the merits.
On the contrary, the Court consistently has viewed the Amendment as
jurisdictional. In Sosna v. Iowa , 419 U. S. 393. 396 n. 2 (1975), the Court
raised the question of the Eleventh Amendment even though the State had
asserted the bar of the Amendment only in its answer to the complaint and
had thereafter abandoned this defense. Unlike the Board of Regents in
this case, the State of Iowa had not advanced the defense in this Court.
Even so, the Sosna Court raised and addressed the question.
These
precedents are ignored by the Court today.

- - ---- - - - - - - - - - - --
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states in plain language that "the judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend" to suits against a
state, from what source does the Court today derive its jurisdiction? The Court's "back-of-the-hand" treatment of this
threshold issue offers no answer. Questions of jurisdiction
and of the legitimate exercise of power are fundamental in
our federal constitutional system. 10

c
The Eleventh Amendment was adopted as a response to
this Court's assumption of original jurisdiction in a suit
brought against the State of Georgia. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2
Dall. 419 (1793). Relying upon express language in Article
III extending the judicial power to controversies between a
State and Citizens of another State, the Court found that it
had jurisdiction. The decision is said to have created a shock
throughout the country. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S.
1, 11 (1890). The Amendment was adopted shortly thereafter, and the Court understood that it had been overruled:
"the amendment being constitutionally adopted, there could
not be exercised any jurisdiction, in any case, past or future,
in which a State was sued by the citizens of another State, or
by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." !d., at 11.
In light of the history and wording of the Amendment, the
Court has viewed the Amendment as placing explicit limits
on the judicial power as defined by Article III. See Nevada
v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 421 (1979). But more than that, and
beyond the express provisions of the Amendment, the Court
has recognized that the Amendment stands for a principle of
10
"Because of their unusual nature, and because it would not simply be
wrong but indeed would be an unconstitutional invasion of the powers reserved to the states if the federal courts were to entertain cases not within
their jurisdiction, the rule is well settled that the party seeking to invoke
the jurisdiction of a federal court must demonstrate that the case is within
the competence of that court." Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 3522.
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sovereign immunity by which the grant of authority in Article III itself must be measured. 11 Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, supra, the Court held that the federal judicial power did
not extend to a suit against a nonconsenting State by one of
its own citizens. Although the Eleventh Amendment by its
terms does not apply to such suits, the Court found that the
language of the Amendment was but an illustration of a
larger principle: Federal jurisdiction over suits against a
State, absent consent, "was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United
States." ld., at 15. 12 See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436
(1900).
Similarly, in Ex Parte State of New York, 256 U. S. 490
(1921), the Court found that despite the Eleventh Amendment's specific reference to suits in "law or equity," the principle of sovereign immunity exemplified by the Amendment
would not permit the extension of federal admiralty jurisdiction over a nonconsenting State. The Court applied the
same approach in Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313
(1934), in which the Court refused to take jurisdiction over a
""[T)he Eleventh Amendment was introduced to clarify the intent of
the Framers concerning the reach of the federal judicial power. . . . The
Eleventh Amendment served effectively to reverse the particular holding
in Chisholm, and. more generally, to restore the original understanding
... Thus, despite the narrowness of the language of the Amendment. its
spirit has consistently guided this Court in interpreting the reach of the
federal judicial power generally ... " Employees v. Missouri Public
Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 292-293 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring).
12
The Hans Court quoted at some length from the constitutional debates
concerning the scope of Article III. In the eighty-first number of the Federalist, for example, Hamilton sought to dispel the suggestion that Article
III extended federal jurisdiction over suits brought against one of the
states: "It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to
the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and
the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the
attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State
in the Union." 134 U. S., at 13 (emphasis in original).
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suit against a State by a foreign state. On its face, Article
III provided jurisdiction over suits "between a State ... and
foreign States." Nor did the Eleventh Amendment specifically exempt the states from suit by a foreign state. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the judicial power of the
United States, granted by Article III, did not extend so far:
"We think that Madison correctly interpreted Clause one of
§ 2 of Article III of the Constitution as making provision for
jurisdiction of a suit against a State by a foreign State in the
event of the State's consent but not otherwise." I d., at 330.
In this case a resident of the State of Florida has sued a
Board exercising a major function of the State's sovereign authority. As prior decisions have held, whether this case is
viewed only under the Eleventh Amendment-with its explicit limitation on federal jurisdiction-or under Article III,
the analysis must be the same. Absent consent, the "judicial
power of the United States," as defined by Article III and the
Eleventh Amendment, simply does not extend to suits
against one of the States by a citizen of that State: 13
"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a
13
Unlike other limitations on federal jurisdiction. the limitation imposed
by the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity may
be waived by consent unequivocally expressed. This was the understanding of the doctrine at the time the Constitution was adopted, see note 11
supra, and the Court has interpreted the "judicial power of the United
States" as used in the Eleventh Amendment and Article III accordingly.
But the fact that the state or the United States may consent to federal jurisdiction, does not render the Eleventh Amendment or the doctrine of
sovereign immunity embodied in Article III "quasi" jurisdictional. Quite
simply, where there has not been consent, there is no jurisdiction. Cf.
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584. 586 (1941) ("The United States,
as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued, and the
terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction
to entertain the suit"); United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., 309 U. S. 506, 514 (1940) ("Consent alone gives jurisdiction to adjudge
against a sovereign. Absent that consent, the attempted exercise of judicial power is void.").

- - --
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fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a
bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the
United States that it has become established by repeated
decisions of this court that the entire judicial pou·er
granted by the Constitution does not embmce authority
to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens
of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign
State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not
even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification." Ex Parte State of New York, 256 U. S. 490
(1921) (emphasis added).
The Court does not distinguish these unquestioned precedents. They are wholly and inexplicably ignored. Quite
simply the Court today disregards controlling decisions and
the explicit limitation on federal court jurisdiction in Article
III and the Eleventh Amendment. The Court does recognize that the Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional "in the
sense" that the State may raise the bar of the Amendment for
the first time on appeal. Yet the Court misses the point of
this statement. The reason that the bar of the Amendment
may be raised at any time-as the Court previously has explained-is precisely because it is jurisdictional:
"The objection to petitioner's suit as a violation of the
Eleventh Amendment was first made and argued . . . in
this Court. This was in time, however. The Eleventh
Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit
limitation on federal judicial power of such compelling
force that' this Court will consider the issue arising under
this Amendment . . . even though urged for the first
time in this Court." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of
Treasury, 323 U. S. 454, 467 (1945). u
1
' See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 678 (1974); Sosna v. Iowa, 419
U. S. 393, 396 n. 2 (1975); Mt . Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274,
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Despite these precedents, and apparently because of an unexplained anxiety to reach the exhaustion issue decided by
the Court of Appeals, this Court remands the issue of its own
jurisdiction to the courts below.

D
I believe that the Eleventh Amendment question must be
addressed and that the answer could hardly be clearer. This
is an action under § 1983. 15 Petitioner seeks relief from the
Board of Regents of the State of Florida, a major instrumentality or agency of the State. Petitioner's argument that the
statute incorporating the Board should be understood to
waive the Eleventh Amendment is foreclosed by numerous
decisions of this Court and is unsupported by State law.
See, e. g., Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home
Assn, 450 U. S. 147 (1981); note 5, supra. Similarly, petitioner's suggestion that the Eleventh Amendment does not
bar her equitable claims against the Board must be rejected.
The Amendment applies to suits "in law and equity." All
suits against an unconsenting State-whether for damages or
injunctive relief-are barred. See Cory v. White,-- U. S.
278 (1977). The Court has consistently viewed the Eleventh Amendment
question as jurisdictional. See Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Read,
322 U. S. 47, 51 (1944) ("A state'sfreedomfrom litigation was established
as a constitutional right through the Eleventh Amendment") (emphasis
added); Monaco v. Mississippi, supra , at 320 (Question is ''whether this
Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit brought by a foreign State against
a State without her consent").
•& The states consented to a dimunition of their sovereignty by ratifying
the Fourteenth Amendment. In its exercise of the powers granted to it
by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may lift the bar of sovereign immunity. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). Thus, if
petitioner had brought this suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, there would have been no jurisdictional problem. But petitioner did
not do so, and the Court has held that Congress has not removed the bar of
sovereign immunity in§ 1983 actions. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332
(1979).

- - - - -- - -- - - - - - --
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- - (1982). 16 Finally, the rule in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S.
123 (1908), permitting a federal court to order state officials
to obey federal law in the future, is simply irrelevant to this
case. 17 Petitioner did not sue the members of the Board of
"It would be a novel proposition indeed that the Eleventh Amendment
does not bar a suit to enjoin the Stte itself simply because no money judgment is sought. . . . [T]he Eleventh Amendment by its terms clearly applies to a suit seeking an injunction, a remedy available only from equity."
Cory v. White,- U. S. - , - (1982).
17
Under the theory of Ex parte Young the Eleventh Amendment does
not bar suits against state officers because when a state officer "comes into
conflict with the superior authority of [the] Constitution, ... he is ...
stripped of his official or representative character." /d ., at 159. Therationale of that decision has no application to suits against the State or its
agencies. Although an individual official may be viewed as acting on his
own and without State authority when acting against federal law, the
State-{)r an agency of the State-cannot act other than in its official State
capacity. Similarly, an action for damages against the state, or an arm of
the state, seeks damages that must be paid from the state's own cofferswhether the damages come directly from the State's general fund or from
some other State fund. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Tax Commn , 327
U. S. 573 (1946) (segregated funds of the State Tax Commission are State
monies subject to the Eleventh Amendment).
Moreover, the fact that the Board is a corporate entity under state law
does not pennit application of the rule in Ex parte Young to the Board itself-as if the Board were an official. This Court repeatedly has held the
Eleventh Amendment to bar suit against such state corporate agencies.
See Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn, 450 U. S. 147
(1981); Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47; Ford Motor
Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 454 (1945); Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. State Tax Commn, 327 U. S. 572 (1946).
Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911), is not to
the contrary.
In that case suit was brought against a state college in
state court to recover damages caused by the college's construction of a
dyke. Although the Court discussed the Eleventh Amendment in some
detail, there was simply no Eleventh Amendment question in that case.
It was clear before Hopkins that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply to
bar review in this Court of any federal question presented in a suit against
a State in state court. See Chandler v. Dix, 194 U. S. 590, 592 (1904).
Cf. University of California Board of Regents v. Bakke; 438 U. S. 265
16

- - --
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Regents. She sued the Board itself, an arm of the State of
Florida.
In my view, the Eleventh Amendment-and the principle
of sovereign immunity exemplified by the Amendment and
embodied in Article III-clearly bars the suit in this case.
The Court's refusal to address the question of its own jurisdiction violates well established precedents of this Court as
well as the basic premise that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Even had the parties neglected to address
the Eleventh Amendment question, it would have been our
responsibility to consider it on our own motion. In fact, the
question has been fully briefed to the Court of Appeals and
raised in this Court. See note 8, supra. See Sosna v. Iowa,
419 U. S. 393, 396 n. 2 (1975). I would dismiss this suit and
vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals for lack of
jurisdiction.
II. Exhaustion of Remedies
In view of my belief that this case should be dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds, I address the exhaustion question
only briefly. Seventeen judges joined in the Court of Appeal's persuasive opinion adopting a rule of "flexible" exhaustion of administrative remedies in § 1983 suits. Other
Courts of Appeals have adopted a similar rule. See e. g.,
Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F. 2d 560 (CA2 1969); Secret v.
Brierton, 584 F. 2d 823 (CA 7 1978). The opinion for the en
bane court carefully reviewed the exhaustion doctrine in general and as applied to § 1983 actions. It found that the prior
(1978). Moreover, the Hopkins Court did not consider the college's activities in that case to be governmental. 221 U. S., at 647. In short, no
Eleventh Amendment question was presented to the Court. The opinion in
Hopkins has never been cited by this Court for the proposition that the
Eleventh Amendment is no bar to suit against a state corporate agency in
federal court. See Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home
Assn, supra; Alabama v. pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978); Parden v. Terminal
R. Co., 377 U. S. 184 (1964).
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decisions of this Court did not clearly decide the question. 18
See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U. S. 55, 63 n. 10 (1979); Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 575 n. 14 (1973). And it concluded
that the exhaustion of adequate and appropriate state administrative remedies would promote the achievement of the
rights protected by § 1983.
I agree with the Court of Appeals' opinion. The requirement that a § 1983 plaintiff exhaust adequate state administrative remedies was the accepted rule of law until quite recently. See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S.
210, (1908) (opinion of Justice Holmes). The rule rests on
sound considerations. It does not defeat federal court jurisdiction, it merely defers it. 19 It permits the states to correct
violations through their own procedures, and it encourages
the establishment of such procedures. It is consistent with
the principles of comity that apply whenever federal courts
are asked to review state action or supersede state proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971).
Moreover, and highly relevant to the effective functioning
of the overburdened federal court system, the rule conserves
and supplements scarce judicial resources. In 1961, the year
that Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), was decided, only
270 civil rights actions were begun in the federal district
courts. Annual Report of the Director ofthe Administrative
Office of the U. S. Courts 238 (1961). In 1981, over 30,000
11
"[l)n all the cases in which the Supreme Court has articulated its noexhaustion rule, the state administraive remedies were sufficiently inadequate that exhaustion would not have been appropriate in any event. "
Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv. L. Rev.
1133, 1274 (1977).
"Cf. Fair Assessment in Real Estate v. McNary,- U. S . -, (1982) (BRENNAN, J., concurring) (exhaustion requirement in§ 1983 cases
can be justified by "a somewhat lesser showing . . . where ... we are concerned not with the displacement of the § 1983 remedy, but with the deferral of federal court consideration pending exhaustion of the state administrative process").

- - - - - -- - --
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such suits were commenced. 20 Annual Report of the Director, 63, 68 (1981). The result of this unprecedented increase
in civil rights litigation is a heavy burden on the federal
courts to the detriment of all federal court litigants, including
others who assert that their constitutional rights have been
infringed.
The Court argues that past decisions of the Court categorically hold that there is no exhaustion requirement in § 1983
suits. But as the Court of Apeals demonstrates, and as the
Court recognizes, many of these decisions can be explained as
applications of traditional exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. See McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S.
668 (1963). Other decisions speak to the question in an offhand and conclusory fashion. See Damico v. California, 389
U. S. 416 (1967) (unargued per curiam). Moreover, a categorical no-exhaustion rule would seem inconsistent with the
decision in Younger v. Harris , 401 U. S. 37 (1971), prescribing abstention when state criminal proceedings are pending.
At least where administrative proceedings are pending,
Younger would seem to suggest the appropriateness of exhaustion. Cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 574-575
(1973). Yet the Court today adopts a flat rule without
exception.
The Court seeks to support its no exhaustion rule with indications of congressional intent. Finding nothing(Oii point
in the history of the Civil Rights Act itself, the Court places
primary reliance on the recent Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1997 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp.
IV). This legislation was designed to authorize the Attorney
General to begin civil rights actions on behalf of institutionalized persons. § 1997a. The Act also placed certain limits on
111
Of the approximately 30,000 civil rights fuits filed in fiscal year 1981,
15,639 were filed by state prisoners under § 1983. The remainder involved
a variety of civil rights suits. See Parrott v. Taylar, 451 U. S. 527, 554 n.
13 (1981) (POWELL, J ., concurring).
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the existing authority of the Attorney General to intervene in
suits begun by institutionalized persons. See § 1997c. In
addition, in§ 1997e, the Act sets forth an exhaustion requirement but only for § 1983 claims brought by prisoners.
On the basis of the exhaustion provision in§ 1997e, andremarks primarily by Representative Kastenmeier, the Court
contends that Congress has endorsed a general no exhaustion
rule. The irony in this reasoning should be obvious. A
principal concern that prompted the Department of Justice to
support, and the Congress to adopt, § 1997e was the vast increase in § 1983 suits brought by state prisoners in federal
courts. There has been a year-by-year increase iii these
suits since the mid-1960's. The increase in fiscal 1981 over
fiscal 1980 was some 26%, resulting in a total of 15,639 such
suits filed in 1981 as compared with 12,397 in 1980. The 1981
total constituted over H% of the total federal district court
docket. Although most of these cases present frivolous
claims, many are litigated through the courts of appeals to
this Court. The burden on the system fairly can be described as enormous with few, if any, benefits that would not
be available in meritorious cases if exhaustion of appropriate
state administrative remedies were required prior to any federal court litigation. It was primarily this problem that
prompted enactment of § 1997e. 21
Moreover, it is clear from the legislative history that Congress simply was not addressing the exhaustion problem in
any general fashion. The concern focused on the problem of
prisoner petitions. The new Act had a dual purpose in this
respect. In addition to requiring prior exhaustion of adequate state remedies, Congress wished to authorize the Atn The exhaustion requirement in § 1997e only becomes effective if the
Attorney General or a federal district court determines that the available
prison grievance procedures comply with standards set forth in subsection
(b) of§ 1997e. As of this date, the Department of Justice has not certified
the inmate grievance procedures of even a single state.
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torney General to act when necessary to protect the constitutional rights of prisoners, but at the same time minimize the
need for federal action of any kind by requiring prior exhaustion. Both sponsors of the Act in the Senate made this clear.
Senator Hatch explained § 1997e as follows:
"In actions relating to alleged violations of the constitutional rights of prisoners, such persons may be required
to exhaust internal grievance procedures before the Attorney General can become involved pursuant to [the
Act]." Congressional Record S1713, February 26, 1980. 22
Senator Bayh, the author of the Act, decribed the exhaustion
provision in similar terms:
"[I]n the event of a prison inmate's rights being alleged
to be violated ... then before the Justice Department
could intervene or initiate suits, the prison inmate or
class of inmates would have to pursue all of their
adiminstrative remedies within the State law before the
Justice Department could intervene under the provisions
of [the Act]." Congressional Record S1859, February
27, 1980.
In short, in enacting the Civil Rights of Institutionalized
Act Congress was focussing on the powers of the Attorney
General, and the particular question of prisoners' suits, not
on the general question of exhaustion in § 1983 actions. Also
Senator Hatch offered the same explanation on several other occasions
in the course of the debate. See Congressional Record S4293, April 29,
1980 ("Section 7 would establish specific procedures that would be applicable before the Attorney General could enter into an action in behalf of an
imprisoned or incarcerated person. Such person would first have had to
fully exhaust all internal grievance mechanisms that existed in the institution in which he was confined"); Congressonal Record S4626, May 6, 1980
("Section 7(D) further clarifies that the administrative grievance procedures established in section 7 are only for the purposes of requiring prisoners to exhaust internal grievance mechanisms before the Attorney General
can litigate on his behalf').
11
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revealing as to the limited purpose of § 1997e is Congress'
consistent refusal to adopt legislation imposing a general noexhaustion requirement. Thus, for example, in 1979, a bill
was introduced into the Senate providing:
"No court of the United States shall stay or dismiss any
civil action brought under this Act on the ground that
the party bringing such action failed to exhaust the remedies available in the courts or the administrative agencies of any State." S.1983, 96th Congress, 1st Session.
The bill was never reported out of committee.
The requirement that plaintiffs exhaust available and adequate administrative remedies-subject to well developed
exceptions-is firmly established in virtually every area of
the law. This is dictated in§ 1983 actions by common sense,
as well as by comity and federalism, where adequate state
administrative remedies are available.
If the exhaustion question were properly before us, I
would affirm the Court of Appeals.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Powell
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The Court holds that the limitations on federal judicial
power embodied in the Eleventh Amendment and in the doctrine of sovereign immunity are not jurisdictional. I consider this holding to be a serious departure from established
constitutional doctrine.
I dissent also from the Court's rejection of the rule of "flexible" exhaustion of state administrative remedies developed
and stated persuasively by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, sitting en bane. In disagreeing with the 17 judges
of the Court of Appeals who adopted the flexible exhaustion
principle, this Court places mistaken reliance on the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1997 et
seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV). I disagree with both portions of the
Court's holding and therefore dissent.

I. The Eleventh Amendment 1
A
'The Eleventh Amendment provides:
"The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State. "
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In tpis "reverse discrimination" action, petitioner, an employee of the Florida International University, brought suit
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against the Board of Regents of the
State of Florida. 2 She did not name the individual regents
as defendants. She sued for $500,000 in damages, and for
injunctive and other equitable relief. See ante, at - - , n. 2.
The Board filed a motion to dismiss arguing that petitioner's
suit was premature in light of her failure to exhaust available
administrative remedies. The District Court agreed and
granted the motion to dismiss.
On petitioner's appeal, the Board added the bar of the
Eleventh Amendment to its defense. 3 It argued that as an
2
As the Court notes, see ante, at--, n. 1, petitioner originally named
the Florida International University as defendant. Because the Florida
International University Jacks the capacity to sue or be sued, the District
Court found that it was not a proper defendant. Petitioner was pennitted
to amend her complaint, and she simply substituted the Board of Regents.
In addition to racial discrimination, petitioner also claimed that she had
been discriminated against on the basis of her sex.
' The Court repeatedly has held that the defense of the Eleventh
Amendment may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 , 678 (1974) ("Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be
raised in the trial court").
The Board's brief on appeal was divided into three parts. Part III was
devoted to the argument that "the Eleventh Amendment precludes subject
matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs complaint. " /d ., at 17. A lengthy statutory addendum was attached in support of the arguments advanced in this
section of the brief. After the case was scheduled for rehearing en bane,
the parties filed sho~. g . four and ten page-supplemental briefs to be
considered in addition to the main briefs already submitted to the Court of
Apeals. The supplemental briefs did not add to the discussion of the Eleventh Amendment issue. But the question was placed before the Court of
Appeals en bane, as it had been placed before the panel, through the thorough discussion in the main briefs.
This Court's explanation for not addressing the Eleventh Amendment
issue is that it was not considered below. Seen. 19, ante. But contrary
to the implication in the Court's explanation, the issue-as shown herewas urged by the Board and argued here.
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instrmpentality of the State, the Board could not be subjected to suit in federal court absent a waiver of immunity. 4
And it asserted that there had been no waiver. Although
the Board of Regents was created as a body corporate with
power "to sue and be sued . . . to plead and be impleaded in
all courts of law and equity," Fla. Stat. §240.042(1), it is well
established that language such as this does not operate to
waive the defense of the Eleventh Amendment." In reply,
'The Board of Regents of the Division of Universities of the Department of Education is established by the Florida Education Code as a part
of the State University System. Fla. Stat. § 240.2011. The Board consists of the Commissioner of Education and twelve citizens appointed by
the Governor. Fla. Stat. § 240.207. The Board has general supervisory
authority over the State University System.
Fla. Stat. § 240.209.
Among its duties are the appointment of university presidents, the review
of budget requests of each university in the state system, the preparation
of an aggregated budget for the State University System, the development
of a master plan, and the establishment of a systemwide personnel classification and pay plan. Fla. Stat. § 240.209.
The Board is an agency of the State of Florida. Fla. Stat. § 216.011.
See Relyea v. State, 385 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. App. 1980). It may claim the
defense of sovereign immunity in suits under state law. See ibid.
Numerous courts of appeals have held state universities or state Boards
of Regents immune from suit in federal court by reason of the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e. g., Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 660 F. 2d
1345, 1349 (CA9 1981); Brennan v. University of Kansas, 451 F. 2d 1287
(CAlO 1971); Ronwin v. Shapiro, 657 F. 2d 1071 (CA9 1981).
3
See Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home, 450 U.S. 147,
150 (1981); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commn, 359 U. S. 275,
276-277 (1959) ("The conclusion that there has been a waiver of immunity
will not be lightly inferred ... And where a public instrumentality is created with the right 'to sue and be sued' that waiver of immunity in the particular setting may be restricted to suits or proceedings of a special character in the state, not the federal courts"); Kennecott Cooper Corp. v. State
Tax Commn, 327 U. S. 573 (1946) (language in state statute providing for
suit in "any court of competent jurisdiction" will not be understood as a
waiver of the Eleventh Amendment); Jagnandan v. Giles, 538 F. 2d 1166,
1177 (CA5 1976). Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974) ("In
deciding whether a state has waived its constitutional protection under the
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petitioner argued that whether the statute creating the
Board' amounted to a waiver-and petitioner believed that it
did-the Eleventh Amendment simply was irrelevant to the
equitable claims she had lodged against the State. See
Reply Brief at 3-4.
Neither the Court of Appeals panel nor the Court of Appeals en bane addressed the Board's Eleventh Amendment
defense. They directed their attention solely to the question
of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The panel held
that there was no exhaustion requirement in § 1983 suits and
remanded to the District Court for consideration of the
Board's Eleventh Amendment argument. 612 F. 2d 946
(CA5 1980). The Court of Appeals, sitting en bane, reversed
holding that § 1983 plaintiffs must exhaust available and reasonable administrative remedies. 634 F. 2d 900 (CA5 1981).
Again the court did not consider the Board's Eleventh
Amendment defense.
The Eleventh Amendment question was raised before this
Court, at the first opportunity after the Court of Appeals' decision, in the Board's response to the petition for writ of certiorari. The Board argued, as it had on appeal, that it was
Eleventh Amendment, we will find waiver only where stated 'by the most
express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as
[will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.'").
At oral argument here the Assistant Attorney General of Florida stated
that the Florida legislature had not waived the Eleventh Amendment and
had waived the defense of sovereign immunity "only in selected tort cases."
Tr. at 26. See Bragg v. Board of Public Instruction, 36 So. 2d 222 (Fla.
1948) ("The mere fact that the Board of Public Instruction is created as a
body corporate with power to sue and be sued does not affect its immunity
from tort"); Relyea v. State, supra (Board of Regents retains defense of
sovereign immunity); Fla. Stat. § 111.071(i)(b)(4) (provision for payment by
the state of civil rights judgments against state officers-including judgments under 42 U. S. C. § 1983----does not waive sovereign immunity "or
any other defense or immunity" to such lawsuits). Cf. Long v. Richardson,
525 F. 2d 74, 79 (CA6 1975) (state university's immunity from suit under
state law disposes of Eleventh Amendment question).
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an arm of the State and that it had not waived its immunity
from suit in federal court. 6 Again petitioner answered that
at most the Eleventh Amendment defense would bar her
claim for damages. And, even as to this claim, petitioner
now argued that the Amendment would not bar damages if
the Board could meet the claim out of its "own funds"-e. g.,
from gifts and bequests-rather than from the State Treasury. These arguments were repeated at oral argument. 7
B
The Court views the jurisdictional question presented by
the Eleventh Amendment as if it were of little or no importance. Its entire discussion of the question is relegated to a
conclusory note at the end of the opinion. See ante, at - - ,
n. 19. The Court concedes that the Amendment and the bar
of sovereign immunity are "jurisdictional," but only in the
sense that the State may raise the claim at any point in the
proceedings. The statement is then made that the Amendment is not jurisdictional "in the sense that it must be raised
and decided by this Court on its own motion." Ante, at--,
n. 19. 8 The Court cites to no authority in support of this
6
See Reply Brief at 23 ("Should this Court grant the writ, the Board
respectfully submits that review should be limited to the jurisdictional issues discussed below and this Court should vacate the Fifth Circuit's decision with instructions to dismiss [petitioner's] suit for lack of
jurisdiction.").
The Court in note 19, ante, attaches importance to the Assistant Attorney General's statement at oral argument that the Board wanted the exhaustion issue decided. This must be viewed, however, in light of the
Board's unsuccessful attempt to have this Court first decide the Eleventh
Amendment issue. Moreover, a party's request-short of a binding
waiver-cannot relieve this Court of its duty to resolve a jurisdictional
question.
'Tr. of Oral Argument 25-28, 40-41. At oral argument, the Board
stated that the Eleventh Amendment question had not been addressed in
its main briefs to this Court "because of the grant of certiorari." !d., at

27.

• In view of the Board's repeated efforts to raise the Eleventh Amend-
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statement, 9 and it would be surprising if any existed. The
reason that the Eleventh Amendment question may be raised
at any point in the proceedings is precisely because it places
limits on the basic authority of federal courts to entertain
suits against a state. The history and text of the Eleventh
Amendment, the principle of sovereign immunity exemplified
by it, and the well established precedents of this Court make
clear that today's decision misconceives our jurisdiction and
the purpose of this Amendment.
A basic principle of our constitutional system is that the
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Their authority extends only to those matters within the judicial
power of the United States as defined by the Constitution.
In language that could not be clearer, the Eleventh Amendment removes from the judicial power, as set forth in Article
III, suits "commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States." When an Amendment to the Constitution
ment question, and its specific request that this Court vacate the decision
of the Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction, see note 6 supra, it is hardly
correct to say that the Court must now raise the question of jurisdiction on
its own motion. Cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 396 n. 2 (1975). In any
event, "we are obliged to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to
the existence of federal jurisdiction." Mt . Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle,
429 u. s. 274, 278 (1977).
•The Court cites, with a "compare" signal, to Mt. Healthy City Board of
Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 279 (1977). The Mt. Healthy Court in no way
suggested that the Eleventh Amendment and the principle of sovereign
immunity embodied in Article III were less than jurisdictional. Indeed,
the Court found it necessary to resolve the Eleventh Amendment question
in that case prior to reaching the merits.
On the contrary, the Court consistently has viewed the Amendment as
jurisdictional. In Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 396 n. 2 (1975), the Court
raised the question of the Eleventh Amendment even though the State had
asserted the bar of the Amendment only in its answer to the complaint and
had thereafter abandoned this defense. Unlike the Board of Regents in
this case, the State of Iowa had not advanced the defense in this Court.
Even so, the Sosna Court raised and addressed the question.
These
precedents are ignored by the Court today.
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states jn plain language that "the judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend" to suits against a
state, from what source does the Court today derive its jurisdiction? The Court's "back-of-the-hand" treatment of this
threshold issue offers no answer. Questions of jurisdiction
and of the legitimate exercise of power are fundamental in
our federal constitutional system. 10

c
The Eleventh Amendment was adopted as a response to
this Court's assumption of original jurisdiction in a suit
brought against the State of Georgia. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2
Dall. 419 (1793). Relying upon express language in Article
III extending the judicial power to controversies between a
State and Citizens of another State, the Court found that it
had jurisdiction. The decision is said to have created a shock
throughout the country. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S.
1, 11 (1890). The Amendment was adopted shortly thereafter, and the Court understood that it had been overruled:
"the amendment being constitutionally adopted, there could
not be exercised any jurisdiction, in any case, past or future,
in which a State was sued by the citizens of another State, or
by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." I d., at 11.
In light of the history and wording of the Amendment, the
Court has viewed the Amendment as placing explicit limits
on the judicial power as defined by Article III. See Nevada
v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 421 (1979). But more than that, and
beyond the express provisions of the Amendment, the Court
has recognized that the Amendment stands for a principle of
10

"Because of their unusual nature, and because it would not simply be
wrong but indeed would be an unconstitutional invasion of the powers reserved to the states if the federal courts were to entertain cases not within
their jurisdiction, the rule is well settled that the party seeking to invoke
the jurisdiction of a federal court must demonstrate that the case is within
the competence of that court." Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 3522.
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sovereign immunity by which the grant of authority in Article III itself must be measured. 11 Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, supra, the Court held that the federal judicial power did
not extend to a suit against a nonconsenting State by one of
its own citizens. Although the Eleventh Amendment by its
terms does not apply to such suits, the Court found that the
language of the Amendment was but an illustration of a
larger principle: Federal jurisdiction over suits against a
State, absent consent, "was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United
States." /d., at 15. 12 See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436
(1900).
Similarly, in Ex Parte State of New York, 256 U. S. 490
(1921), the Court found that despite the Eleventh Amendment's specific reference to suits in "law or equity," the principle of sovereign immunity exemplified by the Amendment
would not permit the extension of federal admiralty jurisdiction over a nonconsenting State. The Court applied the
same approach in Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313
(1934), in which the Court refused to take jurisdiction over a
11
"(T]he Eleventh Amendment was introduced to clarify the intent of
the Framers concerning the reach of the federal judicial power. . . . The
Eleventh Amendment served effectively to reverse the particular holding
in Chisholm, and, more generally, to restore the original understanding
... Thus, despite the narrowness of the language of the Amendment, its
spirit has consistently guided this Court in interpreting the reach of the
federal judicial power generally ... " Employees v. Missouri Public
Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 292-293 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring).
IRThe Hans Court quoted at some length from the constitutional debates
concerning the scope of Article III. In the eighty-first number of the Federalist, for example, Hamilton sought to dispel the suggestion that Article
III extended federal jurisdiction over suits brought against one of the
states: "It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to
the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and
the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the
attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State
in the Union." 134 U. S., at 13 (emphasis in original).
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suit against a State by a foreign state. On its face, Article
III provided jurisdiction over suits "between a State ... and
foreign States." Nor did the Eleventh Amendment specifically exempt the states from suit by a foreign state. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the judicial power of the
United States, granted by Article III, did not extend so far:
''We think that Madison correctly interpreted Clause one of
§ 2 of Article III of the Constitution as making provision for
jurisdiction of a suit against a State by a foreign State in the
event of the State's consent but not otherwise." I d., at 330.
In this case a resident of the State of Florida has sued a
Board exercising a major function of the State's sovereign authority. As prior decisions have held, whether this case is
viewed only under the Eleventh Amendment-with its explicit limitation on federal jurisdiction-or under Article III,
the analysis must be the same. Absent consent, the "judicial
power of the United States," as defined by Article III and the
Eleventh Amendment, simply does not extend to suits
against one of the States by a citizen of that State: 13
"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a
"Unlike other limitations on federal jurisdiction, the limitation imposed
by the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity may
be waived by consent unequivocally expressed. This was the understanding of the doctrine at the time the Constitution was adopted, see note 11
supra, and the Court has interpreted the "judicial power of the United
States" as used in the Eleventh Amendment and Article III accordingly.
But the fact that the state or the United States may consent to federal jurisdiction, does not render the Eleventh Amendment or the doctrine of
sovereign immunity embodied in Article III "quasi" jurisdictional. Quite
simply, where there has not been consent, there is no jurisdiction. See
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 586 (1941) ("The United States,
as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued, and the
terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction
to entertain the suit"); United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., 309 U. S. 506, 514 (1940) ("Consent alone gives jurisdiction to adjudge
against a sovereign. Absent that consent, the attempted exercise of judicial power is void.").
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fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a
bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the
United States that it has become established by repeated
decisions of this court that the entire judicial power
granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority
to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens
of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign
State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not
even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification." Ex Parte State of New York, 256 U. S. 490
(1921) (emphasis added).
The Court does not distinguish these unquestioned precedents. They are wholly and inexplicably ignored. Quite
simply the Court today disregards controlling decisions and
the explicit limitation on federal court jurisdiction in Article
III and the Eleventh Amendment. The Court does recognize that the Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional "in the
sense" that the State may raise the bar of the Amendment for
the first time on appeal. Yet the Court misses the point of
this statement. The reason that the bar of the Amendment
may be raised at any time-as the Court previously has explained-is precisely because it is jurisdictional:
"The objection to petitioner's suit as a violation of the
Eleventh Amendment was first made and argued ... in
this Court. This was in time, however. The Eleventh
Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit
limitation on federal judicial power of such compelling
force that this Court will consider the issue arising under
this Amendment . . . even though urged for the first
time in this Court." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of
Treasury, 323 U. S. 454, 467 (1945). 14
,. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 678 (1974); Sosna v. Iowa, 419
U. S. 393, 396 n. 2 (1975); Mt. Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274,
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- - (1982). 16 Finally, the rule in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S.
123 (1008), permitting a federal court to order state officials
to obey federal law in the future, is simply irrelevant to this
case. 17 Petitioner did not sue the members of the Board of
6
' "It would be a novel proposition indeed that the Eleventh Amendment
does not bar a suit to enjoin the State itself simply because no money judgment is sought. . . . [T]he Eleventh Amendment by its terms clearly applies to a suit seeking an injunction, a remedy available only from equity."
Cory v. White,- U. S. - , - (1982).
"Under the theory of Ex parte Young the Eleventh Amendment does
not bar suits against state officers because when a state officer "comes into
conflict with the superior authority of [the] Constitution, ... he is .. .
stripped of his official or representative character." /d., at 159. The rationale of that decision has no application to suits against the State or its
agencies. Although an individual official may be viewed as acting on his
own and without State authority when acting against federal law, the
State-or an agency of the State-cannot act other than in its official State
capacity. Similarly, an action for damages against the state, or an arm of
the state, seeks damages that must be paid from the state's own cofferswhether the damages come directly from the State's general fund or from
some other State fund . See Kennecott Copper Corp . v. Tax Commn , 327
U. S. 573 (1946) (segregated funds of the State Tax Commission are State
monies subject to the Eleventh Amendment).
Moreover, the fact that the Board is a corporate entity under state law
does not permit application of the rule in Ex parte Young to the Board itself-as if the Board were an official. This Court repeatedly has held the
Eleventh Amendment to bar suit against such state corporate agencies.
See Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn, 450 U. S. 147
(1981) ; Great Northern Insurance Co . v. Read, 322 U. S. 47; Ford Motor
Co . v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 454 (1945); Kennecott Copper
Corp . v. State Tax Commn , 327 U. S. 572 (1946).
Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College , 221 U. S. 636 (1911) , is not to
the contrary.
In that case suit was brought against a state college in
state court to recover damages caused by the college's construction of a
dyke. Although the Court discussed the Eleventh Amendment in some
detail, there was simply no Eleventh Amendment question in that case.
It was clear before Hopkins that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply to
bar review in this Court of any federal question presented in a suit against
a State in state court. See Chandler v. Dix, 194 U. S. 590, 592 (1904).
Cf. University of California Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265
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Regents. She sued the Board itself, an arm of the State of
Florida.
In my view, the Eleventh Amendment-and the principle
of sovereign immunity exemplified by the Amendment and
embodied in Article III-clearly bars the suit in this case.
The Court's refusal to address the question of its own jurisdiction violates well established precedents of this Court as
well as the basic premise that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Even had the parties neglected to address
the Eleventh Amendment question, it would have been our
responsibility to consider it on our own motion. In fact, the
question has been fully briefed to the Court of Appeals and
raised in this Court. See note 8, supra. Cf. Sosna v. Iowa,
419 U. S. 393, 396 n. 2 (1975). I would dismiss this suit and
vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals for lack of
jurisdiction.
II. Exhaustion of Remedies
In view of my belief that this case should be dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds, I address the exhaustion question
only briefly. Seventeen judges joined in the Court of Appeal's persuasive opinion adopting a rule of "flexible" exhaustion of administrative remedies in § 1983 suits. Other
Courts of Appeals have adopted a similar rule. See e. g.,
Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F. 2d 560 (CA2 1969); Secret v.
Brierton, 584 F. 2d 823 (CA 7 1978). The opinion for the en
bane court carefully reviewed the exhaustion doctrine in general and as applied to § 1983 actions. It found that the prior
(1978). Moreover, the Hopkins Court did not consider the college's activities in that case to be governmental. 221 U. S., at 647. In short, no
Eleventh Amendment question was presented to the Court. The opinion in
Hopkins has never been cited by this Court for the proposition that the
Eleventh Amendment is no bar to suit against a state corporate agency in
federal court. See Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Horne
Assn, supra; Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978); Parden v. Terminal
R. Co., 377 U. S. 184 (1964).
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decisions of this Court did not clearly decide the question. 18
See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U. S. 55, 63 n. 10 (1979); Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 575 n. 14 (1973). And it concluded
that the exhaustion of adequate and appropriate state administrative remedies would promote the achievement of the
rights protected by § 1983.
I agree with the Court of Appeals' opinion. The requirement that a § 1983 plaintiff exhaust adequate state administrative remedies was the accepted rule of law until quite recently. See Eisen v. Eastman, supra, at 567. The rule
rests on sound considerations. It does not defeat federal
court jurisdiction, it merely defers it. 19 It permits the states
to correct violations through their own procedures, and it encourages the establishment of such procedures. It is consistent with the principles of comity that apply whenever federal
courts are asked to review state action or supersede state
proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971).
Moreover, and highly relevant to the effective functioning
of the overburdened federal court system, the rule conserves
and supplements scarce judicial resources. In 1961, the year
that Monroe v. Pape , 365 U. S. 167 (1961), was decided , only
270 civil rights actions were begun in the federal district
courts. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative
Office of the U. S. Courts 238 (1961). In 1981, over 30,000
such suits were commenced. 20 Annual Report of the Direc•• "[l]n all the cases in which the Supreme Court has articulated its noexhaustion rule , the state administrative remedies were sufficiently inadequate that exhaustion would not have been appropriate in any event."
Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv. L. Rev.
1133, 1274 (1977).
"Cf. Fair Assessment in R eal Estate v. McNary,- U. S. ,(1982) (BRENNAN, J ., concurring) (exhaustion requirement in§ 1983 cases
can be justified by "a somewhat lesser showing .. . where . .. we are concerned not with the displacement of the§ 1983 remedy, but with the deferral of federal court consideration pending exhaustion of the state administrative process").
"'Of the approximately 30,000 civil rights fuits filed in fiscal year 1981,
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tor, 63, 68 (1981). The result of this unprecedented increase
in civil 'rights litigation is a heavy burden on the federal
courts to the detriment of all federal court litigants, including
others who assert that their constitutional rights have been
infringed.
The Court argues that past decisions of the Court categorically hold that there is no exhaustion requirement in § 1983
suits. But as the Court of Apeals demonstrates, and as the
Court recognizes, many of these decisions can be explained as
applications of traditional exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. See McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S.
668 (1963). Other decisions speak to the question in an offhand and conclusory fashion without full briefing and argument. See Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249, 251
(1971) (unargued per curiam); Damico v. California, 389
U. S. 416 (1967) (unargued per curiam). Moreover, a categorical no-exhaustion rule would seem inconsistent with the
decision in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), prescribing abstention when state criminal proceedings are pending.
At least where administrative proceedings are pending,
Younger would seem to suggest the appropriateness of exhaustion. Cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 574-575
(1973). Yet the Court today adopts a fiat rule without
exception.
The Court seeks to support its no exhaustion rule with indications of congressional intent. Finding nothing directly
on point in the history of the Civil Rights Act itself, the
Court places primary reliance on the recent Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U. S. C.§ 1997 et seq. (1976
ed., Supp. IV). This legislation was designed to authorize
the Attorney General to initiate civil rights actions on behalf
15,639 were filed by state prisoners under§ 1983. The remainder involved
a variety of civil rights suits. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 63,68 (1981). See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527, 554 n. 13 (1981) (POWELL, J ., concurring).
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of institutionalized persons. § 1997a. The Act also placed
certain limits on the existing authority of the Attorney General to intervene in suits begun by institutionalized persons.
See§ 1997c. In addition, in§ 1997e, the Act sets forth an exhaustion requirement but only for § 1983 claims brought by
prisoners.
On the basis of the exhaustion provision in § 1997e, andremarks primarily by Representative Kastenmeier, the Court
contends that Congress has endorsed a general no exhaustion
rule. The irony in this reasoning should be obvious. A
principal concern that prompted the Department of Justice to
support, and the Congress to adopt, § 1997e was the vast increase in § 1983 suits brought by state prisoners in federal
courts. There has been a year-by-year increase in these
suits since the mid-1960's. The increase in fiscal 1981 over
fiscal 1980 was some 26%, resulting in a total of 15,639 such
suits filed in 1981 as compared with 12,397 in 1980. The 1981
total constituted over 8.6% of the total federal district court
docket. Although most of these cases present frivolous
claims, many are litigated through the courts of appeals to
this Court. The burden on the system fairly can be described as enormous with few, if any, benefits that would not
be available in meritorious cases if exhaustion of appropriate
state administrative remedies were required prior to any federal court litigation. It was primarily this problem that
prompted enactment of § 1997e. 21
Moreover, it is clear from the legislative history that Congress simply was not addressing the exhaustion problem in
any general fashion. The concern focused on the problem of
prisoner petitions. The new Act had a dual purpose in this
respect. In addition to requiring prior exhaustion of ade21
The exhaustion requirement in § 1997e only becomes effective if the
Attorney General or a federal district court determines that the available
prison grievance procedures comply with standards set forth in subsection
(b) of§ 1997e. As of this date, the Department of Justice has not certified
the inmate grievance procedures of even a single state .

1

.
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quate state remedies, Congress wished to authorize the Attorney General to act when necessary to protect the constitutional rights of prisoners, but at the same time minimize the
need for federal action of any kind by requiring prior exhaustion. Both sponsors of the Act in the Senate made this clear.
Senator Hatch explained § 1997e as follows:
"In actions relating to alleged violations of the constitutional rights of prisoners, such persons may be required
to exhaust internal grievance procedures before the Attorney General can become involved pursuant to [the
Act]." Congressional Record S1713, February 26, 1980. 22
Senator Bayh, the author of the Act, decribed the exhaustion
provision in similar terms:
"[l]n the event of a prison inmate's rights being alleged
to be violated . . . then before the Justice Department
could intervene or initiate suits, the prison inmate or
class of inmates would have to pursue all of their
adiminstrative remedies within the State law before the
Justice Department could intervene under the provisions
of [the Act]." Congressional Record S1859, February
27, 1980.
In short, in enacting the Civil Rights of Institutionalized
Act Congress was focussing on the powers of the Attorney
General, and the particular question of prisoners' suits, not
22

Senator Hatch offered the same explanation on several other occasions
See Congressional Record 84293, April 29,
1980 ("Section 7 would establish specific procedures that would be applicable before the Attorney General could enter into an action in behalf of an
imprisoned or incarcerated person. Such person would first have had to
fully exhaust all internal grievance mechanisms that existed in the institution in which he was confined"); Congressonal Record 84626, May 6, 1980
("Section 7(D) further clarifies that the administrative grievance procedures established in section 7 are only for the purposes of requiring prisoners to exhaust internal grievance mechanisms before the Attorney General
can litigate on his behalf').

in the course of the debate.
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on the·general question of exhaustion in§ 1983 actions. Also
revealing as to the limited purpose of § 1997e is Congress'
consistent refusal to adopt legislation imposing a general noexhaustion requirement. Thus, for example, in 1979, a bill
was introduced into the Senate providing:
"No court of the United States shall stay or dismiss any
civil action brought under this Act on the ground that
the party bringing such action failed to exhaust the remedies available in the courts or the administrative agencies of any State." S.l983, 96th Congress, 1st Session.
The bill was never reported out of committee.
The requirement that plaintiffs exhaust available and adequate administrative remedies-subject to well developed
exceptions-is firmly established in virtually every area of
the law. This is dictated in § 1983 actions by common sense,
as well as by comity and federalism, where adequate state
administrative remedies are available.
If the exhaustion question were properly before us, I
would affirm the Court of Appeals.
I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER joins
in Part II of this dissenting opinion.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Powell
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GEORGIA PATSY, PETITIONER v. BOARD OF
REGENTS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, ETC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[June-, 1982]

JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The Court holds that the limitations on federal judicial
power embodied in the Eleventh Amendment and in the doctrine of sovereign immunity are not jurisdictional. I consider this holding to be a serious departure from established
constitutional doctrine.
I dissent also from the Court's rejection of the rule of "flexible" exhaustion of state administrative remedies developed
and stated persuasively by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, sitting en bane. In disagreeing with the 17 judges
of the Court of Appeals who adopted the flexible exhaustion
principle, this Court places mistaken reliance on the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1997 et
seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV). I disagree with both portions of the
Court's holding and therefore dissent.
I. The Eleventh Amendment 1
A
' The Eleventh Amendment provides:
"The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State."

\9S 2
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In this "reverse discrimination" action, petitioner, an employee of the Florida International University, brought suit
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against the Board of Regents of the
State of Florida. 2 She did not name the individual regents
as defendants. She sued for $500,000 in damages, and for
injunctive and other equitable relief. See ante, at - - , n. 2.
The Board filed a motion to dismiss arguing that petitioner's
suit was premature in light of her failure to exhaust available
administrative remedies. The District Court agreed and
granted the motion to dismiss.
On petitioner's appeal, the Board added the bar of the
Eleventh Amendment to its defense. 3 It argued that as an
2
As the Court notes, see ante, at--, n. 1, petitioner originally named
the Florida International University as defendant. Because the Florida
International University lacks the capacity to sue or be sued, the District
Court found that it was not a proper defendant. Petitioner was permitted
to amend her complaint, and she simply substituted the Board of Regents.
In addition to racial discrimination, petitioner also claimed that she had
been discriminated against on the basis of her sex.
8
The Court repeatedly has held that the defense of the Eleventh
Amendment may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 678 (1974) ("Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be
raised in the trial court").
The Board's brief on appeal was divided into three parts. Part III was
devoted to the argument that "the Eleventh Amendment precludes subject
matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs complaint." !d., at 17. A lengthy statutory addendum was attached in support of the arguments advanced in this
section of the brief. After the case was scheduled for rehearing en bane,
the parties filed short-e. g. four and ten page-supplemental briefs to be
considered in addition to the main briefs already submitted to the Court of
Apeals. The supplemental briefs did not add to the discussion of the Eleventh Amendment issue. But the question was placed before the Court of
Appeals en bane, as it had been placed before the panel, through the thorough discussion in the main briefs.
This Court's explanation for not addressing the Eleventh Amendment
issue is that it was not considered below. See n. 19, ante. But contrary
to the implication in the Court's explanation, the issue-as shown herewas urged by the Board and argued here.
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instrumentality of the State, the Board could not be subjected to suit in federal court absent a waiver of immunity. 4
And it asserted that there had been no waiver. Although
the Board of Regents was created as a body corporate with
power "to sue and be sued . . . to plead and be impleaded in
all courts of law and equity," Fla. Stat. § 240.042(1), it is well
established that language such as this does not operate to
waive the defense of the Eleventh Amendment. 5 In reply,

l

'The Board of Regents of the Division of Universities of the Department of Education is established by the Florida Education Code as a part
of the State University System. Fla. Stat. § 240.2011. The Board consists of the Commissioner of Education and twelve citizens appointed by
the Governor. Fla. Stat. § 240.207. The Board has general supervisory
authority over the State University System. . Fla. Stat. § 240.209.
Among its duties are the appointment of university presidents, the review
of budget requests of each university in the state system, the preparation
of an aggregated budget for the State University System, the development
of a master plan, and the establishment of a systemwide personnel classification and pay plan. Fla. Stat. § 240.209.
The Board is an agency of the State of Florida. Fla. Stat. § 216.011.
See Relyea v. State, 385 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. App. 1980). It may claim the
defense of sovereign immunity in suits under state law. See ibid.
Numerous courts of appeals have held state universities or state Boards
of Regents immune from suit in federal court by reason of the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e. g., Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 660 F. 2d
1345, 1349 (CA9 1981); Brennan v. University of Kansas, 451 F. 2d 1287
(CAlO 1971); Ronwin v. Shapiro, 657 F. 2d 1071 (CA9 1981).
•see e. g., Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home, 450 U.S.
147, 150 (1981); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commn, 359 U. S.
275, 276-277 (1959) ("The conclusion that there has been a waiver of immunity will not be lightly inferred ... And where a public instrumentality is
created with the right 'to sue and be sued' that waiver of immunity in the
particular setting may be restricted to suits or proceedings of a special
character in the state, not the federal courts"); Kennecott Cooper Corp. v.
State Tax Commn, 327 U. S. 573 (1946) (language in state statute providing for suit in "any court of competent jurisdiction" will not be understood
as a waiver of the Eleventh Amendment); Ford Motor Co., v. Department
of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459 (1945) (same); Great Northern Life Insurance
Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1~4) ("a clear declaration of the state's in-

l{
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petitioner argued that whether the statute creating the
Board amounted to a waiver-and petitioner believed that it
did-the Eleventh Amendment simply was irrelevant to the
equitable claims she had lodged against the State. See
Reply Brief at 3-4.
Neither the Court of Appeals panel nor the Court of Appeals en bane addressed the Board's Eleventh Amendment
defense. They directed their attention solely to the question
of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The panel held
that there was no exhaustion requirement in § 1983 suits and
remanded to the District Court for consideration of the
Board's Eleventh Amendment argument. 612 F. 2d 946
(CA5 1980). The Court of Appeals, sitting en bane, reversed
holding that § 1983 plaintiffs must exhaust available and reasonable administrative remedies. 634 F. 2d 900 (CA5 1981).
Again the court did not consider the Board's Eleventh
Amendment defense.

l

tention to submit its fiscal problems to other courts than those of its own
creation must be found"); Jagnandan v. Giles, 538 F. 2d 1166, 1177 (CA5
1976). Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974) ("In deciding
whether a state has waived its constitutional protection under the Eleventh Amendment, we will find waiver only where stated 'by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as
[will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction."'). It is difficult to reconcile the Court's consistent requirement of an express waiver
{ with the approach advocated by JUSTICE WHITE. See ante, at - - , n. *.
At oral argument here the Assistant Attorney General of Florida stated
that the Florida legislature had not waived the Eleventh Amendment and
had waived the defense of sovereign immunity "only in selected tort cases."
Tr. at 26. See Bragg v. Board of Public Instruction, 36 So. 2d 222 (Fla.
1948) ("The mere fact that the Board of Public Instruction is created as a
body corporate with power to sue and be sued does not affect its immunity
from tort"); Relyea v. State, supra (Board of Regents retains defense of
sovereign immunity); Fla. Stat. § 111.071(i)(b)(4) (provision for payment by
the state of civil rights judgments against state officers-including judgments under 42 U. S. C. § 1983--does not waive sovereign immunity "or
any other defense or immunity" to such lawsuits). Cf. Long v. Richardson,
525 F. 2d 74, 79 (CA6 1975) (state university's immunity from suit under
state law disposes of Eleventh Amendment question).
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The Eleventh Amendment question was raised before this
Court, at the first opportunity after the Court of Appeals' decision, in the Board's response to the petition for writ of certiorari. The Board argued, as it had on appeal, that it was
an arm of the State and that it had not waived its immunity
from suit in federal court. 6 Again petitioner answered that
at most the Eleventh Amendment defense would bar her
claim for damages. And, even as to this claim, petitioner
now argued that the Amendment would not bar damages if
the Board could meet the claim out of its "own funds" -e. g.,
from gifts and bequests-rather than from the State Treasury. These arguments were repeated at oral argument. 7
B
The Court views the jurisdictional question presented by
the Eleventh Amendment as if it were of little or no importance. Its entire discussion of the question is relegated to a
conclusory note at the end of the opinion. See ante, at--,
n. 19. The Court concedes that the Amendment and the bar
of sovereign immunity are "jurisdictional," but only in the
sense that the State may raise the claim at any point in the
proceedings. The statement is then made that the Amend' See Reply Brief at 23 ("Should this Court grant the writ, the Board
respectfully submits that review should be limited to the jurisdictional issues discussed below and this Court should vacate the Fifth Circuit's decision with instructions to dismiss [petitioner's] suit for lack of
jurisdiction.").
The Court in note 19, ante, attaches importance to the Assistant Attorney General's statement at oral argument that the Board wanted the exhaustion issue decided. This must be viewed, however, in light of the
Board's unsuccessful attempt to have this Court first decide the Eleventh
Amendment issue. Moreover, a party's request-short of a binding
waiver-cannot relieve this Court of its duty to resolve a jurisdictional
question.
7
Tr. of Oral Argument 25-28, 40-41. At oral argument, the Board
stated that the Eleventh Amendment question had not been addressed in
its main briefs to this Court "because of the grant of certiorari." I d., at
27.
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ment is not jurisdictional "in the sense that it must be raised
and decided by this Court on its own motion." Ante, at--,
n. 19. 8 The Court cites to no authority in support of this
statement, 9 and it would be surprising if any existed. The
reason that the Eleventh Amendment question may be raised
at any point in the proceedings is precisely because it places
limits on the basic authority of federal courts to entertain
suits against a state. The history and text of the Eleventh
Amendment, the principle of sovereign immunity exemplified
by it, and the well established precedents of this Court make
clear that today's decision misconceives our jurisdiction and
the purpose of this Amendment.
A basic principle of our constitutional system is that the
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Their authority extends only to those matters within the judicial
power of the United States as defined by the Constitution.
In language that could not be clearer, the Eleventh Amend8
In view of the Board's repeated efforts to raise the Eleventh Amendment question, and its specific request that this Court vacate the decision
of the Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction, see note 6 supra, it is hardly
correct to say that the Court must now raise the question of jurisdiction on
its own motion. Cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 396 n. 2 (1975). In any
event, "we are obliged to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to
the existence of federal jurisdiction." Mt. Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle,
429 u. s. 274, 278 (1977).
9
The Court cites, with a "compare" signal, to Mt. Healthy City Board of
Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274,279 (1977). The Mt. Healthy Court in no way
suggested that the Eleventh Amendment and the principle of sovereign
immunity embodied in Article III were less than jurisdictional. Indeed,
the Court found it necessary to resolve the Eleventh Amendment question
in that case prior to reaching the merits.
On the contrary, the Court consistently has viewed the Amendment as
jurisdictional. In Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 396 n. 2 (1975), the Court
raised the question of the Eleventh Amendment even though the State had
asserted the bar of the Amendment only in its answer to the complaint and
had thereafter abandoned this defense. Unlike the Board of Regents in
this case, the State of Iowa had not advanced the defense in this Court.
Even so, the Sosna Court raised and addressed the question.
These
precedents are ignored by the Court today.
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ment removes from the judicial power, as set forth in Article
III, suits "commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States." · When an Amendment to the Constitution
states in plain language that "the judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend" to suits against a
state, from what source does the Court today derive its jurisdiction? The Court's "back-of-the-hand" treatment of this
threshold issue offers no answer. Questions of jurisdiction
and of the legitimate exercise of power are fundamental in
our federal constitutional system. 10

c
The Eleventh Amendment was adopted as a response to
this Court's assumption of original jurisdiction in a suit
brought against the State of Georgia. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2
Dall. 419 (1793). Relying upon express language in Article
III extending the judicial power to controversies between a
State and Citizens of another State, the Court found that it
had jurisdiction. The decision is said to have created a shock
throughout the country. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S.
1, 11 (1890). The Amendment was adopted shortly thereafter, and the Court understood that it had been overruled:
"the amendment being constitutionally adopted, there could
not be exercised any jurisdiction, in any case, past or future,
in which a State was sued by the citizens of another State, or
by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." Id., at 11.
In light of the history and wording of the Amendment, the
Court has viewed the Amendment as placing explicit limits
on the judicial power as defined by Article III. See Nevada
10

"Because of their unusual nature, and because it would not simply be
wrong but indeed would be an unconstitutional invasion of the powers reserved to the states if the federal courts were to entertain cases not within
their jurisdiction, the rule is well settled that the party seeking to invoke
the jurisdiction of a federal court must demonstrate that the case is within
the competence of that court." Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 3522.
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v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 421 (1979). But more than that, and
beyond the express provisions of the Amendment, the Court
has recognized that the Amendment stands for a principle of
sovereign immunity by which the grant of authority in Article III itself must be measured. 11 Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, supra, the Court held that the federal judicial power did
not extend to a suit against a nonconsenting State by one of
its own citizens. Although the Eleventh Amendment by its
terms does not apply to such suits, the Court found that the
language of the Amendment was but an illustration of a
larger principle: Federal jurisdiction over suits against a
State, absent consent, "was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United
States." I d., at 15. 12 See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436
(1900).
Similarly, in Ex Parte State of New York, 256 U. S. 490
(1921), the Court found that despite the Eleventh Amendment's specific reference to suits in "law or equity," the principle of sovereign immunity exemplified by the Amendment
would not permit the extension of federal admiralty jurisdic11
"[T]he Eleventh Amendment was introduced to clarify the intent of
the Framers concerning the reach of the federal judicial power. . . . The
Eleventh Amendment served effectively to reverse the particular holding
in Chisholm, and, more generally, to restore the original understanding
.. . Thus, despite the narrowness of the language of the Amendment, its
spirit has consistently guided this Court in interpreting the reach of the
federal judicial power generally ... " Employees v. Missouri Public
Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 292-293 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring).
12
The Hans Court quoted at some length from the constitutional debates
concerning the scope of Article III. In the eighty-first number of the Federalist, for example, Hamilton sought to dispel the suggestion that Article
III extended federal jurisdiction over suits brought against one of the
states: "It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to
the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and
the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the
attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State
in the Union." 134 U. S., at 13 (emphasis in original).
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tion over a nonconsenting State. The Court applied the
same approach in Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313
(1934), in which the Court refused to take jurisdiction over a
suit against a State by a foreign state. On its face, Article
III provided jurisdiction over suits "between a State ... and
foreign States." Nor did the Eleventh Amendment specifically exempt the states from suit by a foreign state. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the judicial power of the
United States, granted by Article III, did not extend so far:
"We think that Madison correctly interpreted Clause one of
§ 2 of Article III of the Constitution as making provision for
jurisdiction of a suit against a State by a foreign State in the
event of the State's consent but not otherwise." I d., at 330.
In this case a resident of the State of Florida has sued a
Board exercising a major function of the State's sovereign authority. As prior decisions have held, whether this case is
viewed only under the Eleventh Amendment-with its explicit limitation on federal jurisdiction-or under Article III,
the analysis must be the same. Absent consent, the "judicial
power of the United States," as defined by Article III and the
Eleventh Amendment, simply does not extend to suits
against one of the States by a citizen of that State: 13
3
' Unlike other limitations on federal jurisdiction, the limitation imposed
by the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity may
be waived by consent unequivocally expressed. This was the understanding of the doctrine at the time the Constitution was adopted, see note 11
supra, and the Court has interpreted the "judicial power of the United
States" as used in the Eleventh Amendment and Article III accordingly.
But the fact that the state or the United States may consent to federal jurisdiction, does not render the Eleventh Amendment or the doctrine of
sovereign immunity embodied in Article III "quasi" jurisdictional. Quite
simply, where there has not been consent, there is no jurisdiction. See
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 586 (1941) ("The United States,
as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued, and the
terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction
to entertain the suit"); United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., 309 U. S. 506, 514 (1940) ("Consent alone gives jurisdiction to adjudge
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"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a
fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a
bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the
United States that it has become established by repeated
decisions of this court that the entire judicial power
granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority
to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens
of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign
State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not
even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification." Ex Parte State of New York, 256 U. S. 490
(1921) (emphasis added).
The Court does not distinguish these unquestioned precedents. They are wholly and inexplicably ignored. Quite
simply the Court today disregards controlling decisions and
the explicit limitation on federal court jurisdiction in Article
III and the Eleventh Amendment. The Court does recognize that the Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional "in the
sense" that the State may raise the bar of the Amendment for
the first time on appeal. Yet the Court misses the point of
this statement. The reason that the bar of the Amendment
may be raised at any time-as the Court previously has explained-is precisely because it is jurisdictional:
"The objection to petitioner's suit as a violation of the
Eleventh Amendment was first made and argued . . . in
this Court. This was in time, however. The Eleventh
Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit
limitation on federal judicial power of such compelling
force that this Court will consider the issue arising under
this Amendment . . . even though urged for the first
against a sovereign. Absent that consent, the attempted exercise of judicial power is void.").
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time in this Court." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of
Treasury, 323 U. S. 454, 467 (1945). 14
Despite these precedents, and apparently because of an unexplained anxiety to reach the exhaustion issue decided by
the Court of Appeals, this Court remands the issue of its own
jurisdiction to the courts below.

D
I believe that the Eleventh Amendment question must be
addressed and that the answer could hardly be clearer. This
is an action under § 1983. 15 Petitioner seeks relief from the
Board of Regents of the State of Florida, a major instrumentality or agency of the State. Petitioner's argument that the
statute incorporating the Board should be understood to
waive the Eleventh Amendment is foreclosed by numerous
decisions of this Court and is unsupported by State law.
See, e. g., Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home
Assn, 450 U. S. 147 (1981); note 5, supra. Similarly, petitioner's suggestion that the Eleventh Amendment does not
"See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 678 (1974); Sosna v. Iowa, 419
U. S. 393, 396 n. 2 (1975); Mt. Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274,
278 (1977). The Court has consistently viewed the Eleventh Amendment
question as jurisdictional. See Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Read,
322 U. S. 47, 51 (1944) ("A state'sfreedomfrom litigation was established
as a constitutional right through the Eleventh Amendment") (emphasis
added); Monaco v. Mississippi, supra, at 320 (Question is "whether this
Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit brought by a foreign State against
a State without her consent").
15
The states consented to a dimunition of their sovereignty by ratifying
the Fourteenth Amendment. In its exercise of the powers granted to it
by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may lift the bar of sovereign immunity. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). Thus, if
petitioner had brought this suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, there would have been no jurisdictional problem. But petitioner did
not do so, and the Court has held that Congress has not removed the bar of
sovereign immunity in§ 1983 actions. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332
(1979).
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bar her equitable claims against the Board must be rejected.
The Amendment applies to suits "in law or equity." All suits
against an unconsenting State-whether for damages or injunctive relief-are barred. See Cory v. White,-- U. S.
- - (1982). 16 Finally, the rule in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S.
123 (1908), permitting a federal court to order state officials
to obey federal law in the future, is simply irrelevant to this
case. 17 Petitioner did not sue the members of the Board of
"It would be a novel proposition indeed that the Eleventh Amendment
does not bar a suit to enjoin the State itself simply because no money judgment is sought. . . . [T]he Eleventh Amendment by its terms clearly applies to a suit seeking an injunction, a remedy available only from equity."
Cory v. White, - - U. S. - - , - - (1982).
"Under the theory of Ex parte Young the Eleventh Amendment does
not bar suits against state officers because when a state officer "comes into
conflict with the superior authority of [the] Constitution, ... he is ...
stripped of his official or representative character." I d., at 159. The rationale of that decision has no application to suits against the State or its
agencies. Although an individual official may be viewed as acting on his
own and without State authority when acting against federal law, the
State-or an agency of the State-cannot act other than in its official State
capacity. Similarly, an action for damages against the state, or an arm of
the state, seeks damages that must be paid from the state's own cofferswhether the damages come directly from the State's general fund or from
some other State fund. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Tax Commn, 327
U. S. 573 (1946) (segregated funds of the State Tax Commission are State
monies subject to the Eleventh Amendment).
Moreover, the fact that the Board is a corporate entity under state law
does not permit application of the rule in Ex parte Young to the Board itself-as if the Board were an official. This Court repeatedly has held the
Eleventh Amendment to bar suit against such state corporate agencies.
See Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn, 450 U. S. 147
(1981); Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47; Ford Motor
Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 454 (1945); Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. State Tax Commn, 327 U. S. 572 (1946).
Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S. 636 (1911), is not to
the contrary.
In that case suit was brought against a state college in
state court to recover damages caused by the college's construction of a
dyke. Although the Court discussed the Eleventh Amendment in some
16
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Regents. She sued the Board itself, an arm of the State of
Florida.
In my view, the Eleventh Amendment-and the principle
of sovereign immunity exemplified by the Amendment and
embodied in Article III-clearly bars the suit in this case.
The Court's refusal to address the question of its own jurisdiction violates well established precedents of this Court as
well as the basic premise that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Even had the parties neglected to address
the Eleventh Amendment question, it would have been our
responsibility to consider it on our own motion. In fact, the
question has been fully briefed to the Court of Appeals and
raised in this Court. See note 8, supra. Cf. Sosna v. Iowa,
419 U. S. 393, 396 n. 2 (1975). I would dismiss this suit and
vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals for lack of
jurisdiction.
II. Exhaustion of Remedies
In view of my belief that this case should be dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds, I address the exhaustion question
only briefly. Seventeen judges joined in the Court of Appeal's persuasive opinion adopting a rule of "flexible" exhaustion of administrative remedies in § 1983 suits. Other
Courts of Appeals have adopted a similar rule. See e. g.,
detail, there was simply no Eleventh Amendment question in that case.
It was clear before Hopkins that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply to

bar review in this Court of any federal question presented in a suit against
a State in state court. See Chandler v. Dix, 194 U. S. 590, 592 (1904).
Cf. University of California Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265
(1978). Moreover, the Hopkins Court did not consider the college's activities in that case to be governmental. 221 U. S., at 647. In short, no
Eleventh Amendment question was presented to the Court. The opinion in
Hopkins has never been cited by this Court for the proposition that the
Eleventh Amendment is no bar to suit against a state corporate agency in
federal court. See Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home
Assn, supra; Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978); Parden v. Terminal
R. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
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Eisen Vo Eastman, 421 F. 2d 560 (CA2 1969); Secret v.
Brierton, 584 F. 2d 823 (CA7 1978). The opinion for the en
bane court carefully reviewed the exhaustion doctrine in general and as applied to § 1983 actions. It found that the prior
decisions of this Court did not clearly decide the question. 18
See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U. S. 55, 63 n. 10 (1979); Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 575 n. 14 (1973). And it concluded
that the exhaustion of adequate and appropriate state administrative remedies would promote the achievement of the
rights protected by § 1983.
I agree with the Court of Appeals' opinion. The requirement that a § 1983 plaintiff exhaust adequate state administrative remedies was the accepted rule of law until quite recently. See Eisen v. Eastman, supra, at 567. The rule
rests on sound considerations. It does not defeat federal
court jurisdiction, it merely defers it. 19 It permits the states
to correct violations through their own procedures, and it encourages the establishment of such procedures. It is consistent with the principles of comity that apply whenever federal
courts are asked to review state action or supersede state
proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971).
Moreover, and highly relevant to the effective functioning
of the overburdened federal court system, the rule conserves
and supplements scarce judicial resources. In 1961, the year
that Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), was decided, only
8

"[l]n all the cases in which the Supreme Court has articulated its noexhaustion rule, the state administrative remedies were sufficiently inadequate that exhaustion would not have been appropriate in any event."
Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harvo L. Rev.
1133, 1274 (1977).
19
Cfo Fair Assessment in Real Estate v. McNary,- U. S. - , (1982) (BRENNAN, Jo, concurring) (exhaustion requirement in § 1983 cases
can be justified by "a somewhat lesser showing
where .
we are concerned not with the displacement of the§ 1983 remedy, but with the deferral of federal court consideration pending exhaustion of the state administrative process").
'
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270 civil rights actions were begun in the federal district
courts. Annual Report of the Director ofthe Administrative
Office of the U. S. Courts 238 (1961). In 1981, over 30,000
such suits were commenced. 20 Annual Report of the Director, 63, 68 (1981). The result of this unprecedented increase
in civil rights litigation is a heavy burden on the federal
courts to the detriment of all federal court litigants, including
others who assert that their constitutional rights have been
infringed.
The Court argues that past decisions of the Court categorically hold that there is no exhaustion requirement in § 1983
suits. But as the Court of Apeals demonstrates, and as the
Court recognizes, many of these decisions can be explained as
applications of traditional exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. See McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S.
668 (1963). Other decisions speak to the question in an offhand and conclusory fashion without full briefing and argument. See Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249, 251
(1971) (unargued per curiam); Damico v. California, 389
U. S. 416 (1967) (unargued per curiam). Moreover, a categorical no-exhaustion rule would seem inconsistent with the
decision in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), prescribing abstention when state criminal proceedings are pending.
At least where administrative proceedings are pending,
Younger would seem to suggest the appropriateness of exhaustion. Cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 574-575
(1973). Yet the Court today adopts a fiat rule without
exception.
The Court seeks to support its no exhaustion rule with indications of congressional intent. Finding nothing directly
Of the approximately 30,000 civil rights fuits filed in fiscal year 1981,
15,639 were filed by state prisoners under§ 1983. The remainder involved
a variety of civil rights suits. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts 63, 68 (1981). See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527, 554 n. 13 (1981) (POWELL, J., concurring).
20
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on point in the history of the Civil Rights Act itself, the
Court places primary reliance on the recent Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1997 et seq. (1976
ed., Supp. IV). This legislation was designed to authorize
the Attorney General to initiate civil rights actions on behalf
of institutionalized persons. § 1997a. The Act also placed
certain limits on the existing authority of the Attorney General to intervene in suits begun by institutionalized persons.
See§ 1997c. In addition, in§ 1997e, the Act sets forth an exhaustion requirement but only for § 1983 claims brought by
prisoners.
On the basis of the exhaustion provision in § 1997e, andremarks primarily by Representative Kastenmeier, the Court
contends that Congress has endorsed a general no exhaustion
rule. The irony in this reasoning should be obvious. A
principal concern that prompted the Department of Justice to
support, and the Congress to adopt, § 1997e was the vast increase in § 1983 suits brought by state prisoners in federal
courts. There has been a year-by-year increase in these
suits since the mid-1960's. The increase in fiscal 1981 over
fiscal 1980 was some 26%, resulting in a total of 15,639 such
suits filed in 1981 as compared with 12,397 in 1980. The 1981
total constituted over 8.6% of the total federal district court
docket. Although most of these cases present frivolous
claims, many are litigated through the courts of appeals to
this Court. The burden on the system fairly can be described as enormous with few, if any, benefits that would not
be available in meritorious cases if exhaustion of appropriate
state administrative remedies were required prior to any federal court litigation. It was primarily this problem that
prompted enactment of § 1997e. 21
21
The exhaustion requirement in § 1997e only becomes effective if the
Attorney General or a federal district court determines that the available
prison grievance procedures comply with standards set forth in subsection
(b) of§ 1997e. As of this date, the Department of Justice has not certified
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Moreover, it is clear from the legislative history that Congress simply was not addressing the exhaustion problem in
any general fashion. The concern focused on the problem of
prisoner petitions. The new Act had a dual purpose in this
respect. In addition to requiring prior exhaustion of adequate state remedies, Congress wished to authorize the Attorney General to act when necessary to protect the constitutional rights of prisoners, but at the same time minimize the
need for federal action of any kind by requiring prior exhaustion. Both sponsors of the Act in the Senate made this clear.
Senator Hatch explained § 1997e as follows:
"In actions relating to alleged violations of the constitutional rights of prisoners, such persons may be required
to exhaust internal grievance procedures before the Attorney General can become involved pursuant to [the
Act]." Congressional Record S1713, February 26, 1980. 22
Senator Bayh, the author of the Act, decribed the exhaustion
provision in similar terms:
"[l]n the event of a prison inmate's rights being alleged
to be violated ... then before the Justice Department
could intervene or initiate ~uits, the prison inmate or
class of inmates would have to pursue all of their
adiminstrative remedies within the State law before the
the inmate grievance procedures of even a single state.
22
Senator Hatch offered the same explanation on several other occasions
in the course of the debate. See Congressional Record S4293, April 29,
1980 ("Section 7 would establish specific procedures that would be applicable before the Attorney General could enter into an action in behalf of an
imprisoned or incarcerated person. Such person would first have had to
fully exhaust all internal grievance mechanisms that existed in the institution in which he was confined"); Congressonal Record S4626, May 6, 1980
("Section 7(D) further clarifies that the administrative grievance procedures established in section 7 are only for the purposes of requiring prisoners to exhaust internal grievance mechanisms before the Attorney General
can litigate on his behalf').
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Justice Department could intervene under the provisions
of [the Act]." Congressional Record S1859, February
27, 1980 . .

In short, in enacting the Civil Rights of Institutionalized
Act Congress was focussing on the powers of the Attorney
General, and the particular question of prisoners' suits, not
on the general question of exhaustion in § 1983 actions. Also
revealing as to the limited purpose of § 1997e is Congress'
consistent refusal to adopt legislation imposing a general noexhaustion requirement. Thus, for example, in 1979, a bill
was introduced into the Senate providing:
"No court of the United States shall stay or dismiss any
civil action brought under this Act on the ground that
the party bringing such action failed to exhaust the remedies available in the courts or the administrative agencies of any State." S.1983, 96th Congress, 1st Session.
The bill was never reported out of committee.
The requirement that plaintiffs exhaust available and adequate administrative remedies-subject to well developed
exceptions-is firmly established in virtually every area of
the law. This is dictated in§ 1983 actions by common sense,
as well as by comity and federalism, where adequate state
administrative remedies are available.
If the exhaustion question were properly before us, I
would affirm the Court of Appeals.
I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER joins
in Part II of this dissenting opinion.
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Justice Powell, dissenting.

The Court holds that the Board of Regents of the
State of Florida, a state instrumentality, is subject to
suit

in

Eleventh

federal

court

Amendment.

notwithstanding

The

Court

reaches

the
this

bar

of

the

conclusion

2.

through a novel--and, to me, i llog ical--expans ion of the
holding in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

The Court

then rejects the rule of "flexible" exhaustion of state
administrative remedies stated by the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, sitting en bane.

Relying principally

on the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42

u.s.c. §1997e (1976 ed., Supp. IV), the Court holds that
any exhaustion requirement in §1983 suits would violate
the intent of Congress.

I disagree with both portions of

the Court's holding and therefore dissent.
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In
Court
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sovereign

interpreting

sought
immunity

to

the

Eleventh
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embodied

in

both
the

Amendment,
the

the

~~
~

principle of

Amendment

and

the

states' duty to obey--and the federal courts to enforce-federal law. 1

Thus, it is well established that the State

1 The Eleventh Amendment provides:
"The judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State,
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."
The Amendment was adopted in response to the Court's
decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). ~
Foetnebe eont4nue~ neKt page.

3.

is not "divested of its immunity 'on the mere ground that
the case is one arising under the Constitution or laws of
the United States.'"
184, 186

(1964),

10 (1890).

is

not

u.s.

quoting, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1,

1

nevertheless

323

u.s.

\~
And the Court has held that even when a State

2

named

interest.

Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377

as

a

applies

party
if

to

the

the State

suit,
is

the

Amendment

the real party

in

See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
459 (1945) • 3

Court in Chisolm took original jurisdiction over an action
to collect a debt brought by two citizens of South
Carolina against the State of Georgia.
The Court's
decision "that a State was liable to suit by a citizen of
another State or of a foreign country, literally shocked
the Nation." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662 (1974).
The Eleventh Amendment was adopted five years later.
2 1n Hans the Court also held that the Amendment
bars suits brought against an unconsenting State by its
own citizens, although by its terms the Amendment does not
apply to this situation.
Cf. Monaco v. Mississip~i, 292
U.S. 313 (1934) (Eleventh Amendment applies to
ederal
suits against an unconsenting state by a foreign nation).
By contrast, the Amendment has not been applied to suits
against a State brought by another State or by the United
States.
North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923);
United States v. MlSSlssippi, 380 u.s. 128 (1965).
3 1n Ford Motor the plaintiff sued the department
of treasury of the State of Indiana, and the three
officials--the
Governor,
Treasurer,
and
Auditor--who
constituted the board of the department of treasury. The
plaintiff sought a refund of gross income taxes paid to
the department.
Suit was brought in federal District
Court.
The Court held that the suit was barred by the
Eleventh Amendment.
The plaintiff was seeking a refund
from the state not a personal judgment against the
individual officials:
" [W] hen the act ion is in essence
one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is
the real party in interest and is entitled to invoke its
sovereign immunity from suit even though
individual
Footnote continued on next page.
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On the other hand, the Court has not interpreted
the Amendment to bar federal court jurisdiction when the
State has consented to suit, 4 or
Court

of

court.

5

an

action

brought

to bar

against

review by this

the State

in

state

Counties and municipalities may not claim immunity

officials are nominal defendants." 323 u.s., at 464. See
Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 663
("It is
well
established that even though a State is not named a party
to the action, the suit may nonetheless be barred by the
Eleventh Amendment ... The rule has evolved that suit by
private parties seeking to impose a liability which must
be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred
by
the
Eleventh
Amendment")~
Great
Northern
Life
Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
see Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) ~
Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 u.s. 184 (1964).
See
Tribe,
Intergovernmentar-- Immunities
in
Litigation,
Taxation, and Regulation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 682, 685 (1976)
(" [U] nlike the identical ;feference to 'the judicial Power
of the United States~ in~rticle III--a power which cannot
be expanded by legislation or by consent of the parties to
a lawsuit--the language of the eleventh amendment has not
been interpreted to prohibit a suit once a state has given
its consent").
In additio,n, by ratifying the Fourteenth
Amendment, the states consented to a diminution of their
sovereignt~, Thus, Congress may provide for suits against
the States when exercising the powers granted to it by §5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445 (1976) ~ Quern v. Jordan, 440 u.s. 332 (1979).
4

yr

5 In

Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 445 (1900),
the Court noted that even if California had consented to
suit only in its own courts, review would be available in
this Court of any federal question:
"If the California statute be construed as
referring only to suits brought in one of its
own courts, it does not follow that injustice
will be done to any taxpayer whose case presents
a Federal question.
For, if he be denied any
right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and
specially set up by him, the case can be brought
here upon writ of error from the highest court
of the State."
Accord Chandler v. Dix, 194 u.s. 590, 592 (1904)
Footnote continued on next page.
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Great
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under the Amendment.
529

(1890) .

Young,

209

Lincoln County v.

And under &:he
U.S.

123

im~

(1908),

a

Luning, 133 U.S.

decisioA iofl Ex parte

federal

court may order

state officials to obey federal law in the future. 6

;B
In

this

"reverse

discrimination"

action,

petitioner brought suit under 42 u.s.c. §1983 against the
Board of Regents of the State of Florida. 7

She did not

Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 u.s. 47, 57 (1944).
The Court's assumption of jurisdiction in University of
California Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978),
a case originating in state court, thus provides no
support for today' s dec is ion.
For the same reason, the
Court's reliance upon Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural
College, 221 U.S. 636 (1911), is misplaced. See infra.
6 under the theory, some would say fiction, of Ex
parte Young, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits
against state officers because when a state officer "comes
into conflict with the superior authority of
[the]
Constitution, •.. he is ••• stripped of his official or
representative
character."
Id.,
at
159.
On
this
analysis, a prospective injunction requiring the official
to conform his future behavior to federal law, does not
require anything of the State and therefore does not run
afoul
of
the Eleventh Amendment.
The granting of
_'1 _
retroactive relief, on the other hand, would require the
~~~·
official to take action in his offical capacity. Thus, if
~
the official is required to pay damages from state funds,
the State is directly affected.
See Edelman v. Jordan,
~
supra.
Similarly,
retroactive injunctive relief may
~ -~
require the official to take action in his official
~~
capacity and also would be barred by the Eleventh
.J..C
Amendment.
Cf. Larson v. Domestic .!_ Foreign Commerce
~./
Corp., 337 u.s. 682 (1949).
Of course, in addition to
~· .
prospective injunctive relief,
a plaintiff may seek
damages from the individual officer in his personal
~
capacity.
See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-238
~
~
(1974).
7As the Court notes, see ante, at
t~, . ~~
, n. 1,
~~~~petitioner
originally named the Florida International
~-~(:...
University
as
defendant.
Because
the
Florida
~~~
International University lacks the capacity to sue or be
~·
sued, the District Court found that it was not a proper
0
J .~
defendant.
Petitioner
was
permitted
to
amend
her

~~

\ \~
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name the individual regents as defendants.

She sued for

$500,000 in damages, and requested a declaratory judgment

an d

. .
t'1ve re 1'1e f .
lnJunc

8

Under prior decisions of

this

Court, the appropriate Eleventh Amendment analysis of this
{.A.)

case

~m

1\

§1983, and .we

straightforward.

havef~at

from

?

instrumentality

~,.A/
pv
{5

.~

I'

~ ~~
~

().J'

~

~~~~ ~
~

rvvVV

/ .t?.
~

u.s.

the Board of

~~omplaint,

~

440

and

Congress has not removed the

Amendment.~ns.

bar of the Elevent
v. Jordan,

This is an action under

332

(1979).

Petitioner seeks relief

Regents of

the

State of

agency

the

State. 9

or

she

of

simply

See Quern

substituted

Florida,
It

the

an

does

not

Board

of

Regents.
In addition to racial discrimination, petitioner
also claimed that she had been discriminated against on
the basis of her sex.
8 Petitioner
sought
a
declaratory
judgment
"declaring that the Plaintiff has suffered from acts of
discrimination." In addition, she asked the court to
"[r]equire
Defendant
to
remedy
the
discrimination
practiced upon Plaintiff by promoting her to the next
available
position
consistent
with
those
previously
applied for and for which she is qualified or in the
alternative, to require the Defendant to pay to the
Plaintiff the sum of $500,000 as actual and exemplary
damages."
She
requested
any
further
equitable and
injunctive relief that the court deemed appropriate.
9 The
Board
of
Regents
of
the
Division
of
Universities of the Department of Education is established
by the Florida Education Code as a part of the State
University System.
Fla. Stat.
240.2011.
The Board
consists of the Commissioner of Education and twelve
citizens appointed by the Governor, approved by three
members of the Cabinet, and confirmed by the Senate. Fla.
Stat. 240. 207.
The chief administrative officer of the
Board is the Chancellor, who serves by appointment of the
Board.
The Board has general supervisory authority over the
Footnote continued on next page.
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appear that the State has waived the bar of the Eleventh

State University System.
Fla. Stat. 240.209. Among its
duties are the appointment of university presidents, the
review of budget requests of each university in the state
system, the preparation of an aggrgated budget for the
State University System, the development of a master plan,
and
the
establishment
of
a
systemwide
personnel
classification and pay plan. Fla. Stat. §240.209.
The Board is an agency of the State of Florida.
Fla. Stat. §216.011. See Relyea v. State, 385 So.2d 1378
{Fla. App. 1980} {"Florida Atlantic University, the Board
of Regents and the Chancellor of the State University
System are agencies and instrumentalities 'of the State of
Florida."}. Accord Greer v. Mathews, 409 So.2d 1105 {Fla.
App. 1982}.
Cf. Byron v. University of Florida, 403 F.
Supp. 49, 51 {N.D. Fla. 1975} {"It must be conceded that
the University is a political instrumentality of the State
of Florida."}~ Dacey v. Florida Bar, Inc., 414 F. 2d 195,
198 {CAS 1969} {state bar a state agency}~
Spangler v.
Florida State Turnpike Authority, 106 So. 2d 421, 422
{1958} {Turnpike Authority a state agency even though its
revenues derive primarily from tolls}.
The Board may
claim the defense of sovereign immunity in suits at state
law.
See Relyea v. State, supra~ State Bd. of Regents v.
Yant, 360 So. 2d 99 {Fla. App. 1978}.
Numerous
Courts
of
Appeals
have
held
state
universities or state Boards of Regents immune from suit
~ in federal court by reason of the Eleventh Amendment.
See
Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 660 F. 2d 1345, 1349
{CA9 1981}~~
Brennan v. University of Kansas, 451 F. 2d
1287 {CAlO 1971}~ Ronwin v. Shapiro;-657 F. 2d 1071 {CA9
1981}~
Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Trustees of State Colleges in
Colorado, 356 F. 2d 599 {CAlO 1066} ~
Jefferson County
Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, 656 F. 2d 92 , 99 {CAS
1981}, cert granted on~ different question, ___ u.s. ___
{198 2} ~
Jag nandan v. Giles, 5 38 F. 2d 1166 {CAS 19 7 6}
{Board of Trustees of Mississippi State University}~
~ Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College,
:--...J 590 F. 2d 470 {CA3 1978} ~ Prebble v. Brodrick, 535 F. 2d
605
{CAlO
1976}
{Univerity of
Wyom1ng} ~
Long
v.
--........; Richardson, 525 F. 2d 74 {CA6 1974}
{Memphis State
University}.
The majority argues that the Courts of Appeals are
split on the question of whether damages can be awarded
against state universities.
Yet the two cases cited by
the Court to demonstrate a split on this question do not
support the Court's assertion.
In SON! v. Board of
Trustees, 513 F. 2d 347 {CA6 1975} the court found that
the Board of Trustees had waived its immunity to suit,
while in Goss v. Jacinto Junior College, 588 F. 2d 96, 9899 {CAS 1979} the court reasoned that the particular
junior college was similar to a county or municipality, an
"independent 'political subdivision' as a matter of Texas
statutory and common law."
The Court suggests as well
that the Courts of Appeals are agreed that injunctive
relief may be awarded against state universities and state
boards of regents.
Yet again the cases cited provide
Footnote continued on next page.
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Amendment by consenting to suit in federal court. 10

Nor

can it be argued persuasively that the Board of Regents is
similar to those local governmental bodies as to which
Amendment does not extend. See Mt. Healthy Bd. of Ed. v.

little support for the Court's assertion.
In New England
Patriots Football Club, Inc. v. University of Colorado,
592 F. 2d 1196, 1201 (CAl 1979), the court held that
individual members of the Board of Regents might be sued
for prospective injunctive relief.
It did not hold,
however, as the Court implies, that the University itself
might be sued.
Rather, it accepted "the University's
identification with the state."
And in ~ Student
Services v. Texas Ji. ~ M University, 612 F. ~ 160, 165
(CAS 1980), it is unclear that the court held more than
that officials of the University could be sued for
injunctive relief.
Unlike the situation in those two
case, petitioner sued only the Board of Regents.
10 The Board of Regents is incorporated and has the
power "to contract and be contracted with, to sue and be
sued, and to plead and be impleaded 1n all courts of law
and equity." Section 240.205, Fla. Stat.
In past cases
the Court has cautioned against inferring a waiver of
immunity on the basis of similar such provisions.
"The
conclusion that there has been a waiver of immunity will
not
be
lightly
inferred
And
where
a
public
instrumentality is created with the right 'to sue and be
sued' that waiver of immunity in the particular setting
may be restricted to suits or proceedings of a special
character in the state, not the federal courts." Petty v.
Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commn, 359 u.s. 275, 276-277
(19 59) •
See Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Read, 3 22
u.S. 4 7, 54 ("When a state author izesa suit against
itself to do justice to taxpayers who deem themselves
injured by any exaction, it is not consonant with our dual
system for the federal courts to be astute to read the
consent to embrace federal as well as state courts").
In
the absence of "any clear indication that the state
intended to consent to suit in federal courts," Ford Motor
Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 u.s. 454, 465 (1945),
there is no basis for inferring a waiver of the Eleventh
Immunity in this case.
See Bragg v. Board of Public
Instruction, 36 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 1948) ("The mere fact
that the Board of Public Instruction is created as a body
corporate with power to sue and be sued does not affect
its immunity from tort")~
Martin v. University of
Louisville, 541 F. 2d 1171, 1175 n. 4 (CA6 1976) ("Other
courts have construed similar 'sue and be sued' language
in the grant of a corporate charter to a university not to
create a waiver of sovereign immunity").
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Doyle,
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274, 279-281 {1977); Lake Country Estates

v. Tahoe Planning Acency,
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not
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391, 401 {1979).
body but

rather

The
bears

responsibility for the State university system as a whole.
Cf.

Goss

v.

Jacinto Junior College,

588 F.

2d 9 6d

{CAS

1979) •

I~

/Jm1ess

-...

the

rule

in Ex

parte Young,

supra, is applicable, the Eleventh Amendment clearly bars
suit.

But the theory in Ex parte Young, supra, wotlld seem

~
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relief, would

not~~

~~
~) ~L_h-~

been barred) 11
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~eclaratory
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from
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In addition, petitioner could have sought~~

the

individual

members

of

the

Board

of

Regents in their personal capacities.
But petitioner did not

sue the members of the

11 Petitioner's
relief
may
be
injunctive
retroactive to the extent that she asks the Board of
Regents to appoint her to the next available position.
Presumably, such an appointment would require an exercise
of the state's authority. See note 3, supra.
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Board~e
Florida.
simply

sued the Board itself, an arm of the State of
One would have thought that Ex parte Young was

irrelevant

in

these

circumstances.

Although

an

~~.a.£..~

efiou~

individual official may be

to aet on his own and
A

without State authority when acting against federal law,
I
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the

State--or,\~ depaftment' of the State--cannot act ~

~~~~~s~~41
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the state's own coffers.

Whether

the damages come

directly from the State's general fund or from some other
State

fund,

the money

is no less

the State's.

Indeed,

direct application of Ex parte Young to the State and its
instrumentalities would read the Eleventh Amendment out of
the Constitution.
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upon

the
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If the bar of the Amendment is lifted
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State
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Despite the weight of these considerations, the
Court undertakes to apply Ex parte Young to the Board of

11.

Regents itself.

Relying upon the decision in Hopkins v.

Clemson Agricultural

College,

Court

the

reasons

corporate,

is

that

221

Board

no different

Court attempts to bolster

U.S.

of

from

636

(1911),

Regents,

a

a

body

state official.

The

thi~sion

by

~

under

Florida

"director"

of

law

the

the

Division of

concludes that,

Board

just as

of

Regents

as

the

~
~

is

Universities.

termed

the

The Court

in Ex parte Young, the Board of

Regents "may be sued for unconstitutional or unauthorized
actions, as long as the plaintiff is not seeking monetary
relief

that

must

be

paid

out

of

the

state

treasury."

~
~'2 ~h:;:::;onclusion,l ~-~~A~ 4
Ante, at 8.

t\ finds ne

-BI:i~ t

.-i:fl "the

indicated above, the

precedents

of

this

~:~~
~y~

Ex parte Young

Court.

As

~

simply~

"'

not lc;rally apply to a State or State instrumentality.
The

State

cannot

be

"stripped"

of

its

own

authority.

Moreover, if the Board of Regents is a State agency--and
it

clearly

State's.

is--then

Yet

the

its

Court's

assets

are

decision

also
exposes

those

of

the

the Board's

assets to a damage award on the double fiction that the

12.

Board is really an "official"

State.

On

such

a

theory,

assets

~IY{~J

a

state,.\ tGll

~~~/

commission

e-&

~

~

indQed any &t.«ee 6oQ.¥ wi

th~e

be sued for damages.

In addition, such a conclusion is

sources of income)-fy

at odds with the Court's holding in Kennecott Copper Corp.
v.

Tax Commn,

funds

of

the

327 U.S.
State

573

Tax

(1946),

that the segregated

Commission

were

State

monies

subject to the Eleventh Amendment.
Nor does the Board of Regents' corporate status
under

state

law

support

~f-1

governments

lAA.-

commissions,

~
~
~

Court's

holding.

~ ~/
of

~

1\

~...

the

a

variety

"
agencies,

and

corporations.

of

State
boards,

~~-?tv~

~The

Regent• t,;';;o less j;f' inStrumen:- of the State
~
/-z5 tb
/]

Board -of

because~~
/7 -

.

~-h...-~~~~~

i.s a --lega-i

~~e
J t-~

sued.

entit¥~

Jndee~

with the power to contract, to sue and

khis Cour.t repeatedly has held that a

/)A)'

~~

9/J~

~

provision in state law giving a state body the power "to
sue and be sued" does not support the inference that the

~rY

State

~~·

Northern Insurance Co. v. Read,

thereby waives the Eleventh Amendment.

w-1-

Co.

v.

Department

of

Treasury,

322

u.s.

323

47:

u.s.

See Great
Ford Motor

454

(1945);

13.

Kennecott Coppper Corp. v. State Tax Commn, 327 U.S.
{1946) •

~? cone 1 us1on
.

Th e maJOO ty. s

572

t h at corporate status

converts a State body into a State official,

subject to

~-~~
suit,

weuld

S'e'em -te

centradi:et-1, these

well

established

precedents.

~'

I

am unaware of any prior decision of

l-td-

this Court wftteh supports the
parte
Clemson

Young

to

College,

Cv-u.-,.., 1- i

~·s
I

application of Ex

State

instrumentalities.

supra,

relied

Court is simply irrelevant.

upon

so

Hopkins

heavily

by

v.
the

In that case suit was brought

against a state college in state court to recover damages
caused by the college's construction of a dyke.

The state

courts held that the college was protected from suit by
the state law of sovereign immunity.

Although the Court

discussed the Eleventh Amendment in some detail, there was
simply no Eleventh Amendment question in that case. 12

It

12 The state college recognized that there was no
Eleventh Amendment question.
In its brief it noted: "It
is difficult to see how either Section 2 of Article III,
of the Constitution of the United States or the Eleventh
amendment has any application to the inquiry whether a
suit by a citizen of a State in its own Courts is a suit
against that State. That seems to be purely a question of
local law to be determined by the State Court." Brief at
20.

14.
\._

was clear before Hopkins that the Eleventh Amendment does
not

apply

question
court.

to

bar

review

presented

in

a

in
suit

See note 5, supra.

Hopkins

presented

today,

decline to review it:

this

Court

against

of

a

any

State

federal
in state

Indeed, were the question in
the

Court

undoubtedly

would

The state courts' holding that an

action against the college could not be maintained because
of sovereign immunity would be seen as an independent and
adequate state law ground.
Co.

v.

Redwine,

335

u.s.

See Georgia R.
900

(1949).

The

R.

~

fact

Banking
remains

that however the holding in Hopkins is stated, no Eleventh
Amendment

question

was

presented

to

the

Court. 13

It

therefore is no surprise that the opinion has rarely been
cited

in

the subsequent decisions of this Court. 14

The

13 It is no easy matter to state the holding in
Hopkins. The decision antedated Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 u.s. 64 (1938).
It is likely that the Hopkins Court
simply did not differentiate between the state law of
sovereign immunity and the federal law of sovereign
immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment.
In Hamilton
Mfg. Co. v. Trustees of State Colleges in Colorado, 356 F.
2d 599, 601 n. 1 (CAlO 1966), the court viewed Hopkins as
standing for a principle of agency law: "[N]either a state
nor an individual can confer upon an agent authority to
commit a tort, so as to excuse the perpetrator.
In such
cases the law of agency has no application,--the wrongdoer
is treated as a principal, and individually liable for the
damages inflicted, and subject to injunction ••. "
Id. ,
quoting 221 u.s., at 643.
--Footnote(s) 14 will appear on following pages.

15.

case does not deserve the pride of place given to it by
the majority. 15

9f

Moreover,

LA-&- /U..IJU _. ~
two

recent

decisions

of

this

Court

14 The de is ion in Hopkins was most recently cited
in Larson v. Domestic ~Foreign Corp., 337, u.s. 682
(1949}.
The ma:tG;ri-ty in Larson relied upon Hopkins for
the proposit on that an "agent's liability for torts
committed by him cannot be avoided by pleading the
direction or atuhorization of his principal."
337 u.s.,
at 694.
Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion
included Hopkins with cases standing for the proposition
that jurisdiction is barred when the plaintiff seeks an
"interest in property which concededly belonged to the
Government, or demanded relief calling for an assertion of
what was unquestionably official authority."
Id., at 710
& 29. The m&jori.t¥ does not cite to any,.<tleclSlOn of lh:i:e
<Js.u..r..t that relies upon Hopkins for the principle that a
state instrumentality may be sued in federal court.
15 Any reliance on Hopkins further must be tempered
by the Court's view in Hopkins that it was not reviewing
official action. Rather, it viewed the College's activity
as proprietary in nature:

"[T]his is not an action against the College for
a tort committed in the prosecution of any
governmental function.
The fee was in the
State, but the corporation, as equitable owner,
was in possession, use and enjoyment of the
property.
For protecting the bot tom land the
College, for its own corporate purposes and
advantage, constructed the dyke.
In so doing it
was not acting in any governmental capacity.
The embankment was in law similar to one which
might have been built for private purposes by
the plaintiff on the other side of the river.
221 U.S., at 647.
In Employees v. Department of Public Health and
Welfare, 411 u.s. 279 (1973}, the Court distinguished the
earlier Eleventh Amendment decision in Parden v. Terminal
R. Co., 377 u.s. 184 (1964}, on the basis that Parden
concerned State proprietary activity:
"Parden involved
the railroad business which Alabama operated 'for profit.'
Parden was in the area where private persons and
corporations normally ran the enterprise."
By contrast,
the Employees Court found that the employment practices of
state
hospitals
did
not
concern
state
proprietary
activity.
A similar distinction can be drawn between
Hopkins and the present case involving the employment
practices of a state educational institution.

16.

on
state

the

and

majority's

corporate

holding

bodies

that

may

be

treated as state "officials," subject to Ex parte Young.
In Alabama v.
that

suit

for

Pugh,

u.s.

438

injunctive

781

relief

(1978), the Court held

against

the

State

of

Alabama and the Alabama Board of Corrections was barred by
the Eleventh Amendment.

The Court found that "[t]here can

be no doubt •.. that suit against the State and its Board
of Corrections is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, unless
Alabama has consented to the filing of such a suit."
U der

the

rule announced today, however,

Id.,
there

~--.....

ould be considerable doubt whether suit
were ever

f Corrections could be dismissed.
reated

by

single
asily could

be

unit--and

found--it

undoubtedly

would

be

said

that the Board was really an "official" at least subject

Similarly,

u.s.

~84

in

Parden

v.

Terminal

R.

Co.,

377

ftu_ ~ ~ ~
- d.-t.-(1964), involving) a state owned railroa~\ 4::he----

~~~~ ~ ~ A~:::(OL - ~~
Court never

indicated that a state corporation could be

P--

~~~~~L4.~~~~~
sued

as

an

"off1cial."

The

railway

in

Parden

~A~·

..____ ~~ -~p~4.dL~ ~6;

-

~ uaZb.. a- r::v~~

was

I

17.

authorized

to

operate

common carrier."

377

"as

us.

though

185.

it

were

an

ordinary

It performed services for

profit and had contracts and agreements with various labor
orgainzations.

It was "indisputably a common carrier

engaging

interstate

in

commerce."

Nonetheless,

the Court cons ide red

immune

suit

from

in

federal

that

Id. ,
the

court unless

at

185.

railroad was
the State had

waived its immunity.
State

body,

with

separate

funds,

the

railroad

was

no

longer an instrumentality of the State but was merely a
State official.
In
neither

short,

the

by precedent nor

Court's

holding

is

supported

logic.l6
rl~~e<' .c.~

Court

should

wish

.:af!f' < 4

from

~

4

to

~

/1

the

petitioner

'SiL e.....c._

what Ac&n oAl¥- bQ

termed

16 The majority suggests that in prior decisions the
has permitted suit against State Boards of Regents.
See ante, at 5.
Yet in none of these suits was the
.jurisdictional
issue posed as it is here.
Thus, for
example, in University of California Board of Regents v.
Bakke, 438 u.s. 265 (1978), the Eleventh Amendment issue
was not present because the case was here on petition to
the California Supreme Court. See note 5, supra. And in
each of the other cases cited by the Court, the plaintiff
had the good sense to name other defendants in addition to
the particular state board. See, e. g., Board of Regents
v. Tomanio, 446 u.s. 478 (1978); McLaur1n v-.-Oklahoma
State Regents, 339 u.s. 637 (1950).

18.

announcing a
new doctrine,

one that exposes

the

instrumentalities of

/

the State itself to suit in federal court.
decision,

state

boards

injunctive relief.

After today's

and commissions may be

I·n(jeeu-, tile

sued

for

!,;;t~ t~s~lf)

bodies may be sued for damages on the fiction that their
segregated assets are not the State's. 17

The Court's ~

~- ~

~"-' icn>~

of Ex parte Young to the State itself ueriJ es~~ ./.J... Hu.- ~~~~. 1-1--~ ~

,..t~oa~rr

~~

the careful balance worked out in this

~~~
jand lea-ves little stan~ to the
the
of

Appeals

sui t,~r
for

~er

1\

)

Eleventh

alternatively

consideration

-~

of the law

of

Arne~
remand
the

to

the

Elevent .

?

-::---:------.---.~~~;k.. ~ 1-o ~ a.-1~ Lnrw./r,~

f

1t72LL~~~~.~~
~~~~~~~
~ -

17
whether a State board, like a State offici~_!--~
may claim good faith immunity is not clear. Cf ~ ~ ~4~

t1A-

,I.e ~)-·.......... ~~ ~ 19.

JPf :7 J;!ibP#~

r?

In

short,

; lc:f9 9~ / ~

in

enacting

;;;;e

Civil

Rights

Institutionalized Act Congress was focussing on the powers

~

of the Attorney General, and the particular question

I

I

~

suits,

prisoners'

not

on

the

general

questio ~

~

exhaustion -ifl

~
~ Congress'

-·
.. v

cl-9-83 actions

;\ Perbaps

-:mo:r;e

vf;;c;~;.,...
consistent refusal to adopt legislation imposing

a general no-exhaustion requirement.

Thus, for example,

in 1979, a bill was introduced into the Senate providing:
"No court of the United States shall stay or dismiss any
civil action brought under this Act on the ground that the
party brining such action failed to exhaust the remedies
available in the courts or the administrative agencies of
any

State."

The

bill

was

never

reported

out

of

committee. 21
The

requirement

available

and

adequate

subject

to

well

that

~e~

developed

plaintiffs

administrative

exhaust
remedies--

exceptions--is

firmly

established in virtually every area of the la~ I seen&
reason to

dev:i.aJ;.e....

from --tbis

~mmon_

seRse

~le

irr-§"'1-983

a~s. 1fif the exhaustion question were properly before
us, I would affirm the Court of Appeals.

~-~19$3~~

v-z-~,~,~~~,1~

~4---c... ~ ~

~

~ /.LJ~~. ~,.."'fa~
~.

\
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If

petitioner

had

sued

the

individual

members

of

the

.._

"-.c~

Board, p&titii.clil&l7 '" claim for damages against them would
~

not have been barred by the Eleventh Amendmen~~

Nor

5

would her claim for equitable relief to the extent it were
limited to future conduct.

But petitioner did not sue the

members of the Board.

She sued only the Board itself, an

arm

Florida.

of

relief

the

State

sought

by

of

petitioner

Moreover,
would

the

impose

alternative - an affirmative duty on the Board to

principle
in

10

the

promote

her to the next available position of comparable status to

~
those to which she had applied, or }\equire/ the [Board]
to pay to
and

[petitioner]

exemplary damages."

the sum of $500,000.00 as actual
(David cite the complaint,

15

and

also say see n. 3 ante).

··,.

.

·' ·~

Rider A, p. 23 (Patsy)
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The conern that prompted the Department of Justice to
support, and the Congress to adopt, §1997(e) was the vast
increase in §1983 suits brought by state prisoners in
federal courts.

There has been a year-by-year increase in

these suits since the mid-1960's.

The increase in fiscal

1981 over fiscal 1982 was some 26%, resulting in a total
of 16,000 (David, get correct figure) such suits filed in
1981 as compared with

in 1980.

The 1981 total

constitued ____% (David, figure it out, it's about 9%) of
the total federal district court docket.

Although most of

these cases present frivolous claims, many are litigated
through the Court of Appeals to this Court.

The burden on

the system fairly can be described as enormous with few if
any benefits that would not be available in meritorious
cases if exhaustion of appropriate state administrative
remedies were required prior to any federal court
litigation.

It was primarily this problem that prompted

enactment of §1997(e).

2.

Moreover, it is clear from the legislative
history that Congress simply was not addressing exhaustion
problem in any general fashion.
the prisoner petitions.
this respect.

The concern focused on

The new Act had a dual purpose in

In addition to requiring prior exhaustion

of adequate state remedies, Congress wished to authorized
the Attorney General to act when necessary to protect the
constitutional rights of prisoners, but at the same time
minimize the need for federal action of any kind by
requiring prior exhaustion.
the Senate made this clear.

Both sponsors of the Act in
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RIDER2 GINA-POW
If

petitioner

had

sued

the

individual

members

of

the

Board, petitioner's claim for damages against them would
not have been barred by the Eleventh Amendment*l3.

Nor

5

would her claim for equitable relief to the extent it were
limited to future conduct.

But petitioner did not sue the

members of the Board.

She sued only the Board itself, an

arm

Florida.

of

relief

the

State

sought

by

of

petitioner

Moreover,
would

the

impose

alternative - an affirmative duty on the Board to

principle
in

the

10

promote

her to the next available position of comparable status to
those to which she had applied, or "required the [Board]
to pay to

[petitioner]

and exemplary damages."
also say see n. 3 ante).

the sum of $500,000.00 as actual
(David cite the complaint,

and

15
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4

The conern that prompted the Department of Justice to
(\

support, and the Congress to adopt, §1997(e) was the vast
increase in §1983 suits brought by state prisoners in
federal courts.

There has been a year-by-year increase in

these suits since the mid-1960's.

The increase in fiscal

1981 over fiscal 1982 was some 26%, resulting in a total
of 16,000 (David, get correct figure) such suits filed in
1981 as compared with
constitued

- -%

in 1980.

The 1981 total

(David, figure it out, it's about 9%) of

the total federal district court docket.

Although most of

these cases present frivolous claims, many are litigated
through the Court of Appeals to this Court.

The burden on

the system fairly can be described as enormous with few if
any benefits that would not be available in meritorious
cases if exhaustion of appropriate state administrative
remedies were required prior to any federal court
litigation.

It was primarily this problem that prompted

enactment of §1997(e).

2.

Moreover, it is clear from the legislative
history that Congress simply was not addressing exhaustion
problem in any general fashion.
the prisoner petitions.
this respect.

The concern focused on

The new Act had a dual purpose in

In addition to requiring prior exhaustion

of adequate state remedies, Congress wished to authorized
the Attorney General to act when necessary to protect the
constitutional rights of prisoners, but at the same time
minimize the need for federal action of any kind by
requiring prior exhaustion.
the Senate made this clear.

Both sponsors of the Act in

23.

Kastenmeier, the Court contends that Congress has endorsed

~~

a no exhaustion rule.
~
be
)

obvious.

The irony in this reasoning should

~Undoubtedly

the

supporters

of

/

o learn that

proponents of exhaustion--would be surprised

t hey

Jsomehow~

had

instructed

this

exhaustion rule for all other §1983

COUrt

~-

§19

to

adopt

a

claims ~

is clear from the legislative history that Congress simply
was not addressing the exhaustion problem in any general
fashion when it enacted §1997e.
the Act
limit

on

Indeed, both sponsors of

in the Senate viewed this section as placing a
the

Attorney

General's

power

to

interven J

Senator Hatch co-sponsor of the Act, explained §1997e as
follows:
"In actions relating to alleged violations of
the constitutional rights of prisoners, such
persons may be required to exhaust internal
grievance procedures before the Attorney General
can become involved pursuant to [the Act]."
Congr2 sional
Record
Sl713,
February
26,
0
1980.

20 senator Hatch offered the same explanation on
several other occasions in the course of the debate. See
Congressional Record S4293, April 29, 1980 ("Section 7
would
establish
specific
procedures
that
would
be
applicable before the Attorney General could enter into an
action in behalf of an imprisoned or incarcerated person.
Such person would first have had to fully exhasut all
internal
grievance
mechanisms
that
existed
in
the
institution in which he was confined");
Congressonal
Record S4626, May 6, 1980 ("Section 7(D) further clarifies
that the administrative grievance procedures established
Footnote continued on next page.

24.

Senator

Bayh,

the

author

of

the

Act,

decribed

the .

"[I]n the event of a prison inmate's rights
being alleged to be violated, [, constitutional
rights [are] alleged to be violatedj then before
the Justice Department could intervene or
initiate suits, the prison inmate or class of
inmates would have to pursue all of their
adiminstrative remedies within the State law
before the Justice Department could intervene
under
the
provisions
of
[the
Act]."
Congressional Record Sl859, February 27, 1980.

?1

exhaustion provision in similar terms:

In

short,

in

enacting

the

Civil

;

Rights

of

Institutionalized Act Congress was focussing on the powers
of the Attorney General, not on the general question of
exhaustion in §1983 suits.

Indeed,

Congress repeatedly

has failed to enact legislation including a general noexhaustion requirement such as the Court adopts today. 21
If the exhaustion question were properly before
us, I would affirm the Court of Appeals.

in section 7 are only for the purposes of requiring
prisoners to exhaust internal grievance mechanisms before
the Attorney General can litigate on his behalf"}.
21 citations
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Draft:

Patsy v. Board of Regents, No. 80-1874

Justice Powell, dissenting.

The Court holds that the Board of Regents of the
State of Florida, a state instrumentality, is subject to
suit

in

Eleventh

federal

court

Amendment.

notwithstanding

The

Court

reaches

the
this

bar

of

the

conclusion

2.

through a novel--and, to me, illogical--expansion of the
holding in Ex Parte Young, 209 u.s. 123 {1908).
then rejects

The court

the rule of "flexible" exhaustion of state

administrative remedies stated by the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, sitting en bane.

Relying principally

on the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42
u.s.c. §1997e

{1976 ed., Supp.

any exhaustion requirement
the intent of Congress.

IV), the Court holds that

in §1983 suits would

violate

I disagree with both portions of

the Court's holding and therefore dissent.
I

The Eleventh Amendment
A

this

In
petitioner,

an

"reverse

employee

of

discrimination"
the

Florida

action,

International

University, brought suit under 42 u.s.c. §1983 against the
Board of Regents of the State of Florida . 1

She did not

1 As the Court notes, see ante, at
, n. 1,
petitioner originally named the Florida International
Uni ver si ty
as
defendant.
Because
the
Florida
International University lacks the capacity to sue or be
sued, the District Court found that it was not a proper
defendant.
Petitioner
was
permitted
to
amend
her
complaint,
and she simply substituted the Board of
Regents.
In addition to racial discrimination, petitioner
also claimed that she had been discriminated against on
the basis of her sex.

3•

•

name the individual regents as defendants.
$500,000

in

damages,

equitable

relief. 2

and

for

She sued for

injunctive

and

other

The Board filed a motion to dismiss

arguing that petitioner's suit was premature in light of
her failure to exhaust available administrative remedies.
The

District

Court

agreed

and

granted

the

motion

to

dismiss.
On petitioner's appeal, the Board added the bar
of the Eleventh Amendment to its defense. 3

It argued that

~15~
as

an

instrumentality

subjected

~ :. J r
~~

'
11

~ ~

suit

in

the

federal

State
court

~

)

could

absent a

not

be

waiver

of

2 Petitioner
sought
a
declaratory
judgment
"declaring that the Plaintiff has suffered from acts of
discrimination." In addition, she asked the court to
"[r]equire
Defendant
to
remedy
the
discrimination
practiced upon Plaintiff by promoting her to the next
available
position consistent
with
those
previously
applied for and for which she is qualified or in the
alternative, to require the Defendant to pay to the
Plaintiff the sum of $500,000 as actual and exemplary
damages."
She
requested ..&a¥" fur t~er
equitable and
injunctive rel~~ e court deeme~ appropriate.

~·
·~-

to

of

3The Eleventh Amendment provides:
"The judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State,
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."
The Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional in nature,
and the defense of the Amendment may be raised for the
first time on appeal.
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 u.s.
651, 678 (1974) ("Eleventh Amendment defense sufficienty
partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it
need not be raised in the trial court.")
•

4.

.
' t y. 4
1mmun1

Although

the

Board

of

Regents

was

created

as

a

body

corporate with power "to sue and be sued ..• to plead and
be impleaded in all courts of law and equity,"

I

Fla. Stat.
/

~

§240.042(1), it ~well established that language such as
this did not operate to waive the defense of the Eleventh
Amendment. 5

In reply, petitioner argued that whether the

4 "As a corporate state agency and component of
state government, the [Board] operates with state funds,
directs the [State University System], and is local
neither in character nor operation.
As the 'arm of the
state' which manages the Division of Universitites of the
Department of Education, it is clearly part of the state
for Eleventh Amendment purposes." Brief at 18.
The Board of Regents of the Division of Universities
of the Department of Education is established by the
Florida Education Code as a part of the State University
System.
Fla. Stat. 240.2011.
The Board consists of the
Commissioner of Education and twelve citizens appointed by
the Governor, approved by three members of the Cabinet,
and confirmed by the Senate. Fla. Stat. 240.207.
The
chief
administrative
officer
of
the
Board
is
the
Chancellor, who serves by appointment of the Board.
The Board has general supervisory authority over the
State University System.
Fla. Stat. 240.209. Among its
duties are the appointment of university presidents, the
review of budget requests of each university in the state
system, the preparation of an aggrgatea budget for the
State University System, the development of · a master plan,
and
the
establishment
of
a
systemwide
personnel
classification and pay plan. Fla. Stat. §240.209.
The Board is an agency of the State of Florida.
Fla. Stat. §216.011. See Relyea v. State, 385 So.2d 1378
(Fla. App. 1980) .
The Board may claim the defense of
sovereign immunity in suits ft~ state law. See id.
Numerous
Courts
of
Appeals
have
held
state
universities or state Boards of Regents immune from suit
in federal court by reason of the Eleventh Amendment.
See, e. g., Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 660 F.
2d 1345, 1349 (CA9 1981);
Brennan v. University of
Kansas, 451 F. 2d 1287 (CAlO 19 71) ;
Ronwin v. Shapiro,
657 F. 2d 1071 (CA9 1981).
5 see
Home,

Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing
u.s.
,
(1981);
Petty v. TennesseeFootnote continued on next page.

~

5.

statute

creating

petitioner
simply

the

believed

was

Board

that

irrelevant

amounted

to

a

waiver--and

it did--the Eleventh Amendment

to

lodged against the State.

the

equitable

claims

she

had

See Reply Brief at 3-4.

Neither the Court of Appeals panel nor the Court
of

Appeals

en

bane

Amendment defense.

addressed

the

Board's

Eleventh

They directed their at tent ion solely

to the question of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The panel held that there was no exhaustion requirement in
§1983

suits

and

remanded

to

the

District

Court

for

consideration of the Board's Eleventh Amendment argument.
612 F.
en

2d 946

bane,

{CA5 1980}.

reversed

The Court of Appeals, sitting

holding

that

§1983

plaintiffs

must

exhaust available and reasonable administrative remedies.
Again

the

court

did

not

consider

the

Board's

Eleventh

Missouri Bridge Commn, 359 u.s. 275, 276-277 {1959} {"The
conclusion that there has been a waiver of immunity will
not
be
lightly
inferred
And
where
a
public
instrumentality is created with the right 'to sue and be
sued' . that waiver of immunity in the particular setting
may be restricted to suits or proceedings of a special
character in the state, not the federal courts"}; Great
Northern Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 u.s. 47, 54.
See
Bragg v. Board of PU5IIc Instruction, 36 So. 2d 222 {Fla.
1948) {"The mere-fact that the Board of Public Instruction
is created as a body corporate with power to sue and be
sued does not affect its immunity from tort"}.

6.

Amendment defense.
The Eleventh Amendment question was first raised
before this Court in the Board's response to the petition
for writ of certiorari.

The Board argued, as it had on

appeal, that it was an arm of the State and that it had
not waived its immunity from suit in federal court. Again
petitioner

argued

that

at

most

the

Eleventh

defense would bar her claim for damages.
this

petitioner

claim,

now

argued

Amendment

And, even as to

that

the

Amendment

would not bar damages if the Board could meet the claim
{

7

out of

If

\.\

its own funds--e.

g.,

from gifts and bequests--

rather than from the State Treasury.

These arguments were

repeated at oral argument. 6
the

As
Amendment

question

Court
is

acknowledges,
jurisdictional

confronted at the outset.

the
and

Eleventh
must

be

See ante, at

?~~)

t1J

~

~1

~-

.·:{

~'

- 6=-T-r-.---

e Court A
·
prese ing ·'
its Eleventh Amendment defense. See
, n. 3.
though the Board did not present the def se to the
District Court, it briefed the question t
the Court of
Appeals and argued to this Court that
e petition for
writ of certiorari should not be gra ed because of this
jurisdictional bar. Once the peti 'on was granted, it is
understandable that the State
not continue to press
the efense in its main brief
o this Court.

J/t(_; 1/LUv-7 ~
~ ~

~·

~

L. ~

J' ~ ~ 7A-/) 4~~n-.-~~~~
~&uA-~Hu.-~

¥0' -- ~
tZ;-

q t::Z;;; ~ 'b J

J;<

~- ~~ ~-t:-~~ ~4.1C.A
•

-

~~~'-!

I'~ ~-rC; 7?'.

S'...e4!..

~k,) t'h.. S'.

7.

B

In
Court

has

sovereign

interpreting

sought

to

immunity

the

Eleventh

accommodate
embodied

in

both
the

Amendment,
the

the

principle

Amendment

and

of
the

states' duty to obey--and the federal courts to enforce-federal law.

Thus, it is well established that the State

is not "divested of its immunity 'on the mere ground that
the case is one arising under the Constitution or laws of
the United States."'
184, 186

Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377

(1964), quoting, Hans v. Louisiana, 134

u.s.

u.s.

1,

Jf-~w~
7
10 (1890) • ,{And the Cml;f4: bas bebtl"\that ~when a State
itself is not named as a party to the suit, the Amendment
nevertheless
interest.
323

u.s.

applies

if

the State

is the real party

in

See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
459 (1945). 8

7 In Hans the Court also held that the Amendment
bars suits brought against an unconsenting State by its
own citizens, although by its terms the Amendment does not
apply to this situation.
Cf. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292
u.s. 313 (1934) (Eleventh Amendment applies to federal
suits against an unconsenting state by a foreign nation).
By contrast, the Amendment has not been applied to suits
against a State brought by another State or by the United
States.
North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 u.s. 365 (1923);
United States v. Mississippi, 380 u.s. 128 (1965).
8 In Ford Motor the plaintiff sued the ~partment
of t reasury of the State of Indiana, and ~ he three
off j di als--the
Governor,
Treasurer,
and
Auditor--who
Footnote continued on next page.

?

8.

On the other hand, the Court has not interpreted
the Amendment to bar federal court jurisdiction when the
State has consented to suit, 9 or
Cou-r:t

of

court. 1

an

action

° Congress

brought

to bar

against

review by this

the State

in

state

may lift the bar of the Amendment when

exercising powers granted to it by §5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
{1976).

See

Fitzpatrick

Counties

immunity under
133 u.s.

529

429 u.s.

274,

and

279-281

Bitzer,

municipalities

the Amendment.
{1890):

v.

u.s.

427

may

not

445

claim

Lincoln County v. Luning,

Mt. Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle,
{1977)

And under Ex parte Young,

constituted the board of the department of treasury. The
plaintiff sought a refund of -=g ross income t axes paid to
the department.
Suit was brought in federal District
Court.
The Court held that the suit was barred by the
Eleventh Amendment.
The plaintiff was seeking a refund
from the state not a personal judgment against the
individual officials:
"[W]hen the action is in essence
one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is
the real party in interest and is entitled to invoke its
sovereign immunity from suit even though
individual
officials are nominal defendants." 323 U.S., at 464. See
Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 663: Great Northern Life
Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 u.s. 47 {1944).
9 see Clark v. Barnard, 108 u.s. 436, 447
Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U.S. 184 {1964).

{1883):

10 see Smith v. Reeves, 178 u.s. 436, 445 {1900):
Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 u.s. 47, 57
{1944): Chandler v. Dix, 194 u.s. 590, 592 {1904).
The
Court's assumption of jurisdiction in University of
California Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 {1978),
a case originating in state court, thus provides no
support for today • s dec is ion.
For the same reason, the
Court's reliance upon Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural
College, 221 u.s. 636 {1911), is misplaced. See infra.

9.

209

u.s.

123

{1908),

a

federal

court

may

order

state

officials to obey federal law in the future. 11
Application of these settled principles to the
present case is straightforward.
§1983,

and

Congress

has

not

This is an action under
removed

Eleventh Amendment in such actions.
440

u.s.

Board

of

332

{1979).

Regents

Petitioner
of

the

bar

of

seeks

State

relief
of

from

the

Florida,

an

The Board is not

local political body but bears responsibility for

State university system as a whole.
of Ed.

v.

Doyle,

supra.

the

See Quern v. Jordan,

instrumentality or agency of the State.
a

the

the

Cf. Mt. Healthy Bd.

Petitioner's argument that the

11 under the theory, some would say fiction, of Ex
parte Young, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar su1 ts
against state officers because when a state officer "comes
into conflict with the superior authority of
[the]
Constitution, ... he is ••• stripped of his official or
representative
character."
Id.,
at
159.
On
this
analysis, a prospective injunction requiring the official
to conform his future behavior to federal law, does not
require anything of the State and therefore does not bring
the
Eleventh Amendment
to
bear.
The
granting
of
retroactive relief, on the other hand, would require the
official to take action in his offical capacity. Thus, if
the official is required to pay damages from state funds,
the State is directly affected.
See Edelman v. Jordan,
supra.
Similarly,
retroactive injunctive relief may
require the official to take action in his official
capacity and also would be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.
Cf. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 u.s. 682 {1949).
Of course, in addition to
prospective injunctive relief,
a plaintiff may seek
carnages from the individual officer in his personal
capacity.
See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-238
{1974).

10.

statute

incorporating

t~aive

the

Board

should

be

understood

the Eleventh Amendment is foreclosed by numerous

dec is ions
Health

of

v.

Florida

(1981) . 12
Eleventh

this

Court.
Nursing

Similarly,
Arnendrnen t

See,

e.

Horne

not

against a state is incorrect.

Florida Dept of

u.s.

Assn,

petitioner's

does

g. ,

apply

suggestion
to

that

equitable

the

claims

u.s.

See Cory v. White,

(1982).
Thus, unless the rule in Ex parte Young, supra,

~~ ~.nd-~~ ~ "'1 ~~

is 1\a~plicai:He,
suit.

G

1he

the Eleventh Amendment r
theory

in Ex parte Young,

y bars

this

supra, has no

application to the State itself or to an instrumentality
of

the

State.

ndividual members of

petitioner
the Board,

had

sued

petitioner's clairn; .{ at
not

have

-~-

12 In Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Horne
Assn,
u.s.
(1981), the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit found that the Florida Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services had consented to suit.
The
court based its finding of waiver, in part, on the fact
that the Department was a "body corporate" with the
capacity to "sue and be sued" under state law. Fla. Stat.
Ann. §402.34. This Court reversed holding that a general
waiver of sovereign immunity does not amount to a waiver
of the Eleventh Amendment. See id., at
See note 5,
supra.
Without distinguishing Florida Dept of Health,
supra, the Court leaves open the question of whether the
Board has consented to suit. See ante, at 9 & n. 10.

v

addition,
from

the

petitioner

individual

could

members

----

their personal capacities.

of

have
the

sought

Board

~----'-~

But petitioner did not sue the members of the
Board: she sued the Board itself, an arm of the State of
Florida.
simply

One would have thought that Ex parte Young was
irrelevant

in

these

circumstances.

Although

an

individual official may be viewed as acting on his own and
without State authority when acting against federal law,
the

State--or

an agency of

the

State--cannot act other

than in its official State capacity. Similarly, an action
for

damages against the state,

seeks

damages

coffers.

that

Whether

must
the

State's general fund or

be

or

paid

damages

an arm of the state,
from

state's

directly

own

from

the

from some other State fund,

the

money is no less the State's.

come

the

Indeed, direct application

of Ex parte Young to the State and its instrumentalities
would read the Eleventh Amendment out of the Constitution.

13 Petitioner's
injunctive
relief
may
be
retroactive to the extent that she asks the Board of
Regents to appoint her to the next available position.
Presumably, such an appointment would require an exercise
of the state's authority. See note 3, supra.

12.

If

the

bar

of

naming

of

a

the Amendment

injunctive
afford

board,

State

corporation--opening

is

the

way

relief--then

the

constitutionally

lifted merely
commission,

to

damages

Amendment

prescribed

as

no

upon

the

agency

or

well

as

longer

protection

to

would

to

the

states.

c
Despite the weight of these considerations, the
Court

concludes

that

Eleventh Amendment.

this

action

is

not

barred

the

College,
Board of

decision
221

u.s.

Regents,

the

Indeed, the Court undertakes to apply

Ex parte Young to the Board of Regents itself.
upon

by

in
636

Hopkins

v.

Clemson

Agricultural

(1911), the Court reasons that the

as a body corporate,

from a state official.

Relying

is no different

The Court attempts to bolster this

novel conclusion by observing that under Florida law the
Board of Regents is termed the "director" of the Division
of Universities.
parte

Young,

the

The Court concludes that, just as in Ex
Board

of

Regents

"may

be

sued

for

unconstitutional or unauthorized act ions, as long as the

13.

plaintiff is not seeking monetary relief that must be paid
out of the state treasury."

Ante, at 8.

The Court's conclusion is supported neither by
reason nor precedents of this Court.

As indicated above,

the rationale of Ex parte Young does not
to a State or State instrumentality.
"stripped" of its own authority.

~y

apply

The State cannot be

Moreover,

if the Board

of Regents is a State agency--and it clearly is--then its
assets

are

also

those of the State's.

Yet the Court's

decision exposes the Board's assets to a damage award on
the double fiction that the Board is really an "official"
and

that

fictitious

its

separate

being

rather

assets
than

somehow

to

the

belong
On

State.

to

this

such

a

~~I

theory, a state -boa~~of education, highway deartment or
any other agency, board or department of a state with any
separate

~

sources ~ income

could

be

sued

for

damages.

Such a conclusion is at odds with the Court's holding in
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Tax Commn, 327

u.s.

573 {1946),

that the segregated funds of the State Tax Commission were
State monies subject to the Eleventh Amendment.

14.

Nor does the Board of Regents' corporate status
under

state

law

support

the

Court's

holding.

State

governments consist in major part of a variety of boards,
commissions,

agencies,

and

corporations.

These

State

entities are no less instruments of the State because they
may be vested under state law with the power to contract,
to sue and be sued.
Eleventh

Amendment

corporate agencies.
Read,

322

u.s.

Treasury, 323

bar

suit

Ford

Motor

454 (1945);

State Tax Commn, 327
Thus,

to

against

such

state

See Great Northern Insurance Co. v.

47;

u.s.

This Court repeatedly has held the

u.s.

Co.

v.

Department

of

Kennecott Coppper Corp. v.

572 (1946).

in Parden v.

Terminal R. Co.,

377

u.s.

184 (1964) , the Court assumed that a state owned railroad-as an instrumentality of the State--was immune from suit
in federal court absent a waiver.

The railway in Parden

was authorized to operate "as though it were an ordinary
common carrier."

377 US. 185.

It performed services for

profit and had contracts and agreements with various labor
orgainzations.
engaging

in

It was "indisputably a common carrier
interstate

commerce."

Id.,

at

185.

No

15.

suggestion was made that as a State body, with separate
funds,

the

railroad was no longer an instrumentality of

the State but was merely a State official.

And just last

term the Court held that the Florida Department of Health,
a "body corporate" under State law was immune from suit.
Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn,

u.s.

(1981).

Cf. Alabama v. Pugh, 438

("There can be no doubt
and

status
subject

The

converts
to

suit,

Court's
a

781 (1978)

that suit against the St tae

its Board of Corrections

Amendment").

u.s.

State
cannot

is barred by the Eleventh
conclusion

body
be

into

a

reconciled

that

corporate

State

official,

with

these

well

?

established precedents.

I am unaware of any prior decision of this Court
that supports the Court's application of Ex parte Young to
State
supra,

instrumentalities.
relied

irrelevant.

upon

so

Hopkins
heavily

by

v.
the

Clemson
Court

College,
is

simply

In that case suit was brought against a state

college in state court to recover damages caused by the
college's construction of a dyke.

The state courts held

that the college was protected from suit by the state law

16.

of sovereign immunity.
Eleventh Amendment

in

Although the Court discussed the
some

detail,

there was

Eleventh Amendment question in that case. 14

simply no

It was clear

before Hopkins that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply
to

bar

review

in

this

Court

of

any

federal

question

presented in a suit against a State in state court.

See

note 5, supra. However the holding in Hopkins is stated,
no

Eleventh

Court. 15

Amendment

question

was

presented

to

the

It therefore is no surprise that the opinion has

14 The state college recognized that there was no
Eleventh Amendment question.
In its brief it noted: "It
is difficult to see how either Section 2 of Article III,
of the Constitution of the United States or the Eleventh
amendment has any application to the inquiry whether a
suit by a citizen of a State in its own Courts is a suit
against that State. That seems to be purely a question of
local law to be determined by the State Court." Brief at
20.

1

15
It is no easy matter to state the holding in
Hopkins.
Normally the Court would not review a state
court decision holding the state immune from suit brought
under state tort law.
Review would be barred not by the
Eleventh Amendment, but because the holding on sovereign
immunity would be seen as an independent and adequate
state law ground.
See Georgia R. R • .!_ Banking Co. v.
Redwine, 335 u.s. 900 (1949).
Of course, the decision in
Hopkins antedated Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
It is likely that the Hopkins Court simply did
not differentiate between the state law of sovereign
immunity and the federal
law of sovereign immunity
embodied in the Eleventh Amendment.
In Hamilton Mfg. Co.
v. Trustees of State Colleges in Colorado, 356 F. 2d 599,
601 n. 1 (CAlO 1966) , the court viewed Hopkins as standing
for a principle of agency law: "[N]either a state nor an
individual can confer upon an agent authority to commit a
tort, so as to excuse the perpetrator.
In such cases the
law of agency has no application,--the wrongdoer is
treated as a principal, and individually liable for the
damages inflicted, and subject to injunction ••• "
Id.,
quoting 221 u.s., at 643.
---

this

Florida Dept of Health v.

u.s.

Florida Nursing Home Assn, ___

~~

~~does

(1981).

not deserve the pride of

.1\
place

given

to

it

by

the

majority. 17

w...~r
It

is A a

non-

16 The decision in Hopkins was most recently cited
in Larson v. Domestic _!_Foreign Corp., 337, u.s. 682
(1949).
The Court in Larson relied upon Hopkins for the
proposition that an "agent's liability for torts committed
by him cannot be avoided by pleading the direction or
atuhorization of his principal."
337 u.s., at 694.
ustice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion included
Hopkins with cases standing for the proposition that
jurisdiction is barred when the plaintiff seeks an
"interest in property which concededly belonged to the
~overnment, or demanded relief calling for an assertion of
what was unquestionably official authority."
!d., at 710
& 729.
The Court does not cite to any Supreme Court
decision that relies upon Hopkins for the principle that a
state instrumentality may be sued in federal cour.~.
. d
17 fJ.A_~~c~ ~
L.-t.,.
~
An ¥- ~
Ho kins further mwst be t ~mp~ed

'

official action.

.

· 1

.

.

Rather, it v1ewed the College's activit

"[T]his is not an action against the College for
a tort committed in the prosecution of any
governmental function.
The fee was in the
State, but the corporation, as equitable owner,
was in possession, use and enjoyment of the
property.
For protecting the bottom land the
College, for its own corporate purposes and
advantage, constructed the dyke.
In so doing it
was not acting in any governmental capacity.
The embankment was in law similar to one which
might have been built for private purposes by
the plaintiff on the other side of the river.
221 u.s., at 647.

£.,

~

k-

~

~

~

~~

~

~
~.

In Employees v. Department of Public Health and
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (197 3) , the Court distinguished the
Footnote continued on next page.

18.

precedent.
\

earlier Eleventh Amendment decision in Parden v. Terminal
R. Co., 377 u.s. 184 (1964), on the basis that Parden
concerned State proprietary activity:
"Parden involved
the railroad business which Alabama operated 'for profit.'
Parden was in the area where private persons and
corporations normally ran the enterprise."
By contrast,
the Employees Court found that the employment practices of
state
hospitals
did
not
concern
state
proprietary
activity.
A similar distinction can be drawn between
Hopkins and the present case involving the employment
practices of a state educational institution.

?

~suggests

18 The
that in prior decisions the
Court has permitted suit against State Boards of Regents.
See ante, at 5.
Yet in none of these suits was the
jurisdictional issue posed as it is here.
Thus, for
example, in University of California Board of Regents v.
Bakke, 438 u.s. 265 (1978), the Eleventh Amendment issue
was not present because the case was here on petition to
the California Supreme Court. See note 5, supr~. And in
each of the other cases cited by the Court, the plaintiff
had the good sense to name other defendants in addition to
the particular state board . See, e. g., Board of Regents
v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1978); McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Rege ~,u .s. 637 (1950).
· 4ftt1P The
·
als·o argues that the Jtourts of ~ peals
are split on the question of whethe { damages can be
awarded against state universities.
Yet the two cases
cited by the Court to demonstrate a split on this question
do not support the Court's assertion. In SON! v. Board of
Trustees, 513 F. 2d 347 (CA6 1975) the court found that
the Board of Trustees had waived its immunity to suit,
while in Goss v. Jacinto Junior College, 588 F. 2d 96, 9899 (CA5 1979) the court reasoned that the particular
junior college was similar to a county or municipality, an
"independent 'political subdivision' as a matter of Texas
statutory and common law."
The Court suggests as well
that the Courts of Appeals are agreed that injunctive
relief may be awarded again~ t state universities and state
boards of regents.
.x.e-t f,l gain the cases cited provide
little support for the Court's assertion.
In New England
Patriots Football Club, Inc. v. University of Colorado,
592 F. 2d 1196, 1201 (CAl 1979), the court held that
individual members of the Board of Regents might be sued
for prospective injunctive relief.
It did not hold,
~---n~~~ , as the Court implies, that the University itself
might be sued.
Rather, it accepted "the University's
identification with the state."
And in ~ Student
Services v. Texas ~ ~ M University, 612 F. 2d 160, 165
(CA5 1980) , it is unclear that the court held more than
Footnote continued on next page.
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new doctrine, one that exposes the

instrumentalities of

the State itself to suit in federal court.
decision,

state

boards and

~
'f .
lnJunc t'1ve re l1e

The

a:l

After today's

'=z-c;;r
be sued

commission ~ay

decision

also

holds

that

for
such

~

bodies may be sued for damages on the fiction that their
segregated

assets

are

not

the

State's. 19

The

Court's

~~

r--~=~aAsion

of Ex parte Young to the State itself destroys

the rationale of

that decision.

It also undermines the

careful balance worked out in this sensitive area of the

The decision is simply worng.

The Court should

dismiss the suit on the basis of the Eleventh Amendment.
II

Exhaustion of Remedies

Seventeen judges joined in the Court of Appeal's
persuasive

opinion

in

this

case

adopting

a

rule

of

"flexible" exhaustion of administrative remedies in §1983

that officials of the University could be
injunctive relief.
Unlike the situation in
cases,
petitioner
sued only the Board of
Numerous Courts of Appeals have held state
regents to be immune from suit in federal court
of the Eleventh Amendment. See note ___ , supra.
19 whether

sued for
those two
Regents.
board of
by reason

a State board, like a State official,
may claim good faith immunity is not clear but of
substantial
significance.
See
Owen
v.
City
of
Independence,
u.s.

dfl 05/27/82
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Justice Powell, dissenting.

The Court holds that the Board of Regents of the
State of Florida, a state instrumentality, is subject to
suit

in

Eleventh

federal

court

Amendment.

notwithstanding

The

Court

reaches

the
this

bar

of

the

conclusion

..

~
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through an unprecedented - and far reaching

e~~ t; ~~

expansion of the holding in Ex Parte Young, 209
(1908).

u.s.
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As I consider the Court's holding a serious

departure from established constitutional doctrine, this
dissent addresses primarily the Eleventh Amendment issue.
ently the Court was anxious to reach the

exh~ue
attention to the constitutional question.
from the Court's rejection of the rule of "flexible"
exhaustion of state administrative remedies developed and
stated persuasively by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, sitting en bane.

In disagreeing with the 17 judges

of the Court of Appeals who adopted the flexible exhaustion
principle, this Court places

~~
prim.1~

reliance

'.'

·.

2.

~~~--~~~-through f\ a Rev-d

oaR-d..,. t.o -r;e.., lll-og-iea-1--expansion of the

holding in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

The Cour ·

then rejects the rule of "flexible" exhaustion of
administrative remedies stated by the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, sitting en bane.

Relying principally

on the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42

u.s.c.

§1997e

(1976 ed., Supp.

IV): Jhe Court holds that

exhaustion requirement in
Congress.

t

I

The Eleventh Amendment
A

this

In
petitioner,

an

"reverse

employee

of

discrimination"
the

University, brought suit under 42

Florida

u.s.c.

action,

International

§1983 against the

Board of Regents of the State of Florida • 1

She did not

1 As the Court notes, see ante, at
, n. 1,
petitioner originally named the Florida International
University
as
defendant.
Because
the
Florida
International University lacks the capacity to sue or be
sued, the District Court found that it was not a proper
defendant.
Petitioner
was
permitted
to
amend
her
complaint, and she simply substituted the Board of
Regents.
In addition to racial discrimination, petitioner
also claimed that she had been discriminated against on
the basis of her sex.

3.

name the individual regents as defendants.
$500,000

in

damages,

equitable

relief. 2

and

for

She sued for

injunctive

and

other

The Board filed a motion to dismiss

arguing that petitioner's suit was premature in light of
her failure to exhaust available administrative remedies.
The

District

Court

agreed

and

granted

the

motion

to

dismiss.
On petitioner's appeal, the Board added the bar
of the Eleventh Amendment to its defense. 3

It argued that

as an instrumentality of the State, the Board could not be
subjected

to

suit

in

federal

court

absent

a

waiver

of

2 Petitioner
sought
a
declaratory
judgment
"declaring that the Plaintiff has suffered from acts of
discrimination." In addition, she asked the court to
"[r]equire
Defendant
to
remedy
the
discrimination
practiced upon Plaintiff by promoting her to the next
available
position
consistent
with
those
previously
applied for and for which she is qualified or in the
alternative, to require the Defendant to pay to the
Plaintiff the sum of $500,000 as actual and exemplary
damages."
She requested such further
equitable and
injunctive relief as the court deems appropriate.
3

The Eleventh Amendment provides:

"The judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State,
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."
The Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional in nature,
and the defense of the Amendment may be raised for the
first time on appeal.
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 u.s.
651, 678 (1974) ("Eleventh Amendment defense sufficienty
partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it
need not be raised in the trial court.")

4.

.
' t y. 4
1mmun1

Although

And it asserted that there had been no waiver.

the

Board

of

Regents

was

created

as

a

body

corporate with power "to sue and be sued ... to plead and
be impleaded in all courts of law and equity,"

Fla. Stat.

§240.042(1), it is well established that language such as
this did not operate to waive the defense of the Eleventh
Amendment. 5

In reply, petitioner argued that whether the

4 "As a corporate state agency and component of
state government, the [Board] operates with state funds,
directs the [State University System], and is local
neither in character nor operation.
As the 'arm of the
state' which manages the Division of Universitites of the
Department of Education, it is clearly part of the state
for Eleventh Amendment purposes." Brief at 18.
The Board of Regents of the Division of Universities
of the Department of Education is established by the
Florida Education Code as a part of the State University
System.
Fla. Stat. 240.2011.
The Board consists of the
Commissioner of Education and twelve citizens appointed by
the Governor, approved by three members of the Cabinet,
and confirmed by the Senate. Fla. Stat. 240.207.
The
chief
administrative
officer
of
the
Board
is
the
Chancellor, who serves by appointment of the Board.
The Board has general supervisory authority over the
State University System.
Fla. Stat. 240.209. Among its
duties are the appointment of university presidents, the
review of budget requests of each university in the state
system, the preparation of an aggrgated budget for the
State University System, the development of a master plan,
and
the
establishment
of
a
systemwide
personnel
classification and pay plan. Fla. Stat. §240.209.
The Board is an agency of the State of Florida.
Fla. Stat. §216.011. See Rellea v. State, 385 So.2d 1378
(Fla. App. 1980) .
The Boar
may claim the defense of
sovereign immunity in suits under state law. See id.
Numerous
Courts
of
Appeals
have
held--state
universities or state Boards of Regents immune from suit
in federal court by reason of the Eleventh Amendment.
See, e. g., Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 660 F.
2d 1345, 1349 (CA9 1981);
Brennan v. University of
Kansas, 451 F. 2d 1287 (CAlO 19 71) ;
Ron win v. Shapiro,
657 F. 2d 1071 (CA9 1981).
5 see
Home,

Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing
u.s.
,
(1981);
Petty v. TennesseeFootnote continued on next page.

5.

statute

creating

petitioner
simply

the

believed

was

Board

that

irrelevant

amounted

to

a

waiver--and

it did--the Eleventh Amendment

to

lodged against the State.

the

equitable

claims

she

had

See Reply Brief at 3-4.

Neither the Court of Appeals panel nor the Court
of

Appeals

en

bane

Amendment defense.

addressed

the

Board's

Eleventh

They directed their attention solely

to the question of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The panel held that there was no exhaustion requirement in
§1983

suits

and

remanded

to

the

District

Court

for

consideration of the Board's Eleventh Amendment argument.
612 F.
en

2d 946

bane,

(CAS 1980).

reversed

The Court of Appeals, sitting

holding

that

§1983

plaintiffs

must

exhaust available and reasonable administrative remedies.
Again

the

court

did

not

consider

the

Board's

Eleventh

Missouri Bridge Commn, 359 U.S. 275, 276-277 (1959) ("The
conclusion that there has been a waiver of immunity will
not
be
1 ightly
infer red
And
where
a
public
instrumentality is created with the right 'to sue and be
sued' that waiver of immunity in the particular setting
may be restricted to suits or proceedings of a special
character in the state, not the federal courts")~ Great
Northern Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54.
See
Bragg v. Board of PUbiic Instruction, 36 So. 2d 222 (Fla.
1948) ("The mere fact that the Board of Public Instruction
is created as a body corporate with power to sue and be
sued does not affect its immunity from tort").

6.

Amendment defense.
The Eleventh Amendment question was first raised
before this Court in the Board's response to the petition
for writ of certiorari.

The Board argued, as it had on

appeal, that it was an arm of the State and that it had
not waived its immunity from suit in federal court. Again
petitioner

argued

that

at

most

the

Eleventh

defense would bar her claim for damages.
this

claim,

petitioner

now

argued

Amendment

And, even as to

that

the

Amendment

would not bar damages if the Board could meet the claim
out of its "own funds"--e.

g., from gifts and bequests--

rather than from the State Treasury.

~

These arguments were

repeated at oral argument. 6
As
Amendment

the

Court

question

is

confronted at the outset.

acknowledges,
jurisdictional

the
and

Eleventh
must

be

Amendment,

the

See ante, at
B

In
Court

has

interpreting

sought

to

the

Eleventh

accommodate

both

6Tr. of Oral Argument 25-28, 40-41.

the

principle

of

7.

sovereign

immunity

embodied

in

the

Amendment

and

the

states' duty to obey--and the federal courts to enforce-federal law.

Thus, it is well established that the State

is not "divested of its immunity 'on the mere ground that
the case is one arising under the Constitution or laws of
the United States.'"
184, 186

(1964), quoting, Hans v. Louisiana, 134

10

(1890). 7

is

not

named

interest.

u.s.

u.s.

1,

It also is settled that when a State itself

nevertheless

323

Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U.S.

as

a

applies

party
if

to

the

the State

suit,
is

the

Amendment

the real party

in

See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
459 (1945). 8

7 In Hans the Court also held that the Amendment
bars suits brought against an unconsenting State by its
own citizens, although by its terms the Amendment does not
apply to this situation.
Cf. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292
u.s. 313 (1934) (Eleventh Amendment applies to federal
suits against an unconsenting state by a foreign nation).
By contrast, the Amendment has not been applied to suits
against a State brought by another State or by the United
States.
North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 u.s. 365 (1923);
United States v. MlSSlssippi, 380 u.s. 128 (1965).
8 In Ford Motor the plaintiff sued the Department
of Treasury of the State of Indiana, and the three
officials--the
Governor,
Treasurer,
and
Auditor--who
constituted the Board of the Department of Treasury. The
plaintiff sought a refund of gross income taxes paid to
the department.
Suit was brought in federal District
Court.
The Court held that the suit was barred by the
Eleventh Amendment.
The plaintiff was seeking a refund
from the state not a personal judgment against the
individual officials:
"[W]hen the action is in essence
one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is
the real party in interest and is entitled to invoke its
Footnote continued on next page.

8.

On the other hand, the Court has not interpreted
the Amendment to bar federal court jurisdiction when the
State has consented to suit, 9 or
Court of
court. 1

an

action

° Congress

brought

to bar

against

review by this

the State

in

state

may lift the bar of the Amendment when

exercising powers granted to it by §5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
(1976).

See

Fitzpatrick

Counties

and

Mt.

529

429 u.s.

274,

279-281

(1977)

123

(1908),

a

u.s.

427
may

U.S.
not

445
claim

Lincoln County v. Luning,

Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle,

133 u.s.

209

Bitzer,

municipalities

immunity under the Amendment.
(1890);

v.

And under Ex parte Young,

federal

court

may

order

state

officials to obey federal law in the future. 11

sovereign immunity from suit even though individual
officials are nominal defendants." 323 u.s., at 464. See
Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 663; Great Northern Life
Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
9 see Clark v. Barnard, 108 u.s. 436, 447
Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).

(1883);

10 see Smith v. Reeves, 178 u.s. 436, 445 (1900);
Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 u.s. 47, 57
(1944); Chandler v. Dix, 194 u.s. 590, 592 (1904).
The
Court's assumption ~ jurisdiction in Universit~ of
California Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 u.s. 265 (~78T;
a case originating in state court, thus provides no
support for today' s decision.
For the same reason, the
Court's reliance upon Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural
College, 221 u.s. 636 (1911), is misplaced. See infra.
11 under the theory, some would say fiction, of Ex
parte Young, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits
Footnote continued on next page.

9.

Application of these settled principles to the
present case is straightforward.
§1983,

and

Congress

has

not

This is an action under
removed

Eleventh Amendment in such actions.
440

u.s.

Board

332

of

(1979} •

Regents

Petitioner
of

the

bar

of

seeks

State

relief
of

from

the

Florida,

an

The Board is not

local political body but bears responsibility for

State university system as a whole.
of Ed.

v.

statute
waive

Doyle,

supra.

incorporating

the

Eleventh

the

See Quern v. Jordan,

instrumentality or agency of the State.
a

the

the

Cf. Mt. Healthy Bd.

Petitioner's argument that the

the Board should be

Amendment

is

foreclosed

understood to
by numerous

against state officers because when a state officer "comes
into conflict with the superior authority of
[the]
Constitution, ..• he is .•• stripped of his official or
representative
character."
Id.,
at
159.
On
this
analysis, a prospective injunction requiring the official
to conform his future behavior to federal law, does not
require anything of the State and therefore does not bring
the
Eleventh Amendment
to
bear.
The
granting
of
retroactive relief, on the other hand, would require the
official to take action in his offical capacity. Thus, if
the official is required to pay damages from state funds,
the State
is directly affected.
See Edelman v. Jordan,
supra.
Similarly,
retroactive injunctive relief may
require the official to take action in his official
capacity and also would be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.
Cf. Larson v. Domestic _!_ Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 u.s. 682 (1949}.
Of course, in addition to
prospective injunctive relief,
a plaintiff may seek
damages from the individual officer in his personal
capacity.
See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 u.s. 232, 237-238
(1974}.

10.

decisions
Health

of

v.

Florida

{1981). 12
Eleventh

this

Nursing

Similarly,
Amendment

See,

Court.

e.

Horne

petitioner's

does

not

against a state is incorrect.

apply

g.,

Florida Dept

u.s.

Assn,
suggestion
to

of

that

equitable

See Cory v. White,

the

claims

u.s.

{1982) •
Thus, unless the rule in Ex parte Young, supra,
is

extended beyond any previous decision of this Court,

the Eleventh Amendment bars this suit.

The theory in Ex

parte Young, supra, has no application to the State itself
or to an instrumentality of the State.
sued the
damages
Eleventh

If petitioner had

individual members of the Board, her claim for
against

them would not have been barred by the

Amendment.

Nor

would

her

claim

for

equitable

relief have been barred to the extent it were limited to

12 In Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Horne
Assn,
u.s.
{1981), the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit found that the Florida Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services had consented to suit.
The
court based its finding of waiver, in part, on the fact
that the Department was a "body corporate" with the
capacity to "sue and be sued" under state law. Fla. Stat.
Ann. §402.34. This Court reversed holding that a general
waiver of sovereign immunity does not amount to a waiver
of the Eleventh Amendment. See id., at
See note 5,
supra.
Without distinguishing Florida Dept of Health,
supra, the Court leaves open the question of whether the
Board has consented to suit. See ante, at 9 & n. 10.

11.

future conduct.
the Board.

But petitioner did not sue the members of

She sued only the Board itself, an arm of the

State of Florida.
by

petitioner

Moreover, the principle relief sought

would

the

impose--in

alternative--an

affirmative duty on the Board to promote her to the next
available position of comparable status to those to which
she had applied, or would "require the
[petitioner]
damages."

[Board] to pay to

the sum of $500,000 as actual and exemplary

App., 39.

Seen. 3, ante.

One would have thought that Ex parte Young was
simply

irrelevant

in

these

circumstances.

Although

an

individual official may be viewed as acting on his own and
without State authority when acting against federal law,
the

State--or

an agency of

the

State--cannot act

other

than in its official State capacity. Similarly, an action
for

damages against the state,

seeks

damages

coffers.

that

Whether

must
the

State's general fund or

be

or an arm of the state,

paid

damages

from

state's

directly

own

from

the

from some other State fund,

the

money is no less the State's.

come

the

Indeed, direct application

of Ex parte Young to the State and its instrumentalities

12.

would read the Eleventh Amendment out of the Constitution.
If

the

bar

of

of

a

naming

the Amendment

injunctive
afford

board,

State

corporation--opening

is

the

relief--then

way
the

constitutionally

lifted merely
commission,

to

damages

Amendment

prescribed

as

no

upon

the

agency

or

well

as

longer

protection

to

would
to

the

states.

c
Despite the weight of these considerations, the
Court

concludes

that

Eleventh Amendment.

this

action

is

not

barred

the

College,
Board of

decision
221

u.s.

Regents,

the

Indeed, the Court undertakes to apply

Ex parte Young to the Board of Regents itself.
upon

by

in
636

Hopkins

Clemson

Agricultural

(1911), the Court reasons that the

as a

from a state official.

v.

Relying

body corporate,

is no different

The Court attempts to bolster this

novel conclusion by observing that under Florida law the
Board of Regents is termed the "director" of the Division
of Universities.
parte

Young,

the

The Court concludes that, just as in Ex
Board

of

Regents

"may

be

sued

for

unconstitutional or unauthorized actions, as long as the

13.

plaintiff is not seeking monetary relief that must be paid
out of the state treasury."

Ante, at 8.

The Court's conclusion is supported neither by
reason nor precedents of this Court.

As indicated above,

the rationale of Ex parte Young does not apply to a State
or State instrumentality.
of its own authority.

The State cannot be "stripped"

Moreover, if the Board of Regents

is a State agency--and it clearly is--then its assets are
also

those

of

the

State's.

Yet

the

Court's

decision

exposes the Board's assets to a damage award on the double
fiction that the Board is really an "official" and that
its

separate

assets

somehow

belong

being rather than to the State.
welfare

board,

highway

to

this

fictitious

On such a theory, a state

deartment

or

any

other

agency,

board or department of a state with any separate funds or
income could be sued for damages.

Such a conclusion is at

odds with the Court's holding in Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
Tax Commn, 327

u.s.

573 (1946), that the segregated funds

of the State Tax Commission were State monies subject to
the Eleventh Amendment.

14.

Nor does the Board of Regents' corporate status
under

state

law

support

the

Court's

holding.

State

governments consist in major part of a variety of boards,
commissions,

agencies,

and

corporations.

These

State

entities are no less instruments of the State because they
may be vested under state law with the power to contract,
to sue and be sued.
Eleventh

This Court repeatedly has held the

Amendment

to

322

u.s.

suit

47;

Ford

Motor

Treasury, 323 U.S. 454 (1945);
State Tax Commn, 327
Thus,

against

such

state

See Great Northern Insurance Co. v.

corporate agencies.
Read,

bar

u.s.

Co.

v.

Department

of

Kennecott Coppper Corp. v.

572 (1946).

in Parden v.

Terminal R.

Co. ,

3 77 U.S.

184 (1964), the Court assumed that a state owned railroad-as an instrumentality of the State--was immune from suit
in federal court absent a waiver.

The railway in Parden

was authorized to operate "as though it were an ordinary
common carrier."

377

us.

185.

It performed services for

profit and had contracts and agreements with various labor
orgainzations.
engaging

in

It was "indisputably a common carrier
interstate

commerce."

Id.,

at

185.

No

15.

suggestion was made that as a State body, with separate
funds,

the

railroad was no longer an instrumentality of

the State but was merely a State official.

And just last

term the Court held that the Florida Department of Health,
a "body corporate" under State law was immune from suit.
Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn,

u.s.

(1981).

Cf. Alabama v. Pugh, 438

("There can be no doubt
and

781 (1978)

.•• that suit against the Sttae

its Board of Corrections

Amendment").

u.s.

is barred by the Eleventh

The Court's conclusion that corporate status

converts a State body into a State official,
suit,

cannot

be

reconciled

with

these

subject to

well established

precedents.
D

I am unaware of any prior decision of this Court
that supports the Court's application of Ex parte Young to
State
supra,

instrumentalities.
relied

irrelevant.

upon

so

Hopkins

heavily

by

v.
the

Clemson
Court

)

College,
is

simply

In that case suit was brought against a state

college in state court to recover damages caused by the
college's construction of a dyke.

The state courts held

16.

that the college was protected from suit by the state law
of sovereign immunity.
Eleventh Amendment

in

Although the Court discussed the
some detail,

there was

Eleventh Amendment question in that case. 13

simply no

It was clear

before Hopkins that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply
to

bar

review

in

this

Court

of

any

federal

question

presented in a suit against a State in state court.

See

~kv~~
note 5, supra. However the holding in Hopkins is st-a-ted,
no

Eleventh

Court. 14
never

Amendment

question

was

presented

to

the

It therefore is no surprise that the opinion has

been cited by this Court for

the proposition that

the Eleventh Amendment is no bar to suit against a state
agency in federal court.
standing

for

If the case could be viewed as

the proposition that state agencies may be

13 The state college recognized that there was no
Eleventh Amendment question.
In its brief it noted: "It
is difficult to see how either Section 2 of Article III,
of the Constitution of the United States or the Eleventh
amendment has any application to the inquiry whether a
suit by a citizen of a State in its own Courts is a suit
against that State. That seems to be purely a question of
local law to be determined by the State Court." Brief at
20.
14 Hopkins has been viewed primarily as standing
for a principle of agency law. See Larson v. Domestic &
Foreign Corp., 337 u.s. 682, 694 (1949} ("agent's l1abiity
for torts committed by him cannot be avoided by pleading
the direction or authorization of his principal}; Hamilton
Mfg. Co. v. Trustees of State Colleges in Colorado, 356 F.
2d 599, 601 n. 1 (CAlO 1966}.

)

17.

sued as if they w re state officials, the case long since
has been overruled.
Nursing Home Assn,

See Florida Dept of Health v. Florida

u.s.

(1981) • Hopkins does not

deserve the pride of place given to it by the majority. 15
It is in fact a non-precedent.

-1-o/i
The Court

a

new doctrine,

one

that exposes the instrumentalities of the State itself to
suit

in

federal

court.l 6

After

today's decision,

state

15 The irrelevance of Hopkins is further indicated by
the fact that the College's activities in that case were
viewed as proprietary in nature:

"[T]his is not an action against the College for
a tort committed in the prosecution of any
governmental function.
The fee was in the
State, but the corporation, as equitable owner,
was in possession, use and enjoyment of the
property.
For protecting the bottom land the
College, for its own corporate purposes and
advantage, constructed the dyke. In so doing it
was not acting in any governmental capacity.
The embankment was in law similar to one which
might have been built for private purposes by
the plaintiff on the other side of the river.
221 u.s., at 647.
Cf. Employees v. Department of Public Health and
Welfare, 411 u.s. 279 (1973) (distinguishing Parden v.
Term1nal R. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), on the bas1s that
Parden concerned State proprietary activity).
16 The Court suggests that in prior decisions the
Court has permitted suit against State Boards of Regents.
See ante, at 5.
Yet in none of these suits was the
jurisdictional issue posed as it is here.
Thus, for
example, in University of California Board of Regents v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) , the Eleventh Amendment issue
was not present because the case was here on petition to
the California Supreme Court. See note 5, supra. And in
each of the other cases cited by the Court, the plaintiff
had the good sense to name other defendants in addition to
the particular state board. See, e. g., Board of Regents
Footnote continued on next page. ---

18.

boards and commissions may be sued for injunctive relief.
The Court also holds
damages on the
not

the

that

fiction

State's. 17

such

bodies may be

sued

for

that their segregated assets are

The

Court's

extension of

Ex

parte

Young to the State itself destroys the rationale of that
decision.

It also undermines the careful balance worked

out in this sensitive area of the law.

v. Tomanio, 446 u.s. 478 (1978); McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents, 339 u.s. 637 (19SO).
The Court also argues that the courts of appeals are
split on the question of whether damages can be awarded
against state universities.
Yet the two cases cited by
the Court to demonstrate a split on this question do not
support the Court's assertion.
In SON! v. Board of
Trustees, Sl3 F. 2d 347 (CA6 197S) the court found that
the Board of Trustees had waived its immunity to suit,
while in Goss v. Jacinto Junior College, S88 F. 2d 96, 9899 (CAS 1979) the court reasoned that the particular
junior college was similar to a county or municipality, an
"independent 'political subdivision' as a matter of Texas
statutory and common law."
The Court suggests as well
that the courts of appeals are agreed that injunctive
relief may be awarded against state universities and state
boards of regents.
Again the cases cited provide little
support for
the Court's assertion.
In New England
Patriots Football Club, Inc. v. University of Colorado,
S92 F. 2d 1196, 1201 (CAl 1979), the court held that
individual members of the Board of Regents might be sued
for prospective injunctive relief.
It did not hold, as
the Court implies, that the University itself might be
sued.
Rather,
it
accepted
"the
University's
identification with the state."
And in ~ Student
Services v. Texas ~ ~ M University, 612 F. 2d 160, 16S
(CAS 1980), it is unclear that the court held more than
that officials of the University could be sued for
injunctive relief.
Unlike the situation in those two
cases,
petitioner
sued only the Board of Regents.
Numerous Courts of Appeals have held state board of
regents to be immune from suit in federal court by reason
of the Eleventh Amendment. See note ___ , supra.
17 whether a State board, like a State official,
may claim good faith immunity is not clear but of
substantial
significance.
See
Owen
v.
City
of
Independence,
U.S.

•

19.

The decision is simply worng.

The Court should

dismiss the suit on the basis of the Eleventh Amendment.
II

Exhaustion of Remedies

In view of my belief that this case should be
dismissed

on

jurisdictional

grounds,

exhaustion question only briefly.
in

the

Court of Appeal's

I

address

the

Seventeen judges joined

persuasive opinion adopting

a

rule of "flexible" exhaustion of administrative remedies
in §1983 suits.
similar rule.

Other Courts of Appeals have adopted a

See e. g., Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F. 2d 560

{CA2 1969); Secret v. Brierton, 584 F. 2d 823 (CA7 1978).
The opinion for

the en bane court carefully reviewed the

exhaustion doctrine
actions.
did

not

u.s.

as

applied

to

§1983

It found that the prior decisions of this Court
clearly

Barchi, 443
411

in general and

u.s.

564,

decide

the

question. 18

See

Barry

v.

55, 63 n. 10 (1979); Gibson v. Berryhill,
575

{1973).

And

it

concluded

that

the

18 " [I] n all the cases in which the Supreme Court
has
articulated
its
no-exhaustion
rule,
the
state
administraive remedies were sufficiently inadequate that
exhaustion would not have been appropriate in any event."
Developments in the Law--Section 1983 and Federalism, 90
Harv. L. Rev. 1133, 1274 (1977).

20.

exhaustion

adequate

of

and

appropriate

state

administrative remedies would promote the achievement of
the rights protected by §1983.
I agree with the Court of Appeals' opinion.

The

requirement that a §1983 plaintiff exhaust adequate state
administrative remedies was the accepted rule of law until
quite recently.
211 U.S.

See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co.,

210,

(1908}

(opinion of Justice Holmes}.

rule rests on sound considerations.
federal

court

jurisdiction,

The

It does not defeat

it merely defers

it.l

9

It

permits the states to correct violations through their own
procedures,
procedures.

and it encourages the establishment of such
It

is

consistent

comity that apply whenever

with

the

principles

federal courts are asked to

review state action or supersede state proceedings.
Younger v. Harris, 401

~

PQ.l"aaps

of

See

u.s. 37 (1971}.

~

s:i.9-Q.ificant.J..y:, the rule conserves

1\
19 cf.

Fair Assessment in Real Estate v. McNary,
,
(Brennan, J., concurring} (exhaustion
requirement in §1983 cases can be justified by "a somewhat
lesser showing •.• where .• we are concerned not with the
displacement of the §1983 remedy, but with the deferral of
federal court consideration pending exhaustion of the
state administrative process"}.

u.s.

~~~JAr~ to
~~~~~~~

~--.-~~~~~.)

21.

and

supplements

scarce

judicial resources.

1961, the year that Monroe v. Pape, 365

lfp/ss 05/28/82

The nee&- £or ~

u.s.

167

(1961),

Rider A,

PATSYl SALLY-POW
David:

Perhaps we should add a footnote along these lines:

~

Of the approximately 30,000 civil rights suits

filed in fiscal year 1981, 16,000 (use exact figures) were
filed by state prisoners under §1983.

The remainder

involved a variety of civil rights suits.

~
......

~e;6.4~

?~

' k-ls

(?1..1(,

~k.,

t4· r~vr~

'tY

22.

u.s.

37

(1971),

proceedings

prescribing abstention when state court

are pending.

At

least where administrative

proceedings are pending, Younger would seem to suggest the
appropriateness of exhaustion.
411

u.s.

564

(1973).

Cf. Gibson v. Berryhill,

Yet the Court today adopts a flat

rule without exception.
The
rule with

Court

seeks

to

support

its

indications of congressional

·H.rl/ v~

little on point

in the history of

no exhaustion

intent.

Finding

the Civil Rights Act

•
1-~.1
.
II
,
itself, the Court turns to the more re ent Civil Rights of
LJ~

'(

Institutionalized

Persons Act,

(1976 ed.,

IV).

authorize

Supp.
the

42

u.s.c.

§1997

Act

also

seq.

This legislation was designed to

Attorney

General

to

begin

civil

actions on behalf of institutionalized persons.
The

et

placed

certain

limits

on

the

rights
§1997a.

existing

authority of the Attorney General to intervene in suits
begun

by

addition,

institutionalized
in

§1997e,

the

persons.

Act

sets

See
forth

§1997c.
an

In

exhaustion

requirement for §1983 claims brought by adult prisoners.
On
§1997e,

and

the

basis
remarks

of

the

exhaustion

primarily

by

provision

in

Representative

-

FIRST DRAFT

7

Patsy v. Board of Regents, No. 80-1874.

Ji(~

g.,f~6

j ·171#-~

Justice Powell, dissenting.

~~'

The Court holds that the Board of Regents of the
State of Florida, a state instrumentality,
suit

in

Eleventh

federal

court

Amendment.

notwithstanding

The

Court

through an unprecedented--and

the holding in Ex Parte Young, 209
consider

the

established

Court's

holding

constitutional

the

reaches

far

a

is subject to
bar

this

of

the

conclusion

reaching--expansion of

u.s.

123 (1908).

serious

doctrine,

departure
this

As I
from

dissent

addresses primarily the Eleventh Amendment issue.

....'

2.

I dissent also from the Court's rejection of the
rule

of

"flexible"

exhaustion

of

state

administrative

remedies developed and stated persuasively by the Court of
Appeals

for

the

Fifth

Circuit,

sitting

en

bane.

In

disagreeing with the 17 judges of the Court of Appeals who
adopted

the

flexible

places

mistaken

exhaustion

reliance

Institutionalized

Persons

on
Act,

principle,
the

42

Civil

u.s.c.

this

Court

Rights

§1997

et

of
~·

(1976 ed., Supp. IV). I disagree with both portions of the
Court's holding and therefore dissent.
I

The Eleventh Amendment
A

In
petitioner,

this
an

"reverse

employee

of

discrimination"
the

University, brought suit under 42

Florida

u.s.c.

action,

International

§1983 against the

Board of Regents of the State of Florida . 1

She did not

1 As the Court notes, see ante, at
, n. 1,
petitioner originally named the Florida International
University
as
defendant.
Because
the
Florida
International University lacks the capacity to sue or be
sued, the District Court found that it was not a proper
defendant.
Petitioner
was
permitted
to
amend
her
complaint,
and she simply substituted the Board of
Regents.
In addition to racial discrimination, petitioner
Footnote continued on next page.

3.

name the individual regents as defendants.
$500,000

in

damages,

equitable

relief. 2

and

for

She sued for

injunctive

and

other

The Board filed a motion to dismiss

arguing that petitioner's suit was premature in light of
her failure to exhaust available administrative remedies.
The

District

Court

agreed

and

granted

the

motion

to

dismiss.
On petitioner's appeal, the Board added the bar
of the Eleventh Amendment to its defense. 3

It argued that

also claimed that she had been discriminated against on
the basis of her sex.
2Petitioner
sought
a
declaratory
judgment
"declaring that the Plaintiff has suffered from acts of
discrimination." In addition, she asked the court to
"[r]equire
Defendants
to
remedy
the
discrimination
practiced upon Plaintiff by promoting her to the next
available
position consistent
with
those
previously
applied for and for which she is qualified or in the
alternative, to require the Defendants to pay to the
Plaintiff the sum of $500,000 as actual and exemplary
damages."
She requested such further
equitable and
injunctive relief as the court deems appropriate.
App.
38-40.
3 The Eleventh Amendment provides:
"The judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State,
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."
Footnote continued on next page.

4.

as an instrumentality of the State, the Board could not be
subjected
immunity. 4

to

suit

in

federal

court

absent

a

waiver

of

And it asserted that there had been no waiver.

The Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional in nature,
and the defense of the Amendment may be raised for the
first time on appeal.
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 u.s.
651, 678 (1974) ("Eleventh Amendment defense sufficienty
partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it
need not be raised in the trial court.")
4

"As a corporate state agency and component of
state government, the [Board] operates with state funds,
directs the [State University System], and is local
neither in character nor operation.
As the 'arm of the
state' which manages the Division of Universities of the
Department of Education, it is clearly part of the state
for Eleventh Amendment purposes." Brief at 18.
The Board of Regents of the Division of Universities
of the Department of Education is established by the
Florida Education Code as a part of the State University
System.
Fla. Stat. 240.2011.
The Board consists of the
Commissioner of Education and twelve citizens appointed by
the Governor, approved by three members of the Cabinet,
and confirmed by the Senate. Fla. Stat. 240.207.
The
chief
administrative
officer
of
the
Board
is
the
Chancellor, who serves by appointment of the Board.
The Board has general supervisory authority over the
State University System.
Fla. Stat. 240.209. Among its
duties are the appointment of university presidents, the
review of budget requests of each university in the state
system, the preparation of an aggregated budget for the
State University System, the development of a master plan,
and
the
establishment
of
a
systemwide
personnel
classification and pay plan. Fla. Stat. §240.209.
The Board is an agency of the State of Florida.
Fla. Stat. §216.011.
See Relyea v. State, 385 So.2d 1378
(F'la. App. 198 0) •
The Board may claim the defense of
sovereign immunity in suits under state law. See id.
Footnote continued on next page.

5.

Although

the

Board

of

Regents

was

created

as

a

body

corporate with power "to sue and be sued .•. to plead and
be impleaded in all courts of law and equity,"

Fla. Stat.

§240.042(1), it is well established that language such as
thjs does not operate to waive the defense of the Eleventh
Amendment. 5
statute

creating

petitioner
simply

In reply, petitioner argued that whether the

was

the

believed

Board

that

irrelevant

to

amounted

to

a

waiver--and

it did--the Eleventh Amendment
the

equitable

claims

she

had

Numerous
courts
of
appeals
have
held
state
universities or state Boards of Regents immune from suit
in federal court by reason of the Eleventh Amendment.
See, e. g., Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 660 F.
2d 1345, 1349 (CA9 1981):
Brennan v. University of
Kansas, 451 F. 2d 1287 (CAlO 1971):
Ronwin v. Shapiro,
657 F. 2d 1071 (CA9 1981).
5 see Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing
Home, 450 u.s. 147, lSo--(1981):
Petty v. TennesseeMissouri Bridge Commn, 359 u.s. 275, 276-277 (1959) ("The
conclusion that there has been a waiver of immunity will
not
be
lightly
inferred
And
where
a
public
instrumentality is created with the right 'to sue and be
sued' that waiver of immunity in the particular setting
may be restricted to suits or proceedings of a special
character in the state, not the federal courts"): Great
Northern Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 u.s. 47, 54.
See
Bragg v. Board of PU5Iic Instruction, 36 So. 2d 222 (Fla.
1948) ("The mere fact that the Board of Public Instruction
is created as a body corporate with power to sue and be
sued does not affect its immunity from tort").

:,o_•

6.

lodged against the State.

See Reply Brief at 3-4.

Neither the Court of Appeals panel nor the Court
of

Appeals

en

bane

Amendment defense.

addressed

the

Board's

Eleventh

They directed their attention solely

to the question of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The panel held that there was no exhaustion requirement in
§1983

suits

and

remanded

to

the

District

Court

for

consideration of the Board's Eleventh Amendment argument.
612 F.
en

2d 946

bane,

(CAS 1980).

reversed

The Court of Appeals, sitting

holding

that

§1983

plaintiffs

must

exhaust available and reasonable administrative remedies.
634 F. 2d 900 (CAS 1981). Again the court did not consider
the Board's Eleventh Amendment defense.
The Eleventh Amendment question was first raised
before this Court in the Board's response to the petition
for writ of certiorari.

The Board argued,

as it had on

appeal, that it was an arm of the State and that it had
not waived its immunity from suit in federal court. Again
petitioner

argued

that

at

most

the

Eleventh

defense would bar her claim for damages.
this

claim,

petitioner

would not bar damages

now

argued

that

Amendment

And, even as to
the

Amendment

if the Board could meet the claim

out of its "own funds"--e.

g., from gifts and bequests--

7•

rather than from the State Treasury.

These arguments were

repeated at oral argument. 6
As
Amendment

the

Court

question

is

confronted at the outset.

acknowledges,

Eleventh

the

must

be

Amendment,

the

jurisdictional

and

See ante, at
B

In

Court

interpreting

t:U...~~
~

sovereign

sought

to

immunity

the

Eleventh

accommodate

embodied

in

both
the

the

principle

Amendment

and

of
the

states' duty to obey--and the federal courts to enforce-federal law.

Thus, it is well established that the State

is not "divested of its immunity 'on the mere ground that
the case is one arising under the Constitution or laws of
the United States.'"
184, 186
10

{1964), quoting, Hans v.

{1890) . 7

u.s.
u.s. 1,

Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377
Louisiana, 134

It also is settled that when a State itself

6 Tr. of Oral Argument 25-28, 40-41.
7 In Hans the Court also held that the Amendment
bars suits brought against an unconsenting State by its
own citizens, although by its terms the Amendment does not
apply to this situation.
Cf. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292
u.s. 313 {1934) {Eleventh Amendment applies to federal
suits against an unconsenting state by a foreign nation).
By contrast, the Amendment has not been applied to suits
Footnote continued on next page .

..

~.

"

8.

is

not

named

nevertheless
interest.

as

a

applies

party
if

to

the

the State

suit,
is

the

the

Amendment

real party

in

See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,

323 u.s. 459 (1945) .8

On the other hand, the Court has not interpreted
the Amendment to bar federal court jurisdiction when the
State has consented to suit, 9 or
Court
court.

of
1

an

action

° Congress

brought

to bar

against

the

review by this
State

in

state

may lift the bar of the Amendment when

against a State brought by another State or by the United
States.
North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923);
United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
8 In Ford Motor the plaintiff sued the Department
of Treasury of the State of Indiana, and the three
officials--the
Governor,
Treasurer,
and
Auditor--who
constituted the Board of the Department of Treasury. The
plaintiff sought a refund of gross income taxes paid to
the department.
Suit was brought in federal District
Court.
The Court held that the suit was barred by the
Eleventh Amendment.
The plaintiff was seeking a refund
from the state not a personal judgment against the
individual officials:
"[W]hen the action is in essence
one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is
the real party in interest and is entitled to invoke its
sovereign immunity from suit even though
individual
officials are nominal defendants." 323 u.s., at 464. See
Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 663; Great Northern Life
Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 u.s. 47 (1944).
9 see

l

Clark

v. Barnard, 108 u.s. 436, 447 (1883);
Footnote continued on next page.
Footnote(s) 10 will appear on following pages.
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P.xercising powers granted to it by §5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
(1976).

See

Fitzpatrick

Counties

and

Mt.

427

may

u.s.
not

445

claim

Lincoln County v. Luning,

Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle,

133 u.s.

529

429 u.s.

274,

279-281

(1977)

u.s.

123

(1908),

a

209

Bitzer,

municipalities

immunity under the Amendment.
(1890) :

v.

And under Ex parte Young,

federal

court

may

officials to obey federal law in the future.

order

state

11

Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 u.s. 184 (1964).
10 see Smith v. Reeves, 178 u.s. 436, 445 (1900);
Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 u.s. 47, 57
(1944); Chandler v. D1x, ~u.s. 590, 592 (1904).
The
Court's assumption of
jurisdiction in University of
California Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978),
a case originating in state court, thus provides no
support for today' s decision.
For the same reason, the
Court's reliance upon HoDkins v. Clemson Agricultural
College, 221 U.S. 636 (191 , is misplaced. See infra.
11 under the theory, some would say fiction, of Ex
parte Young, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar su1 ts
against state officers because when a state officer "comes
into conflict with the superior authority of
[the]
Constitution, ... he is •.. stripped of his official or
representative
character."
Id.,
at
159.
On
this
analysis, a prospective injunction requiring the official
to conform his future behavior to federal law, does not
require anything of the State and therefore does not bring
the
Eleventh
Amendment
to
bear.
The
granting
of
retroactive relief, on the other hand, would require the
official to take action in his offical capacity. Thus, if
the official is required to pay damages from state funds,
Footnote continued on next page.
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Application of these settled principles to the
present case is straightforward.
§1983,

and

Congress

has

not

This is an action under
removed

Eleventh Amendment in such actions.
440

u.s.

Board

332

of

(1979) •

Petitioner

Regents

of

the

the

of

seeks

State

relief
of

from

the

Florida,

an

The Board is not

local political body but bears responsibility for

State university system as a whole.
of Ed.

v.

statute
waive

supra.

incorporating

the

decisions
Health

Doyle,

of

v.

(1981). 12

Eleventh
this

Florida

the

Cf. Mt. Healthy Bd.

Petitioner's argument that the

the Board should be

Amendment
Court.
Nursing

Similarly,

the

See Quern v. Jordan,

instrumentality or agency of the State.
a

bar

is

See,

understood to

foreclosed
e.

Home

petitioner's

g.,
Assn,

by numerous

Florida Dept of
450

suggestion

u.s.

147

that

the

the State is directly affected.
See Edelman v. Jordan,
supra.
Similarly,
retroactive injunctive relief may
require the official to take action in his official
capacity and also would be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.
Cf. Larson v. Domestic .!_ Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 u.s. 682 (1949).
Of course, in addition to
prospective injunctive relief,
a plaintiff may seek
damages from the individual officer in his personal
capacity.
See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 u.s. 232, 237-238
(1974).
Footnote(s) 12 will appear on following pages.

11.

Eleventh

Amendment

does

not

against a state is incorrect.

apply

to

equitable

See Cory v. White,

claims
u.s.

(1982).
Thus, unless the rule in Ex parte Young, supra,
is extended beyond any previous decision of this Court,
the Eleventh Amendment bars this suit.

The theory in Ex

parte Young, supra, has no application to the State itself
or to an instrumentality of the State.
sued the
damages
Eleventh

If petitioner had

individual members of the Board, her claim for
against

them would

Arnendrnen t.

Nor

not have been barred by the

would

her

claim

for

equitable

relief have been barred to the extent it were limited to
future conduct.

But petitioner did not sue the members of

12 In Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Horne
Assn, 450 u.S. 14 7 (1981) , the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit found that the Florida Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services had consented to suit.
The
court based its finding of waiver, in part, on the fact
that the Department was a "body corporate" with the
capacity to "sue and be sued" under state law. Fla. Stat.
Ann. §402.34. This Court reversed holding that a general
waiver of sovereign immunity does not amount to a waiver
of the Eleventh Amendment. See id., at 150. See note 5,
supra.
Without distinguishing Florida Dept of Health,
supra, the Court leaves open the question of whether the
Board has consented to suit. See ante, at 9 & n. 10.

12.

the Board.

She sued only the Board itself, an arm of the

State of Florida.
by

petitioner

Moreover, the principle relief sought

would

impose--in

the

alternative--an

affirmative duty on the Board to promote her to the next
available position of comparable status to those to which
she had applied, or would "require the [Board]
[petitioner]
damages."

to pay to

the sum of $500,000 as actual and exemplary

App., 39.

Seen. 3, ante.

One would have thought that Ex parte Young was
simply

irrelevant

in

these

circumstances.

Although

an

individual official may be viewed as acting on his own and
without State authority when acting against federal law,
the

State--or

an

agency of

the

State--cannot act

other

than in its official State capacity. Similarly, an action
for

damages against the state,

seeks

damages

coffers.

that

Whether

must
the

State's general fund or

be

or

paid

damages

an arm of the state,
from

state's

directly

own

from

the

from some other State fund,

the

money is no less the State's.

come

the

Indeed, direct application

of Ex parte Young to the State and its instrumentalities
would read the Eleventh Amendment out of the Constitution.
If

the

bar

of

naming

of

a

the Amendment
State

board,

is

lifted merely
commission,

upon

the

agency

or

13.

corporation--opening
injunctive

afford

the

relief--then

way
the

constitutionally

to

damages

Amendment

prescribed

as

no

well

as

longer

protection

to

would

to

the

states.

c
Despite the weight of these considerations, the
Court

concludes

that

Eleventh Amendment.

this

action

is

not

barred by

Indeed, the Court undertakes to apply

Ex parte Young to the Board of Regents itself.
upon

the

College,
Board of

decision
221 U.S.
Regents,

the

in
636

Hopkins

Clemson

Agricultural

(1911), the Court reasons that the

as a

from a state official.

v.

Relying

body corporate,

is no different

The Court attempts to bolster this

novel conclusion by observing that under Florida law the
Board of Regents is termed the "director" of the Division
of Universities.
parte

Young,

the

The Court concludes that, just as in Ex
Board

of

Regents

"may

be

sued

for

unconstitutional or unauthorized act ions, as long as the
plaintiff is not seeking monetary relief that must be paid
out of the state treasury."

Ante, at 8.

The Court's conclusion is supported neither by
reason nor precedents of this Court.

As indicated above,

the rationale of Ex parte Young does not apply to a State

,.

. ·.~~·;~tl .
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,.
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or State instrumentality.
of its own authority.

The State cannot be "stripped"

Moreover,

if the Board of Regents

is a State agency--and it clearly is--then its assets are
also

those

of

the

State's.

Yet

the

Court's

decision

exposes the Board's assets to a damage award on the double
fiction that the Board is really an "official" and that
its

separate

assets

somehow

belong

being rather than to the State.
welfare

board,

highway

to

this

fictitious

On such a theory, a state

department

or

any other

agency,

board or department of a state with any separate funds or
income could be sued for damages.

Such a conclusion is at

odds with the Court's holding in Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
Tax Commn, 327

u.s.

573 (1946), that the segregated funds

of the State Tax Commission were State monies subject to
the Eleventh Amendment.
Nor does the Board of Regents' corporate status
under

state

law

support

the

Court's

holding.

State

governments consist in major part of a variety of boards,
commissions,

agencies,

and

corporations.

These

State

entities are no less instruments of the State because they
may be vested under state law with the power to contract,
to sue and be sued.
Eleventh

<,

Amendment

This Court repeatedly has held the
to

bar

suit

against

such

state

15.

corporate agencies.
Read,

u.s.

322

Treasury, 323

See Great Northern Insurance Co. v.

47;

u.s.

Motor

454 (1945);

State Tax Commn, 327
Thus,

Ford

u.s.

Co.

v.

Department

of

Kennecott Coppper Corp. v.

572 (1946).

in Parden v.

Terminal R. Co.,

377 U.S.

184 (1964) , the Court assumed that a state owned railroad-as an instrumentality of the State--was immune from suit
in federal court absent a waiver.

The railway in Parden

was authorized to operate "as though it were an ordinary
common carrier."

377 U.S. 185.

It performed services for

profit and had contracts and agreements with various labor
organizations.
engaging

in

It was "indisputably a common carrier
interstate

commerce."

Id.,

at

185.

No

suggestion was made that as a State body, with separate
funds,

the

railroad was

no longer an instrumentality of

the State but was merely a State official.

And just last

term the Court held that the Florida Department of Health,
a "body corporate" under State law was immune from suit.
Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn, 450

u.s.

147 (1981).

Cf. Alabama v. Pugh, 438

("There can be no doubt
and

781 (1978)

. • • that suit against the State

its Board of Corrections

Amendment").

u.s.

is barred by the Eleventh

The Court's conclusion that corporate status

16.

converts a State body into a State official,
suit,

cannot

be

reconciled

with

these

well

subject to
established

precedents.
D

I am unaware of any prior decision of this Court
that supports the Court's application of Ex parte Young to
State

instrumentalities.

supra,

relied

irrelevant.

upon

so

Hopkins

heavily

by

v.

Clemson

the Court,

College,
is

simply

In that case suit was brought against a state

college in state court to recover damages caused by the
college's construction of a dyke.

The state courts held

that the college was protected from suit by the state law
of sovereign immunity.
Eleventh Amendment

in

Although the Court discussed the
some detail,

there was

Eleventh Amendment question in that case. 13

simply no

It was clear

before Hopkins that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply

13 The state college recognized that there was no
Eleventh Amendment question.
In its brief it noted: "It
is difficult to see how either Section 2 of Article III,
of the Constitution of the United States or the Eleventh
amendment has any application to the inquiry whether a
suit by a citizen of a State in its own Courts is a suit
against that State. That seems to be purely a question of
local law to be determined by the State court." Brief at

20.

17.

to

bar

review

in

this

Court

of

any

federal

question

presented in a suit against a State in state court.
note

10,

viewed,

supra.

the

holding

in Hopkins may

be

no Eleventh Amendment question was presented to

the Court. 14
has

However

See

never

It therefore is no surprise that the opinion

been

cited by this Court

for

the proposition

that the Eleventh Amendment is no bar to suit against a
state

agency

in

federal

court.

If

the

case

could

be

viewed as standing for the proposition that state agencies
may be sued as if they were state officials, the case long
since

has

decisions.

been

overruled

sub

silento

by

subsequent

See Florida Dept of Health v. Florida Nursing

Home Assn, supra.

Hopkins does not deserve the pride of

place given to it by the majority. 15 It is in fact a non-

14 Hopkins has been viewed primarily as standing
for a principle of agency law. See Larson v. Domestic &
Foreign Corp., 337 u.s. 682, 694 (1949) ("agent's liabiity
for torts committed by him cannot be avoided by pleading
the direction or
authorization of
his
principal")~
Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Trustees of State Colleges in
Colorado, 356 F. 2d 599, 601 n. 1 (CAlO 1966).
15 The irrelevance of Hopkins is further indicated by
the fact that the College's activities in that case were
viewed as proprietary in nature:
"[T]his is not an action against the College for
a tort committed in the prosecution of any
Footnote continued on next page.
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precedent.
The

announces a new doctrine,

one that exposes the instrumentalities of the State itself
to suit in federal court. 16

After today's decision, state

governmental function.
The fee was in the
State, but the corporation, as equitable owner,
was in possession, use and enjoyment of the
property.
For protecting the bottom land the
College, for its own corporate purposes and
advantage, constructed the dyke.
In so doing it
was not acting in any governmental capacity.
The embankment was in law similar to one which
might have been built for private purposes by
the plaintiff on the other side of the river.
221 u.s., at 647.
Cf. Employees v. Department of Public Health and
Welfare, 411 u.s. 279 (1973} (distinguishing Parden v.
Terminal R. Co. , 377 U.S. 18 4 (19 64} , on the bas is that
Parden concerned State proprietary activity}.
16 The Court suggests that in prior decisions the
Court has permitted suit against State Boards of Regents.
See ante, at 5.
Yet in none of these suits was the
jurisdictional issue posed as it is here.
Thus, for
example, in University of California Board of Regents v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978} , the Eleventh Amendment issue
was not present because the case was here on petition to
the California Supreme Court. See note 5, supra. And in
each of the other cases cited by the Court, the plaintiff
had the good sense to name other defendants in addition to
the particular state board. See, e. g., Board of Regents
v. Tomanio, 446 u.s. 478 (1978}; McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents, 339 u.s. 637 (1950}.
The Court also argues that the courts of appeals are
split on the question of whether damages can be awarded
against state universities.
Yet the two cases cited by
Footnote continued on next page.

19.

boards and commissions may be sued for injunctive relief.
The Court

also holds

damages on the
not

the

that

fiction

State's. 17

such bodies may

be

sued

for

that their segregated assets are

The

Court's

extension of

Ex

parte

the Court to demonstrate a split on this question do not
support the Court's assertion.
In SON! v. Board of
Trustees, Sl3 F. 2d 347 (CA6 197S) the court found that
the Board of Trustees had waived its immunity to suit,
while in Goss v. Jacinto Junior College, S88 F. 2d 96, 9899 (CAS 1979) the court reasoned that the particular
junior college was similar to a county or municipality, an
"independent 'political subdivision' as a matter of Texas
statutory and common law." The Court suggests as well that
the courts of appeals are agreed that injunctive relief
may be awarded against state universities and state boards
of regents. Again the cases cited provide little support
for the Court's assertion.
In New England Patriots
Football Club, Inc. v. University of Colorado, S92 F. 2d
119 6, 1201 (CAl 1979) , the court held that individual
members of the Board of Regents might be sued for
prospective injunctive relief.
It did not hold, as the
Court implies, that the University itself might be sued.
Rather, it accepted "the University's identification with
the state."
And in ~ Student Services v. Texas Ji ~ !!_
University, 612 F. 2d 160, 16S (CAS 1980), it is unclear
that the court held more than that officials of the
University could be sued for injunctive relief.
Unlike
the situation in those two cases, petitioner sued only the
Board of Regents.
Numerous courts of appeals have held
state board of regents to be immune from suit in federal
court by reason of the Eleventh Amendment.
See n. 4,
supra.
17

whether a State board, like a State official,
may claim good faith immunity is not clear but of
substantial
significance.
See
Owen
v.
City
of
Independence, 44S U.S. 622 (1980) •

.
.

.

"·'
'J

'
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Young to the State itself destroys the rationale of that
decision.

It also undermines the careful balance worked

out in this sensitive area of the law.
The decision is simply wrong.

The Court should

dismiss the suit on the basis of the Eleventh Amendment.
II

Exhaustion of Remedies

In view of my belief that this case should be
dismissed

on

jurisdictional

grounds,

exhaustion question only briefly.
in

the Court of Appeal's

rule of

I

address

the

Seventeen judges joined

persuasive opinion adopting

a

"flexible" exhaustion of administrative remedies

in §1983 suits.
similar rule.

Other Courts of Appeals have adopted a

See e. g., Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F. 2d 560

(CA2 1969); Secret v. Brierton, 584 F. 2d 823 (CA7 1978).
The opinion for the en bane court carefully reviewed the
exhaustion doctrine
actions.
did

not

in general

and

as

applied

to

§1983

It found that the prior decisions of this Court
clearly

decide

the

question. 18

See

Barry

v.

18 " [I] n all the cases in which the Supr erne Court
has
articulated
its
no-exhaustion
rule,
the
state
administraive remedies were sufficiently inadequate that
exhaustion would not have been appropriate in any event."
Developments in the Law--Section 1983 and Federalism, 90
Footnote continued on next page .

..
~
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Barchi, 443
411

u.s.

u.s.

55, 63 n. 10 (1979); Gibson v. Berryhill,

564, 575 n. 14 (1973).

exhaustion

of

adequate

And it concluded that the
and

appropriate

state

administrative remedies would promote the achievement of
the rights protected by §1983.
I agree with the Court of Appeals' opinion.

The

requirement that a §1983 plaintiff exhaust adequate state
administrative remedies was the accepted rule of law until
quite recently.
211

U.S.

See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co.,

210,

(1908)

(opinion of Justice Holmes) .

rule rests on sound considerations.
f e d era 1

cour t

· · d 1c
· t 1on,
·
JUr1s

1' t

The

It does not defeat

mere 1 y defer s

1' t . 19

It

permits the states to correct violations through their own
procedures,
procedures.

and it encourages the establishment of such
It

is

consistent

comity that apply whenever

with

federal

the

principles

of

courts are asked to

Harv. L. Rev. 1133, 1274 (1977).
19 cf.

Fair Assessment in Real Estate v. McNary,
U.S.
,
(1982)
(Brennan, J., concurring)
(exhaustion requirement in §1983 cases can be justified by
"a somewhat lesser showing ••. where •• we are concerned
not with the displacement of the §1983 remedy, but with
the deferral of federal court consideration pending
exhaustion of the state administrative process").

22.

review state action or supersede state proceedings.

u.s.

Younger v. Harris, 401
Moreover,

See

37 (1971).

and highly relevant to the effective

functioning of the overburdened federal court system, the
rule conserves and supplements scarce judicial resources.
In

1961,

(1961),

the

year

was decided,

that

Monroe

v.

Pape,

Annual Report of the

Director of the Administrative Office of the
(1961).

commenced. 20

In

over

1981,

Annual

30,000

Report

of

the

Administrative Office of the

u.s.

Such a

dramatic

litigation

burden

on

federal

the

increase
federal

court

167

only 270 civil rights actions were

begun in thefederal district courts.

238

u.s.

365

in

courts

litigants,

to

such

Director

detriment
those

were

of

68

imposes

including

Courts

suits

Courts 63,

the

u.s.

The

(1981).

a

heavy

of

all

whose

constitutional rights in fact have been infringed.
The
Court

Court

categorically

argues
hold

that
that

past
there

decisions
is

no

of

the

exhaustion

20 of the approximately 30,000 civil rights fuits
filed in fiscal year 1981, 15,639 were filed by state
prisoners under §1983.
The remainder involved a variety
of civil rights suits.
See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 u.s.
527, 554 n. 13 (1981) (POWELL, J., concurring).

23.

requirement

in §198 3 suits.

But as the Court of Apeals

demonstrates, and as the Court recognizes, many of these
decisions can be explained as applications of traditional
exceptions to the exhaustion requirement.
Board of Education, 373
speak

to

the

fashion.

question

See Damico v.

(unargued

u.s.

per

in

668 (1963).

Other decisions

an

and

offhand

California,

curiam).

See McNeese v.

conclusory

389 U.S.

Moreover,

a

416

(1967)

categorical

no-

exhaustion rule would seem inconsistent with the decision
in

Younger

v.

Harris,

u.s.

401

37

(1971),

prescribing

abstention when state criminal proceedings

are pending.

At

are

least

Younger

where
would

exhaustion.
575

administrative
seem

to

proceedings

suggest

the

appropriateness

Cf. Gibson v. Berryhill,

(1973).

Yet

the

Court

today

pending,

411 U.S.
adopts

a

of

564, 574flat

rule

without exception.
The
rule with

Court

seeks

to

support

indications of congressional

its

no exhaustion
Finding

intent.

nothing on point in the history of the Civil Rights Act
itself,

the Court places primary reliance on the recent

Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act,
§1997 et seq.

(1976 ed., Supp. IV).

42

u.s.c.

This legislation was

designed to authorize the Attorney General to begin civil

f

l

..

24.

rights

actions

§1997a.

The

on
Act

behalf
also

of

institutionalized

placed

certain

limits

persons.
on

the

existing authority of the Attorney General to intervene in
suits begun by institutionalized persons.
addition,

in

§1997e,

the

Act

sets

See §1997c.

forth

an

In

exhaustion

requirement for §1983 claims brought by adult prisoners.
On
§1997e,

the

and

basis

of

remarks

the

exhaustion

primarily

by

provision

in

Representative

Kastenmeier, the Court contends that Congress has endorsed
a general no exhaustion rule.
should

be

Department

obvious.
of

The

Justice

to

The irony in this reasoning
concern

support,

that
and

prompted

the

Congress

the
to

adopt, §1997e was the vast increase in §1983 suits brought
by state prisoners in federal courts.

There has been a

year-by-year increase in these suits since the mid-1960's.
The increase in fiscal 1981 over fiscal 1980 was some 26%,
resulting in a total of 15,639 such suits filed in 1981 as
compared with 12,397 in 1980.
over

11%

Although

of
most

the
of

total
these

The 1981 total constituted

federal
cases

district

present

court

docket.

frivolous

claims,

many are litigated through the courts of appeals to this
Court.

The burden on the system fairly can be described

as enormous with few,

''•

if any, benefits that would not be

.,

25.

available

in

appropriate

meritorious

state

cases

administrative

exhaustion

if

remedies

prior to any federal court litigation.

were

of

required

It was primarily

this problem that prompted enactment of §1997e.
Moreover,
history

that

it

is

Congress

exhaustion problem

clear

simply

from

was

in any general

not

the

legislative

addressing

fashion.

The concern

focused on the problem of prisoner petitions.
had

a

dual

requiring

purpose

prior

in

this

exhaustion

respect.

of

adequate

In

the

The new Act
addition

state

to

remedies,

Congress wished to authorize the Attorney General to act
when

necessary

prisoners,

but

to

protect

at

the

same

the

constitutional

time

minimize

the

rights of
need

for

federal action of any kind by requiring prior exhaustion.
Both sponsors of the Act in the Senate made this clear.
Senator Hatch explained §1997e as follows:
"In actions relating to alleged violations of
the constitutional rights of prisoners, such
persons may be required to exhaust internal
grievance procedures before the Attorney General
can become involved pursuant to [the Act]."
Congrzfsional
Record
Sl713,
February
26,
1980.

21 senator Hatch offered the same explanation on
several other occasions in the course of the debate. See
Footnote continued on next page.
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Senator

Bayh,

the

author

of

the

Act,

decribed

the

exhaustion provision in similar terms:
"[I]n the event of a prison inmate's rights
being alleged to be violated . • • then before
the
Justice
Department
could
intervene or
initiate suits, the prison inmate or class of
inmates would have to pursue all of their
adiminstrative remedies within the State law
before the Justice Department could intervene
under
the
provisions
of
[the
Act]."
Congressional Record Sl859, February 27, 1980.

In

short,

in

enacting

the

Civil

Rights

of

Institutionalized Act Congress was focussing on the powers
of

the Attorney General,

prisoners'
exhaustion

suits,

not

and the particular question of
on

in §1983 actions.

the
Also

general

question

revealing

as

to

of
the

limited purpose of §1997e is Congress' consistent refusal

Congressional Record S4293, April 29, 1980 ("Section 7
would
establish
specific
procedures
that
would
be
applicable before the Attorney General could enter into an
action in behalf of an imprisoned or incarcerated person.
Such person would first have had to fully exhasut all
internal
grievance
mechanisms
that
existed
in
the
institution in which he was confined");
Congressonal
Record S4626, May 6, 1980 ("Section 7(D) further clarifies
that the administrative grievance procedures established
in section 7 are only for the purposes of requiring
prisoners to exhaust internal grievance mechanisms before
the Attorney General can litigate on his behalf").

27.

to

adopt

legislation

requirement.

Thus,

imposing
for

a

general

example,

in

no-exhaustion

1979,

a

bill

was

introduced into the Senate providing:
"No court of the United States shall stay or
dismiss any civil action brought under this Act
on the ground that the party bringing such
action failed to exhaust the remedies available
in the courts or the administrative agencies of
any State." S.l983, 96th Congress, 1st Session.

The bill was never reported out of committee.
The

requirement

that

plaintiffs

exhaust

available and adequate administrative remedies--subject to
well

developed

exceptions--is

virtually every area of

the

firmly

law.

This

established

in

is dictated in

§1983 actions by common sense, as well as by comity and
federalism, where adequate state administrative remedies
are available.
If the exhaustion question were properly before
us, I would affirm the Court of Appeals.

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of the Associate Attorney General

Washington, D.C. 20530

June 1, 1982

Ms. Sara Sonet
Research Librarian
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D.C.
20543
Dear Ms. Sonet:
Thank you for your letter of May 26, 1982, inquiring about
the status of the program established by 42 U.S.C. Section 1997(e)
relating to inmate grievance procedures.
Section 1997(e), enacted in 1980 as part of the Civil Rights
of Institutionalized Persons Act, requires the Attorney General
to promulgate minimum standards for inmate grievance procedures
and to establish a method of certifying such procedures upon the
application of states and political subdivisions. Pursuant to
the directive in Section 1997(e), the Department, after thorough
study and review, promulgated standards for inmate grievance
procedures and established a certification method on October 1,
1981. Those standards and the procedure for certification may be
found at 28 C.F.R. Part 40.
On October 27, 1981, the State of Wyoming submitted the
first application for certification under the standards. The
Department reviewed Wyoming's application and advised the appropriate officials of a number of deficiencies in the application
materials. Wyoming submitted additional materials in support of
its application in March of 1982 in order to correct these deficiencies. The Department is in the process of reviewing the
additional submission.
To date, Colorado and New Mexico are the only other jurisdictions that have submitted applications for certification of
their inmate grievance procedures. Colorado's application was
submitted by letter dated April 1, 1982 and is currently under
review. New Mexico submitted its application by letter dated
May 25, 1982; that application has just been received.

You also ask whether the Attorney General has submitted to
Congress the report required by 42 U.S.C. Section 1997(f). That
Section, also a part of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized
Persons Act, requires the Attorney General to report to Congress
on the discharge of certain duties imposed on the Department under
the Act relating to the review of complaints of mistreatment made
by persons confined in state or local institutions such as prisons
and jails. In March of 1982, the Attorney General submitted the
first report required by Section 1997(f) to Congress; a copy is
enclosed. You will note that nothing in Section 1997(f) requires
the Attorney General to include in the report a summary of his
activities related to the processing of applications for certification of inmate grievance procedures and, accordingly, no such
summary is contained in the report.
I hope this answers your questions.
Please do not hesitate
to contact me if further information is needed.

rederick Fr"edman
Special Assistant to the
Associate Attorney General
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 4, 1982

Re:

80-1874 - Patsy v. Florida
j.

Dear Thurgood:
Although I was content with your Eleventh
Amendment analysis, I am still with you on your most
recent circulation.
Respectfully,

}"C
Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

.;§uvuutt <qottrl of t!tt ~ttitt~ .;%imua
'J1'rtt£rfrin.gton. l(l. <q. 20,?Jl.;l
June 7, 1982

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re: No. 8 0-1874 - Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida
Dear Thurgood:
On the understanding that the two minor changes that I have
suggested will be made , I a m glad to join your recirculatio n of
June 3.
Sincer e ly,

~~-!·

Justice Marshall
cc: The Confer en ce

J'

."

lfp/ss 06/08/82
MEMORANDUM
TO:

David

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

June 8, 1982

80-1874 Patsy v. Board of Regents
I find your revised draft of June 7 totally
persuasive until we come to the final section of Part I
(subpart D, as relettered by me, pp. 14-18, inclusive).
To this point, you have stated the case, and then
demonstrated by an impressive array of authorities, well
presented, that the Eleventh Amendment issue is
jurisdictional in the most fundamental sense, except only
that a state may consent to be sued.

As I have indicated in

marginal notes, the quotations from prior decisions seem
controlling.

If the cases themselves- i.e., the issue

presented and the holding of the Court - are consistent with
these quotations, I suggest makingthe language in the
Eleventh Amendment section of the opinion (Part I) more
positive.

I have suggested some language that I am sure you

can improve.
Subpart D (commencing at the bottom of p. 14)
addresses the arguments of petitioner as to why the Eleventh
Amendment is not a bar.

I do not have TM's opinion with me,

and the truth is I have not read it since the Eleventh
Amendment issue was relegated to a footnote.
read it tomorrow.

I will try to

But if my understanding is correct, the

arguments you address in Subpart Dare the petitioner's and

'

.
r

•

'•.

2.

are not relied upon in TM's revised opinion.
made explicit at the outset of Subpart D.

This should be

You might

commence along the following lines:
"As the Court itself offers no answer to
the reason and force of its prior decisions,
I turn now to the arguments advanced by
petitioners. It bears repeating, that both
parties have addressed this issue and it was
fully aired at the oral argument. See supra,
at
" (David cite general page
references to the oral argument) •

As I read Subpart D, I become less certain as to
its central thrust.

The two specific arguments referred to

on page 15 are petitioner's claims of waiver and that the
·-Arne ~~

! oe_: not bar equitable

claim~

You dispatch each

of these arguments in a sentence rather unpersuasively.

The

draft did address the waiver issue on page 4 as a part of
the statement of the case and position of parties.

Is it

desirable, David, simply to assert, in a brief sentence for
each, these two grounds on which petitioner relies, and move
the argument of these issues - including footnotes - to
Subpart D?

And do we make the point explicitly anywhere

that the requirement of our cases is "consent", and this
cannot be implied.
action.

It can be accomplished only by explicit

There is a great deal of excellent language on

this, particularly for the immunity of the United States.
The greater part of Subpart D is devoted to Ex
parte Young.

Did petitioner rely on it?

As I dictate this

memorandum, I see that your reliance on the Eleventh

3.

Amendment is the principal answer to the equitable relief
claim, although I do think this is not made as clearly as it
can be.
In sum, Subpart D as now written seems a weak
ending.

It is appropriate to conclude an opinion by

advancing - and knocking down - arguments of the losing
party.

But the principal "knocking" on the waiver or

consent issue is on p. 4.
After you have read this memo, we can talk about
this.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

..

lfp/ss 06/08/82
MEMORANDUM
TO:

David

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

June 8, 1982

80-1874 Patsy v. Board of Regents
I find your revised draft of June 7 totally

persuasive until we come to the final section of Part I
(subpart D, as relettered by me, pp. 14-18, inclusive).
To this point, you have stated the case, and then
demonstrat.ed by an impressive array of authorities, well
presented, that the Elevent'.h Amendment i.ssue is
jurisdictional in the most

fundament~l

that a state may consent to be sued.

sense, except only
As I have indicated in

marginal notes, the quot..ations fr,.,m prior decisions seem
controlling.

If the cases themselves- i.e., the issue

presented and the holding of the Court - are consistent with
. f

-~1,(. .

• s these quotations, I suggest makingthe language in the
Eleventh .'l!Jnendment section of the opinion (Part I) more
positive.

I have suggested some language that I am sure you

can improve.
Subpart D (commencing at the bottom of p. 34)
addresses the arguments of petitioner as to why the Eleventh
Amendment i.s not a bar.

I do not have 'J'M's opi.nion with me,

and the truth is I have not read it since the Eleventh
Amendment issue was relegated to a footnote.
read it tomorrow.

J

will try to

But if my understanding i.e correct, the

arguments you address in Subpart D are the petitioner's and

~

.

~--·-'U'l---·ll'll!-·- - - · ' "

w

2.

are not relied upon in TM's revised opinion.
made expl i.ci t at the outset of Subpart D.

This should be

You might

commence along the Eollowing lines:
"As the Court itself offers no answer to
the reason and force of its prior decisions,
I turn now to the arguments advanced by
petitioners. It bears repeating, that both
parties have adoressed this issue and it was
fully aired at the oral argument. See supra,
at
." (David cite general page
references to the oral argument) •

As I read Subpart o, I become less certain as to
its central thrust.

~he

two specific arguments referred to

on page 15 are petitioner's claims of waiver and that the
Amendment does not bar equitahle claims.
of these arguments in a

sent~nce

You dispatch each

rather unpersuasively.

The

draft did address the waiver issue on page 4 as a part of
the statement of the case and position of parties.
desir~ble,

Is it

David, simply to assert, in a brief sentence for

each, these two grounds on which petitioner relies, and move
the argument of these issues - including footnotes - to
Subpart D?

And do we make the point explicitly anywhere

that the requirement of our cases is "consent", and this
cannot be implied.
action.

It can be accomplished only by explicit

There is a great deal of excellent language on

this, particularly for the immunity of the United States.
The greater part of Subpart D is devoted to
parte Young.

Did petitioner rely on it?

~

As I dictate this

memorandum, I see that your reliance on the Eleventh

"-------..
.,,
<

'

,,

.)!.

-,{•

•

3.

Amendment is the principal answer to the equitable relief
claim, although I do think this is not made as clearly as it
can be.
In sum, Subpart 0 as now written seems a weak
ending.

It is appropriate to conclude an opinion by

advancinq - and knocking down - arguments of the losing
party.

But the principal "knocking" on the waiver or

consent issue is on p. 4.
A-fter you have read this memo, we can talk about
this.

L.F.P., Jr.
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CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 9, 1982
Re:

No. 80-1874

Patsy v. Board of Regents of the
State of Florida

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

.-.., ~ ,_.
' \' v.,.

l /;,.'

Justice Marshall
cc:

The Conference

'

I

Qfonrl of t4t ~~ ,jtattg
Jfagfri:nghtn. J. <q. 2llP.,.~

,ju:.pt"tutt

CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 10, 1982

Re:

No. 80-1874 - Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Florida

Dear Lewis:
Please show me as joining Part II of your dissenting
opinion. You may add at the end something like :
"I am authorized to state that Chief
Justice Burger joins in Part II of
this dissenting opinion."
Regards ,

Justice Powell

-

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

RE:

June 17 , 198 2

80-1874 - Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State
of Florida ( ~~~

~)
Dear Lew is:
I join Part II of your dissent . Through inadvertence my
June 10 memo to you did not go to the Con fe renee .
Regards,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF'

/

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

May 21, 1982

Re:

80-1874 - Patsy v. Board of Regents
of Florida

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

;~
Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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May 26, 1982

Mr. Fred Friedman

Special Assistant· to the Associate
Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, DC 2053.0
Dear Mr.

I,.

Fri~dman,

I am ~terested in ascertaining the status of the program established by 42 u.s.c. 1997 (e). As we have dis.c ussed, this section
provides for review and possible certification by the Attorney General
of procedures established by state correctional facilities to review
prisoner grievances.

Specifically, I would like to know which states have submitted
procedures for review by the Attorney General. Has the Attorney
General certified the procedures of any of those state cor rectional
facilites as submitted? Has the Attorney General submitted a report
to congres-s describing the status of his activities per 42 u. s.c. 1997 (f) 1
If so, Inay · I obtain a copy of this report?
Thank you so much for your patience during our numerous telephone
conversations. I would deeply appreciate your prompt r e sponse to
this request~

Yours s i ncerely ,
Sara Sonet
Research Librarian
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REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO CONGRESS REGARDING
ACTIVITIES INITIATED PURSUANT TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS
OF INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT, 42

(

(;

(As

required

by

42

u.s.c.

u.s.c.

§1997(f))

§1997

I·

Introduction

The Civil Right• of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 u.s.c.
§1997 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), was enacted in May,
1980. It authorizes· the Attorney General to initiate or to
intervene in equitable actions against public institutions in
Which he has reasonable cause to believe there is a systematic
pattern or practice of flagrant or egregioua violations of the
affected persona' constitutional or federal statutory rights.
This report will provide Members of COngress with the criteria
by Which actions are initiated pursuant to the Act, the details
surrounding actions initiated under the Act in fiscal year 1981,
and information concerning the progress made in federal institutions toward meeting promulgated standards for such institutions or constitutionally guaranteed minima. It is submitted
in accord with the reporting requirements of 42 u.s.c. §1997(f).

II.

Criteria fOr Review of Complaints and for the Initiation
of Investigations
(a)

( ·

Nature of the Allegations

Determine the severity and scope of the allegations,
including the exigency of the circumstances presented, ~·
are life threatening emergencies or abuses implicated: how
large a clasa of persons are involved. Make a judgment concerning Whether a claim authorized by Public Law 96-247 is
presented.
(b)

EValuate the Allegations in Light of Decisional
Law

Revi~appropriate decisional law to determine whether
courts -have addressed the issues presented by the complaint. Deter.mine Whether the Special Litigation Section has
pursued simLLar claims in the past: Whether the issue is novel
or canplezr and- whether, although the issues may be well settled
in the decisional law, enforcement actions are common.
th~

(c)

Potential Alternative Resolutions

Ascertain. ~f possible, Whether the complainant has private
resources, orretained private or public interest counsel.
Determine Whether-, the assistance available to the complainant
is adequate ta address the issues raised by the complaint.
Assess Whetherthere are, reasonably available, administrative
or other meana. that are likely to offer speedy relief.
f

1 -r

lu

I
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(d)

Geographic Location

Dete~ine Whether the Special Litigation Section has other
cases or matters pending in the jurisdiction from Which the
complaint baa coae and assess the likely impact that a new
investigation may have on those matters or cases.

(e)

I

I

Relationship of the Complaint to Section Priorities

From time to time, the Special Litigation Section staff
will review, in consultation with the Assistant Attorney
General's office, ita litigation priorities. In each instance,
a decision muat be made as to whether a particular complaint
falls within thea~ priorities. To the extent that it does
not, it must th~ · be dete~ined whether there are specific,
unusual factora that nevertheless justify further action.
(f)

Resource Allocation

Make a preliminary judgment about the time, effort and
resources the- complaint, if investigated, will likely consume.
For exampl.•• bow many lawyers and support staff will be required
to condu~the investigation and for What period? How much
travel ia required? What need will there be for use of consultants? Bow active are other pending cases and matters in
the office?
2.

Review"o£ Particular Complaint

(a) Upon receipt of a complaint, the above-criteria
shall be appli~to it, and an initial determination shall be
made with respect to its merits.
(b) ID. the event that the complaint, on ita face,
appears meritorious t~ere shall be additional efforts made
to obtain preliminary verification of the allegation from
public sourcaa. existing files or other persona known to
the DiviaiaD or identified in the complaint.
(c) If the complaint is without merit or otherwise
fails to satisfy tha Division's criteria, the complainant
shall be 110 notified an<! the matter closed.

\
.•

•
3.
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Investigation Memorandum

(a) If, on the ba•i• of the review and application of
criteria, there ia a need for a statutory investigation, a
memorandum shall be prepared. It must, at a minimum, review
the complaint, applying the criteria specified above, describe
the independent verification and corroboration obtained, and
suggest method• and time·f:rames for conducting an investigation.
(b) The memorm~duDt shall be written to the Section
Chief, after review by the appropriate Deputy. It shall be
accompanied by proposed notice letters and, where appropriate, by FBI investigation requests.
4.

Section Chief

Revi~

(a) Upon receipt of the investigation memorandum, the
Section Chief shall review promptly the recommendation.
(b) If the Chief agrees with the recommendation, he or
she shall fo~it to the Assistant Attorney General in
accordance with the provisions set forth below. The Chief
may request addi%ional information, require other modification
of the propoaa1~ or· disapprove the recommendation.

s.

Assistant Attorney General Review

(a)
In the event that the Section Chief recommends
commencement o£ an investigation, he or she shall forward
this recommendation, together with the investigation memorandum and the· proposa~notice letters, to the Assistant
Attorney · Ge~era1 for Civil Rights.
(b) The- .Aaai.atant. Attorney General shall review
the recommendation and may approve the recommendation by
signing the proposed notice letters, may disapprove by explanatory memorandum stating briefly the reasons therefor, or may
require such modification or additional information as is
deemed necessary.

- 4 6.

I

Commencing an Investigation

When approved, the investigation is begun officially by
forwarding a notice letter, return-receipt requested, to the
appropriate state or local officials. No investigation shall
begin for seven days from the date of receipt of such notice
by the officials. The:not~ce ~ederal officials required
by the Act shall also be aeat at this time.
7.

Conduct of the Investigation

(a) The attorney aaaigned to conduct the investigation
shall endeavor to enlist the cooperation of state or local
authorities. The attorney shall make reasonable and timely
requests for access to the institution(s), for documents and
for such other information aa may be necessary, and shall
conduct the investigation genera~ in a professional and
courteous manner.

{-

(b) The investigationmay, as necessary, include site
visits by the attorney, by FBI'. agent&. or by professional
consultants retained for thia purpose. It may also include a
review of pertinent documents, interviews with residents of
the facility or other members· of the public with relevant
information, and such othe~ •taDdard investigatory techniques
as may be appropriate.
(c) Attorneys shalLmake reasonable efforts, in accordance with their case load· and. 'WOrk assignments, to assure
that the investigation is conducted and completed promptly.
8.

Completion of the Investigation

Upon the canpletion o~' the investigation, the attorney
shall review all the informaticnrobtained and apply to it the
criteria set forth in Standard 1, above.
(a) If the evidence ia- inauf~icient to justify recommending further action, th• attorney shall so advise the
Section Chief and shal1 pre~~aa appropriate letter, for
the Assistant Attorney GeneraL~• aignature, which notifies
the state or local authoritieEthat the matter has been
closed.
(b) If there is evidenet of ~lagrant or egregious
conditions that appear to result in leq~l violations, the
attorney shall so advise the section Chief and shall prepare

I

- 5 -

a letter, for the Assistant Attorney General's siqnature,
Which notifies the state or local authorities of the alleged
conditiona, the supporting facta and the minimum remedial
measures necessary. In matters involving jails or prisons,
the views of the Federal Bureau of Prisons shall be sought
and considered.
(c) The notice lettera referred to in (a) and (b)
above shall be reviewed by the Section Chief, who may modify
them or request additional information and then forward them .
to the Assistant Attorney General for signature.
(d) The Assistant Attorney General shall sign, modify,
request additional information or take such other action as
is appropriate.
9.

(

Discussions with State or Local Oficials

(a)
In the event that a letter is sent notifying state
or local officials that violations may exist, the attorney
shall then enter into good-faith discussions concerning the
institution's response to the allegations and shall consider
whatever remedial measures are proposed. If state officials
so desire, the attorney shall endeavor to assist the institution in obtaining information about potential federal funds
that may be available to help correct the alleged problems.
(b) Where such negotiations result in a mutually
satisfactory resolution of the alleged problems, the attorney
will propose a consent decree or other enforceable order to
the state or local official& for their signature.
(c) · Where such negotiations fail to achieve a satisfactory resolution, the attorney will proceed with the requirements set forth below concerning the filing of a civil action.
10.

Initiation of Civil Action

(a) Where negotiation• fail to produce a mutually
satisfactory result, the attorney may submit the standard
memorandum in justification for initiating a lawsuit, accompanied by a proposed complaint and certificate for tne Attorney
General's signature.
(b) The justification memorandum shall. in addition to
the standard required itema. review compliance with this procedure, discuss the negotiations with state officials and stress

I, .

•
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flagrant and egregioua conditione believed to have gone
uncorrected. In matters involving prisons or jails the
view• expressed by the Federal Bureau of Priaons ahall
be , set forth in the justification memorandum.
(c) The memorandum muat be reviewed. and approved by
the Section Chief, Who shall forward approved recommendations
to the Assistant -Attorney General. Xf the Assistant Attorney
General approves filing the case, it ahaLL be forwarded to
the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney Gamtral, as appropriate,
for review and approval.
(d) The complaint must bea (1) signed personally by
the Attorney General: (2r-iecompanied by the statutorily
required certificate signed peraonally by the Attorney General:
(3) filed no sooner than 49 days after receipt by state officials
of the Completion of Investigation Letter required by Section 8,
above.
11.

COnduct and Resolution of Suits

Suits filed pursuant to t.he- Act and .. t.'heae operational
procedures shall proceed in accordanc:e. with .the same standards
applicable to other suits initiated by the Civil Rights Division.
In matters involving jails or prison•• positions shall be
developed in consultation with the· Federa~ Bureau of Prisons.
12.

Intervention Under the Act

(a) In situations Where th~Division· is requested or
desires to intervene in an ongoing suit involving the conditions in a pUblic institution, the- sam• review, investigation
and memoranda required in other case& where the Division
intervenes are applicable. In addition~ , tblh..following conditions must be meta
(1) In evaluating a · caae-for intervention, the
criteria set forth in Section 1 above •hall be applied:
( 2) In matters involving jails·· or prisons, the
views of the Federal Bureau of Prison• shall be sought
and considered.
( 3) The complaint in interventiOJZ- must be signed
personally by the Attorney General and. muat be accompanied by the statutorily required certificate, also
signed personally by the Attorney Gen~.

•
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(4) At least 15 days prior to filing the complaint
in intervention, a letter must be sent to the appropriate
state or local officials, advising them of the proposed
intervention, the legal violations believed to exist,
the facts supporting these allegations and minimum
measures believed necessary to correct the violations.
This letter may be signed by the Assistant Attorney
General or such other official as the Attorney General
may designate. The notice to federal officia·l s required
by the Act shall be sent at this time.
(b) Once approved and filed, suits in intervention
shall be conducted and resolved in accordance with the same
standards applicable to other suita intervened in by the
Civil Rights Division.
Since the enforcement of this Act has not ye~reached
the point Where federal financial and technical assistance
to the state or other entities has been discussed, */ we are
unable to provide descriptions of such assistance
required
by Section 8(4).

a.

(
~/ In the proposed consent decree with Defendant&-in Santana

v. Collazo (D. P.R.) prior to our intervent·ion·· und~tr 42 u.s.c.
1997, the federal government offered to provide expert consultation on the appropriate mechanisms which should be used to
facilitate gradual closing of the isolation unit of the subject
juvenile facilities: since the consent decre•wa• never entered,
these services were not utilized. The federal government also
offered to provide technical assistance to· ev~~t. · the individualized needs of each juvenile for placemenroutside of defendant
facilities: Puerto Rican officials declined.~this offer: in 1979.

/

•
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Actions Initiated in Fiscal Year 1981

Section 8 of the statute requires specified information concerning all actions instituted pursuant to the Act. That information follows.

TO date, no case has been initiated under the Act.
the following actions occurred during the fiscal yearz
•'
I

1.

However,

On October 15, 1980, we notified Mr. Steven R.

Reid, Olairman of the Dauphin County Board of
Prisons, and other appropriate officials of our
intent to investigate allegations of unconstitutional practices and conditions in the Dauphin
County Prison, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Thi•
investigation was initiated after receipt of
allegations of brutality by correctional officer••
inadequate medical and psychiatric services,
inadequate access to courts and legal materials.
and egregious conditions of confinement. Afterevaluating the data collected during the inves~-
gation, we concluded that no further action was:;,
warranted. The Department advised Mr. Reid on
August 4, 1981 that the investigation was beingclosed.

,,;

2.

November 5, 1980, we formally advised Governor~
David Treen of our intent to investigate conditions
and treatment at East Louisiana State Hospital andFeliciana Forensic Facility in Jackson, Louisiana~
The investigation was based in part on a series of
. newspaper articles describing seriously substaDdar4- living conditions at the two facilities, including
several recent deaths among patients, lack of care.
inadequate staffing, brutality and filthy condLtiom..
The investigation has thus far included toura ~the facilities by Department attorney• and an
consultant, meetings with state officiala
On

\
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to discuss recent atepa taken to improve
aervicea and physical conditions, and review
of institutional recorda. The Department is
continuing to evaluate the facta gathered in
thia investigation.
3.

4.

s.

On NOvember 7, 1980, we notified Governor Harry
Hughes and other state officials of our intent
to investigate conditions and treatment providea
to the mentally retarded residents of Rosewood
center, OWings Mills, Maryland. The Departmewt
received a written complaint in May, 1980 alleqinq·
that residents of Rosewood were confined in an
environment that failed to provide necessary habil.i tative services: that residents were needleaaly
institutionalized: that residents were subjected to
physical abuse: and that Rosewood was short or
crucial staff. The investigation has included- .
meetings with state officials and client advocacy
groups, tours of the institution on several occasions,,.
once with an expert consultant, and review of numerou• institutional ~nd state documents. We are presently
evaluating the collected information.
On November 14, 1980, we notified Governor Huqh ~ carey:.
and appropriate corrections officials of our intent to investigate Attica Prison, Attica, New York •.
Previously, a number of inmate complaints alleging...
inadequate conditions of confinement, includin~tha
special housing unit were forwarded to the Departmen~
by the HOnorable John T. Curtin, u.s. District
JUdge for the Western District of New York. W.
reviewed the complaints and found them to be- a .:·
_ sufficient basis on Which to initiate an investiq•tion under the Act. We are continuing to evalua.t•
the data already collected by the Federal Bur~ of:Investigation on this matter.
On December 3, 1980, we notified Governor Lee-

Sherman Dreyfua and state correctional officia1e
of our intent ta investigate the Wisconsin priso~
system. The Department had previously recei.vecl. a
number of inmate complaints alleging unconstitutional conditions within the state prison facilitie•our investigation has thus far focused partic~arly

l
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on the area• of environmental health an~ saf.ety,
and medical care delivery. An expert consultant
bas visite~ the facilities and ia preparinq a
report based upon hia observations of the prison,
and review of institutional documents.
6.

7.

On December 12, 19q~, we notified Governor Richard
Thornburgh and other state correctional officials
of our intent to investigate Western State Correctional Institution, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. On
the basis of prior inma~e correspondence F the F~eral: .
Bureau of Investigation obtained requested information concerning the con~itiona of confinement. on
August 5, 19131, we advised Governor Thornburqlt that ..
our investigation indicated deficiencies primarily
in the areas of medical and mental health care. W•
recommended a number of correcti,,e measures inclu~in~
assessment of professional staffing needs, plans for
training medical personnel, and provision o~ appro-priate services and housing to mentally ill inmate.·We have subsequently received a number of plans
designed by state correctional officials to correct
the identified deficiencies. We are reviewing th~
plans.

8.

On December 15, 1980, we notified Governor

( ·

!
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On December 3, 19AO, we notified Mayor Kevin H.
White and other Boston city officials of our
intent to investigate conditions of .confinement at
Deer Island House of Corrections, Boston, Massachuaettt.
This action was baaed upon receipt of citizen correspondence and newspaper articles which alleged
unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the
facility, including inadequate physical facilities,.
medical care and overcrowdinq. We are continuing
to evaluate information on this facility qathered
by the FBI at our request.

~ichard L~
state juvenile officials of our int~ 
the Youth Development Center, Co~

Thornburgh and
to investigate
Heights, Pennsylvania. Our investigation was based
upon information contained in reports on the faci1~ty
by public interest groups which documented deficiencie.
in eervices and conditions of confinement. These
deficiencies included inadequate educational and
rehabilitative services as well as substandar~ livin9
facilities. The investiqation has inclu~ed tours
of the facility, including one by an expert consultant.
and a review of documents from the institution. We
are continuing to evaluate the i nformation r e c eived.

I

i

•
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On February 24* 1981* we notified Governor John D.
Rockefeller IV and other state officials of our
intent to investigate the West Virginia Industrial
School for Boys in Pruntytown, West Virginia. We
had previously received a report prepared by a
citizens group Which indicated significant deficiencies in services provided to juveniles confined
in the facility. We had also received information
that residents had been abused by staff at Pruntytown. OUr investigation has focused on the physical
conditions, educational and programmatic services,
and the degree to which the institution protects
the juveniles from harm. We have toured the facility*
and are reviewing documents provided by the state.

10.

On March 23, 1981, we notified Governor Frank White
and state health officials of our intent to investigate Benton Services Center Nursing Home in Benton,
Arkansas. The action was initiated on the basis
of a written complaint which alleged that the physical
environment at the facility was inadequate~ that
large groups of residents, especially mentally
retarded and mentally ill residents , received no
program services at all7 that there were staff deficiencies: and that patient abuse had occurred. Thus
far, we have toured the facility with an expert
consultant and are reviewing other factual data
concerning the facility. We are awaiting receipt
of the consultant's report on his findings.

11.

On March 23, 1981, we notified Governor Robert
· Graham and state health officials of our intent
to investigate South Florida State Hospital, Hollywood,
Florida. Our investigation was initiated on the
basis of a citizen complaint and newspaper articles
Which suggested serious deprivations of constitutional rights due to alleged staffing shortages,
lack of treatment programs, inadequate physical
environment and instances of physical abuse of
residents. OUr investigation has thus far included
a tour of the institution, and a review of institutional records and plans for improvement. On
August 5* 1981, we ad~ised Governor Graham of our
finding that Florida officials have prepared extensive
remedial plans to address deficienc ies in the
operation of South Florida State Hospital. Initial
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legislative proposals based upon these plana were
to be finalized in Fall, 1981 for submission tp
the State Legislature. Baaed upon the thoughtful
formulation of these plana and their submission
to the legislature for action, we propose to delay
further investigation pending the result of
legislative action.
12. on July 13, 1981, we notified Governor James R.
Thompson and other state officials of our intent
to investigate Dixon Development Center, Dixon,
Illinois. we had previously received information
Which alleged that conditions at the facility
were substandard: that staffing was deficientr
that some residents of the facility had been abased:
that habilitation services were inadequate: and
that some residents were receiving inappropriate
medications. Division attorneys have toured the
facility and consulted with groupe of interested
citizens. The investigation is continuing.

I

I
II
I c-

Through rather unique circumstances, the Department intervened
in Santana v. Collazo, Civil Action No. 75-1187 (D. P.R.) under the
Act on January 27, 1981. The United States previously participated
as plaintiff-intervenor in this case from December 6, 1976 to
september 11, 1980 when it waa dismissed by the court. In its
order of dismissal, however, the Court granted the Attorney General
the oppOrtunity to subsequently move to intervene pursuant to
Section 5(c) of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act.
The pre-filing requirements of the Act were deemed to have been
met by the facts obtained through discovery and trial evidence,
and exchanged during lengthy negotiations Which had earlier
resulted in three proposed consent decrees. Trial concluded in
July, 1981. Post-trial briefs were aubmi tted in october, 1981.
IV.

~
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Federal Institutions

Section 8(5) of the Act requires the Attorney General to
report on the progress made in each Federal institution toward
meeting existing promulgated standarda fo: auch institutions
or constitutionally guaranteed minima.
The federal prison system is operated by the Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) Which has taken a number of steps to meet such
standards and protect constitutional rights. TO date, twelve
federal prisons have been accredited by the Commissioner on
Accreditation for corrections (CAC)J three other BOP facilities
are candidates for accreditation and are awaiting final audit
or full hearing before the Commission. The goal of the federal
prison system, as set forth in ita current Five Year Plan
(1981-1985) ia that all federal correctional facilities will bea

•
accredited by the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections,
13 -

1)
and 2) meet the Federal Standards for Prisons and Jails,
issued by the Department of Justice. The Bureau is on schedule
in meeting this goal. Since 1978, the Bureau has initiated
the year long accreditation process in 5 to 12 of ita facilities
each year. Additionally, for those institutions which have
already been accredited, a year long re-accreditation process
must be undertaken every third year.
In 1981, the federal prison system began an internal
audit, the Standards Compliance Review project, to insure
that ita program managers incorporate the CAC correctional
standards into their institution's basic policy directives
and procedural guidelines. Where the Review indicated that
such inclusion was not occurring, plana of actions were
developed to revise policy. The information gathered by
this internal audit permits the Bureau to identi£y areas
Where standards are not currently being met. In this way,
deficiencies in policies, procedures or resources may be
corrected in order to obtain accreditation for the facility.

(·

The Bureau baa launched a serious, well planned effort
to bring its prisons into compliance with professional
correctional standards. Based upon its efforts aince 1978,
the Bureau has made considerable ,progess toward meeting
atandarda and guaranteeing minimal constitutional protections.
siMilar progress has been made at St. Elizabeth's Hospital,
washington, o.c., which is operated by the Department of Health
and Human Services. The hospital, which serves approximately
3,000 persons w;~h psychiatric disorders, is accredited by
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) which
requires compliance with specific standards set forth in the
JCAH Consolidated Standards for Psychiatric Hospitals and Standards
for Community Mental Health Care. St. Elizabeth's Hospital has
taken additional steps to provide for the constitutional rights
of its patient population by establishing an internal Patient
Advocate's Office. This office is charged with th~ responsibility
of operating a complaint system to assist in problea resolution
and monitoring a variety of hospital reports to assure appropriate
action on alleged violation of patient rights, ae well aa
responsibility to educate hospital staff about the rights of patients.
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conclusion

The enforcement activities of the Civil Righta Oiviaion
under the Civil Right• of Inatitutionalized Peraona Act are
proceeding deliberately in accord with the requirements impoaed
by Congreaa in the Act. Conciliation with atate and local
officials ia being atresaed, in an effort to achieve reform
where necessary without resort to litigation. This conciliatory
approach, which accords with the intent of Congress in drafting
the Act, has already begun to bear fruit. The Division will
continue in the days ahead to aeek out and resolve all violations
of the civil rights of institutionalized persons under the Act.

. (
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lfp/ss 05/26/82
MEMORANDUM

TO:

David

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

May 26, 1982

80-1874 Patsy v. Board of Regents
t have read your draft of 5/25 (immunity issue

only), and am i.mpressed and convinced.

I do have a couple

of general observations, and then a few questions.
1.
your argument.

Tt is not easy to follow the organization of
My

i~pression

certain amount of repetition.

also is that there is a
The footnotes reflect

enormous research and capacity to orqanize and use thP
product of

rese~rch.

But, as you reread this, eliminate all

or parts of notes that are truly marginal.
2.

I suggest that we restructure your draft

generally along the lines we would write an opinion for the
Court, as you did when you revised Hydrolevel.

This would

mean, generally, that after identifying the parties, you
would summarize Patsy's claim; state respondent's answer to
itJ and state the holding of CAS noting that it did not
address the Eleventh Amendment issue even though it had been
argued.

This would constitute Part I.

Perhaps Part II

could be a summary of the general principles applicable to
the Eleventh Amendment cases, and then use some of your
wonderfully strong and persuasive language to the effect
that these principlP-s control thta case.

Perhaps in a Part

IV you could then address - and demolish - TM's treatment of

.

1
;

'

. '

the immunity issue.

2.

Of course the foregoing is merely a

suggested rough outline.

You are better than I am at

organizing an opinion.
It is not clear to me what TM did rely on in

3.

rejecting the Elevent.h Amendment argument.

Various points

appear in your draft, but they seem to be addressed in a
random fashion.
TM

My

gueAs i.s that this results from the Tilay

gave the immunity issue the back of his hand.

4.

I identify questions that occurred to me in

reading your draft:
(a)

What is the basis for the alleqed waiver,

and what is the Florida Attorney General's anS\>let?

My

recollection is that he denied ernohattcallv that the state
had waived anythinq.
address it?

If TM didn't rely on waiver, should we

Perhaps note his non-reliance and quote the

Attorney General.
(b)

In view of the overwhelminq authorities -

including statutes - that you cite for the view that the
Board of Regents is an agency of the state, is this
conceded?

If TM largely ignored it (as I recall}, perhaps

we should say that although not relied upon, Florida law and
overwhelming authority, made clear that the Board is a state
agency.
(c)

tn this connection, does the Court cite any

of the cases you assemble on page 7?
point this out.

If not, we should

You distinguish convincingly the one case

TM relies on.

·.

3.

(d)

Is there a need for clarification as to the

Court's position with respect to funds of the Board of
Regents thAt do not come from the state treasury?

• • * * *
Although this memorandum may sound negative, I am
in fact very positive about the persuasiveness of the rlraft,
and the compellinq force of the authori.ties you cite and the
reasons you qive.

r... F.P., Jr.
ss
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DAVID GINA-POWMay 27, 1982
To:

David

From:

LFP, Jr.

Subject:

80-1874 - Patsy

The revised draft of 5/27 looks great.
I have suggested a rider for pp. 10-11, that puts into
somewhat sharper focus what petitioner is really claiming.
My only other suggestion relates to the discussion of
Hopkins that commences at the bottom of page 15 and runs
through 17, with elaborate notes.

My impression is that we

give Hopkins a "place of pride" greater than it deserves.

I

would not change what you have written in the text, with the
possible exception noted in the margin on page 17.

My

concern is that the elaborate footnotes may be read as
"protesting too much".

I would not say, for example, that

it is "no easy matter to state the holding in Hopkins" (n.
15}.

This substracts something from our textual statement

that the case simply is not in point.
Could we not say in a note that Hopkins has been viewed
primarily as standing for a principle of agency law, and
cite Hamilton Manufacturing Co. and perhaps Larson '! I would
be inclined to omit from note 16 the quote from
Frankfurter's dissent.

Indeed, in light of changes I

suggest in the text I would omit footnote 16 altogether.

2.

When you work these minor changes out, lets move it to
~
a Chamber's draft so we can get it in print. We can deliver
Part II to the print shop when it also is ready.
LFP, Jr.

DAVID GINA-POWMay 27, 1982
To:

David

From:

LFP, Jr.

Subject:

80-1874 - Patsy

The revised draft of 5/27 looks great.
I have suggested a rider for pp. 10-11, that puts into
somewhat sharper focus what

petltione~

is really claiminq.

My only other suggestion relates to the discussion of

Hopkins that commences at the bottom of page 15 and runs
through 17, with elaborate notes.

My impression is that we

give HoPkins a "place of pride" greater than it deserves.
~~ould

I

not chanqe what you have written in the text, with the

possible exception noted in the margin on page 17.

My

concern is that the elaborate footnotes may be read as
"protesting too much".

I would not say, for example, that

it is "no easy matter to state the holding in Hopkins" (n.
15).

This substracts something from our textual statement

that the case simply is not in point.
Could we not say in a note that Hopkins has been viewed
primarily as standing for a principle of aqency

la~,

cite Hamilton Manufacturing Co. and Perhaps Larson.

and
I would

be inclined to omit from note 16 the quote from
Frankfurter's dissent.

Indeed, in light of changes I

suggest in the text I would omit footnote 16 altogether.
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2.

When you work these minor changes out, lets move it to
a Chamber's draft so we can get it in print.

We can deliver

Part II to the print shop when it also is reaov.
LFP, Jr.

June 1, 1982

80-1~74 Patsy v. Board of Regents

Dear l'f'lhurqood:
As vou have maoe substantial chanqPs in vour
opinion for the Court, my dissent also will have to be
revised.
!t rnav ~e two or three davs before ! can
recirculate.
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
lfp/ss

cc:

The Conference

